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Abstract 
Whether interested or not, economy has always influenced 
everybody’s life and daily choices. Our way of living and our 
important life decisions, for most of us, are framed not only by 
each own preference, but also and foremost by economic laws 
and budget constraints. Therefore, starting from real life, my 
interest for empirical economics has grown in different and 
complementary topics, ranging from consumer choices and 
asymmetric information in a developed world to analyzing 
developing countries and international trade in terms of value 
chains. My aim is that of connecting economic theories with 
empirical evidences. In fact, chapter two is a direct connection 
between people’s health attitude and principal-agent theory 
which analysis follows a recent experiment that I realized in the 
USA. My goal is also that of showing the economic mechanism 
in both developed and developing countries therefore chapter 
three is placed in Pakistan and analyses parental level of 
education on female student religiosity. As a conclusion, the last 
chapter interests a deep economic analysis of international trade 
among different countries and cultures, where developed and 
developing countries collaborate along the value chain by taking 
advantage from each other in order to be able to follow the path 
of a common development process.
 1 
 
Chapter 1  
Introduction  
 
This thesis is a result of my curiosity on economic topics and 
interconnection between economic theory and actual data. I 
focused on empirical economics ranging from asymmetric 
information to international trade and developing world.  
The second chapter comes from an idea that I had watching a 
documentary about sugar consumption in the developed world. 
It immediately attract my attention to the point of engaging 
myself in a deeper research at 360 degrees. In fact, I spent 
months in reading not only economic articles but also medical 
and clinical ones. At the end of the personal documentation, I 
decided to put into effect my knowledge by launching a 
randomized survey experiment in the USA1 through Amazon 
Mechanical Turk. The link between economic theory of the 
principal agent model can be more visual by translating it into a 
current consumer behavior. 
My interest in economic behavior through survey data is 
presented in the third chapter as well. Differently from the 
previous analysis, this time the framework is a developing 
country, Pakistan, and the data studied come from a survey done 
in 2011 about similarities and differences of level of religiosity 
among two groups of female girls: madrasas and college 
                                                          
1 The experiment was supported by personal funding. 
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students. This work is a result of a co-authored work with 
professor Masooda Bano during my visiting period abroad at 
Oxford University, England. 
After analyzing two different countries with diverse cultures 
and contrasting economic development, I focus on a deeper 
study of a group of countries trading among each other along the 
value chain and exploiting comparative advantages. This is a 
joint work with the associate professor Armando Rungi and PhD 
Candidate Davide Donofrio. This cooperation was born because 
of common and complementary interests. In fact, I was more 
attracted by the developing world while Davide Donofrio in 
international trade. Professor Rungi was our supervisor for this 
paper and contributed for the initial idea by merging our own 
interests. He guided us to create a complete framework from 
both economic theory and empirical analysis. I focused, 
primarily, on empirical application and econometric analysis 
with Stata while Davide concentrated on the literature, dataset 
analysis and Stata codes for the empirical application for the 
system of simultaneous equations. 
The three chapters following the introduction are a 
presentation of the three papers, which content is shown in more 
details in the next paragraph. 
 
Chapter 2 
There is a large literature dedicated to principal-agent theory 
and asymmetric information and their relevance in our daily 
environment. In particular, there is large evidence about the 
contradiction between the free and easy access to information 
and bad health habits regarding eating behaviour, in specific, an 
extremely high consumption in added sugar in daily food and 
 3 
 
drink products. In this study, I show the existence of a principal-
agent problem, as described by Ross model, between US 
taxpayers and US government. To fulfil this goal, I designed and 
experiment and launched a randomized online survey in the 
USA through Amazon Mechanical Turk and Limesurvey to 
create the survey and collect data. I, then, analyze the effect 
given by free and clear information to the treated group. 
The results show significant treatment effects which support 
the existence of principal-agent problem on topic such as added 
sugar, food products and perceived healthy food thanks to the 
added information for the treated group. Treatment effect 
appears again in the case of actual personal effort from 
respondents. This result shows how information can drive not 
only a slight change in people’s thoughts but also in people’s 
behavior. Finally, no treatment effects is shown when the 
respondents of both groups, treated and control, have to judge 
possible governmental actions. These kind of results seem to 
suggest that people have a stronger responsibility and awareness 
of power given by their own actions, instead of leaving it 
completely to a third party such as the government in this case.  
 
Chapter 3 
This study presents an empirical analysis of the impact of school 
type on students’ levels of religiosity. Our work is related to that 
part of literature focused on the analyses of education and level 
of religiosity as well as parental influence on their offspring. We 
use a new dataset on female students of registered madrasas 
(Islamic schools) and secular schools from urban parts of 
Pakistan. On most counts of religious behaviour, the students 
from the two groups record broadly similar results. However, 
 4 
 
our probit analysis shows that when we control for students’ 
socio-economic profile and attitudes, on few counts of religiosity 
madrasa effect does emerge but it disappears as soon as we 
control for parental level of education. Our findings support the 
hypothesis that parental education, especially mother’s 
education, is key to modernising religious and cultural norms in 
conservative societies. 
 
Chapter 4 
Over the last decades global trade has benefited from the 
increasing cross-country production sharing. Firms are engaged 
in transactions across national borders and the phenomenon has 
involved both manufacturing and services industries. Although 
it is recognized that traditional trade statistics need to be revised 
in order to take account of value-added, there is still little 
assessment of this phenomenon on a global scale and the 
question of how production choices interact with value-added 
specialization path have been relatively neglected. 
In this contribution, we provide some empirical evidence of 
the impact of economic and financial institutions as sources of 
comparative advantage, along with the traditional Heckscher-
Ohlin relative factor endowment determinants. We do this by 
estimating a global production function with a novel panel 
dataset at country-sector-level, WIOD, over a time span of 15 
years. 
We suggest that there the level of international sourcing of 
intermediate inputs as well as educational attainments of labor 
force are key determinants of performance and should be key 
factors to consider for policy implications. Moreover, our results 
point out that, consistently with previous literature, institutional 
 5 
 
quality does have a positive effect on the value-added based 
specialization pattern of a country-sector.2 
                                                          
2 Acknowledgements: This contribution is funded by Crisis Lab. Project. We 
thank Zhi Wang and Shangjin Wei, Bastiaan Quast, Stefan Sperlich, Marcelo 
Olarreaga, and Frédéric Robert-Nicoud. We thank also participants at mini-
conference organized by the Academy of International Business at Bocconi 
University of Milan for helpful discussion and comments on preliminary draft. 
Data and stata codes are available on demand. 
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Chapter 2  
Does information affect 
consumer’s choice? 
Evidence from a 
randomized online 
experiment in the USA  
 
2.1 Introduction  
Internet made very easy the access to any kind of information 
(including wrong or misleading information), mostly at no cost 
and in real time; however, the lack of information and/or the 
misinformation about very important topics for our daily life are 
wide-spread. A real-life example concerns people’s health: our 
sugar consumption habits.  
High sugar consumption induces some severe diseases 
associated with metabolic syndrome such as: hypertension, high 
triglycerides and insulin resistance through synthesis of fat in 
the liver, diabetes, ageing process (Johson et al., 2009). Over the 
 7 
 
past 50 years, sugar consumption has tripled worldwide3 and 
only 20% of items in a regular supermarket do not contain sugar.  
In particular, most of nutritionists and medical doctors point 
out the very significant negative effects of eating too much 
added sugars on people’s health.  
In short, added sugars are sugars and syrups added to the 
food during its preparation or processing, or added at the table. 
The American Heart Association (AHA) recommends no more 
than 9 teaspoons (tsp) of added sugar a day for men (38 grams) 
and 6 tsp for women (25 grams). The average US consumer eats 
approximately 19.5 tsp (or 82 grams) of added sugar a day, more 
than twice the recommended maximum amount.  
A striking discovery is the level of misinformation on the 
quantity of added sugar incorporated in food and drinks often 
perceived by consumers as healthy. A recent empirical evidence 
about the level of misinformation on this topic is provided by a 
survey conducted in October 2016 by Healthline, a recognized 
health information website, in the US4. The results show that the 
majority of the respondents (62%) is aware of the health’s 
consequences of their sugar consumption habits and they declare 
they do feel concerned about it. However, 70% of the 
                                                          
3 Global consumption of sugar increased an average of 1.93% over the past 
decade, likely due to increasing income, population growth and shifts of 
dietary patterns. The top ten largest consumers are: India, EU-28, China, Brazil, 
US, Indonesia, Russian Federation, Pakistan, Mexico, Egypt. Interestingly, US 
produces around 7.70 mln tonn of sugar but, on the other side, they consume 
10.83 mln tonn, therefore they are in deficit and in need of importing sugar 
from abroad. 
4 For further information on Healthline you can check directly their website on the 
following link: 
http://www.healthline.com/health/about-us?ref=footer 
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respondents believe that what they perceive as healthy food 
contains a lower quantity of added sugar than it actually 
contains. Similar results are reached in a different survey 
conducted in the UK at the University of Glasgow which 
confirms that people use to heavily underestimate the content of 
added sugar in their food5.  
The complete discordance between US consumers’ choices in 
terms of food and drinks habits and the suggested sugar intake 
from the AHA, were the starting point for the process of better 
understanding the interaction between consumers, the sugar 
market and other key players like FDA6 (Food and Drug 
Administration).  
                                                          
5 This misunderstanding can also be related to the confusion given by the food 
labelling. In fact, the term sugar is used for table sugar or sucrose and not for 
sweeteners, even though these are actually forms of added sugar. Therefore, 
food makers can easily use sweeteners and declare that in their products there 
is no added sugar. Besides, in the market, there are lots of products that 
naturally contain sugar while other products have sugar in the form of added 
sweeteners. Unfortunately, food labelling laws do not currently require 
companies to differentiate natural sugar from the added sugar. 
6 FDA is the acronym for Food and Drug Administration, an agency within the 
U.S. Department of Health and Human Services. It consists of the Office of the 
Commissioner and four directorates overseeing the core functions of the 
agency: Medical Products and Tobacco, Foods and Veterinary Medicine, Global 
Regulatory Operations and Policy, and Operations. FDA is responsible for 
protecting the public health by ensuring the safety, efficacy, and security of 
human and veterinary drugs, biological products, and medical devices; and by 
ensuring the safety of our nation's food supply, cosmetics, and products that 
emit radiation. FDA also has responsibility for regulating the manufacturing, 
marketing, and distribution of tobacco products to protect the public health 
and to reduce tobacco use by minors. In general FDA regulates the following 
products (this is not an exhaustive list): food, drugs, biologics, medical devices, 
electronic products that give off radiation, cosmetics, veterinary products, 
 9 
 
There are evidences, as explained in the related literature, 
showing the conflicts of interest between the taxpayers and the 
FDA because of the permission, since 1992, of collecting private 
industry funds in order to faster the research for the introduction 
of new drugs, for example. Added to that, many researchers 
working in the FDA receive different kind of benefits from 
private industries and corruption is not only a rumour inside the 
US agency. 
The questions are: does information matters in terms of 
affecting consumers’ choice? Is the government giving proper 
information to the US citizens, or people are aware and simply 
want to adopt wrong eating habits? What explains this level of 
misinformation on such a relevant topic, despite the presence of 
US agencies such as the FDA in charge of broadcasting 
information? The main question is: Is there any principal-agent 
problem between US taxpayers and the FDA?  
In order to answer to those questions, I was interested in 
studying people’s behaviour in front of additional information. 
There are parties with more complete information and others, 
the consumers, with a lack of information and who mostly rely 
on firms and advertisement rather than FDA or other 
governmental health agencies.  
The lack of information can cause perverse behaviours, as 
shown by the recent enforcement of the policy concerning 
banning advertisement for junk food, in particular for potato 
chips (see Dubois, Griffith and O’Connell, 2016). In this case, the 
                                                                                                                               
tobacco products, advertising, alcohol, consumer products, drugs of abuse, 
meat and poultry, pesticides, vaccines for animal diseases, water. For further 
information see: 
https://www.fda.gov/AboutFDA/Transparency/Basics/ucm192695.htm 
 10 
 
policy’s result was not what policy makers were hoping, i.e. 
increased health for the citizens, rather than banning simply 
caused a lower sale price of potato chips from the producers’ 
side and a switch to other junk food from the consumers’ side. 
In my experiment, I provide medical and technical 
information to US consumers and monitor how they react to 
them. Most of the information that I provide is the same offered 
by the FDA. The main problem that arises between the FDA and 
the consumers is the agency problem such as, for example, the 
relationship between the employer and the employee, the lawyer 
and the client or the buyer and the supplier. There are evidence 
indicating a potential conflict of interests between the FDA and 
consumers and those facts are not as evident as the food labeling 
marketing done by the FDA. Starting from 1992, the FDA 
obtained the authorization of the Congress, through the creation 
of the Prescription Drug User Fee Act (PDUFA), to collect funds 
from companies producing certain human drug and biological 
products. One of the main requirement contemplated in the act is 
that these funds has to be invested by the FDA in hiring more 
reviewers to assess application so that the drug approval process 
can expedite7. Up to 1992, taxpayers were the one and the only 
responsible for the FDA’s New Drug Approvals Division’s 
budget but after the creation of the PDUFA, therefore after the 
funds collected by brandname pharmaceutical industries, more 
than 50% of the budget is covered by private industries ($170 
million in 2002 against $162 million). The table below shows how 
                                                          
7 For further details see also the following link: 
https://www.fda.gov/forindustry/userfees/prescriptiondruguserfee/default.htm 
Starting from 1992, the PDUFA has to be reauthorized every five years 
therefore it was renewed in 1997, 2002, 2007, 2012 and, lately, in August 2017. 
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much the distance between the users fee and the taxpayers has 
diverged:   
 
Table 1.a Generic Drug Program Obligations by Source, 
Amount and Percentage of Total Funding, Fiscal Years (FY) 2013 
through 2016 
 
  2013 % 2014 % 2015 % 2016 % 
Taxpayers $146 55 $161 42 $121 27 $121 24 
User Fees $121 45 $226 58 $332 73 $373 76 
Total $267   $387   $453   $494   
Source: GAO8 analysis of Food and Drug Administration data. See document GAO-
17-4529. 
 
The direct consequence of such an increase in the amount of 
funds thanks to the brandname pharmaceutical industries has 
correspond to a significal increase in the number of drugs 
approved. In fact, the loss of a manufacturer can reach the 
average amount of over US $1 million for each day’s delay in 
terms of obtaining the marketing approval from the FDA. 
Private manufacturers can support researchers in economic 
terms or by giving them some other types of benefits (see 
Abraham John 2002).  
                                                          
8 GAO is the acronym for Government Accountability Office; it is an 
independent, non partisan agency that works for Congress. It investigates how 
the federal government spends taxpayers dollars. For more information see the 
following link:  
http://www.gao.gov/about/index.html 
9 https://www.gao.gov/assets/690/684950.pdf 
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For all the above reasons, the risk of a conflict of interests 
between the need of being protected of the citizens and the needs 
of the private manufacturers may exists because by economically 
supporting FDA they can obtain the approval of some new 
drugs and therefore the failure of the public policy (Lawson, 
2005). In support of this suspection, there is also a letter 
published in the Wall Street Journal written by a group of 
scientists working at the FDA who request to the US president to 
restructure the agency because of the presence of corruption and 
distortion in the scientific review process for medical devices 
(Mundy and Favole, 2009)10. The existence of a corrupted 
environment inside the FDA, therefore of a conflict between the 
principal and agent’s goals, cause, indirectly, also difficulties in 
terms of controlling the agent’s activities. Both problems 
concerning the principal-agent theory emerge in this framework. 
I decide, therefore, to run a randomized online experiment, 
by adopting a linear probability model with ethnicity fixed 
effects, and offer two set of robustness checks for the findings. I 
implemented my survey in the US on the 1st of February and I 
managed to collect all the data in less than three days. The 
survey is structured as follows: first of all, it has socioeconomic 
questions such as demographic ones, political leaning as well as 
health questions; secondly, the omnibus survey has a treated and 
a control section, given to different randomized people, where 
the treated, apart from the questions, has additional health 
information and economic implications while the control has 
only the questions; finally, to conclude the experiment, there are 
                                                          
10 See the full article in the following link:  
https://www.wsj.com/articles/SB123142562104564381 
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questions concerning recommended policies, personal efforts 
and trust in governmental actions. 
The first set of results on healthy products and multinational 
food companies shows the presence of treatment effect with a 
high level of significance and a very important magnitude 
ranging from 40 to 12-percentage-point. This is a strong sign that 
free information does matter on shaping people’s thoughts once 
it is shown and understood by the people. Even though, this 
information was supposed to be already spread around the 
country, it seems no to be broadcast efficiently and the presence 
of principal-agent problem is likely to exist between the US 
taxpayers and US government. In fact, there is a high level of 
significance of the coefficient that represents the treatment effect 
and the difference between the control and treated group. The 
second set of results, related to questions on recommended 
policies to be adopted by the government does not show any 
level of significance, therefore there is no treatment effect. Both 
groups, control and treated, seem to have same ideas about the 
government and a very low trust on it. Though, on the other 
side, there is a treatment effect when I ask people to sign the 
petition and the treated group responded positively in doing this 
effort by spending their time and putting their names. Finally, I 
observe that information does matter and it does affect people’s 
behaviour to some extent, at least for topic concerning people’s 
health and their daily choices on food and drink products. 
 
2.2 Related Literature  
Information easily influences the decision-making processes 
faced by different subjects such as individuals, private 
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companies and governments. It can be public, therefore free of 
any costs, or private, if only some individuals can use the 
information. The coexistence of public and private information 
brings the attention to the phenomenon recognized as 
asymmetric information. Stiglitz (2000) recognizes two types of 
information, information about quality and information about 
intent, in which cases asymmetry is particularly important. The 
former one happens when one individual does not possess full 
information as far as the characteristics of the other individual is 
concerned. The latter, instead, occurs when one individual is 
concerned about the behaviour of another individual (Elitzur 
and Gavious, 2003).  
The importance of this topic has been largely studied in the 
field of economics and one particular theory dealing with this 
problem is the theory of principal agency. A large number of 
articles have been written on the theory starting from the 1970s. 
Initially the problem was framed around the insurance 
environment but soon, it was clear that the topic of information 
asymmetries and principal agency is particularly interesting also 
for other settings such as accounting, finance, marketing, 
political science, organizational behaviour, sociology and many 
more.  In specific, agency theory studies the agency relationship 
between the principal and the agent. The former delegates work 
to another entity called agent that can be a person, an 
organization, a business activity, in charge of performing the 
work. The problems that arise are twofold: the agency problem 
when the goals of the principal and the agent conflict and the 
difficulty that the principal has to face in order to control what 
the agent is actually doing. Some examples of principal agent 
relationships are employer-employee, lawyer-client, buyer-
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supplier. The same kind of relationship exists between the FDA 
and the US consumers. In fact, in this case, the FDA, an agency 
within the U.S. Department of Health and Human Services, is in 
charge of protecting the public health by ensuring the safety, 
efficacy and security of human and veterinary drugs, biological 
products and medical devices. Apart from those duties, FDA is 
also responsible of ensuring the safety of the U.S.’ food supply, 
cosmetics and product that emit radiation, of regulating the 
tobacco market from the manufacture to the production process  
and the alcohol market. There are evidence indicating a potential 
conflict of interests between the FDA and consumers due to the 
fact that the FDA, in 1992, obtained the authorization of the 
Congress to collect funds from companies producing certain 
human drug and biological products in order to expedite the 
drug approval process. Up to 1992, taxpayers were the one and 
the only responsible for the FDA’s New Drug Approvals 
Division’s budget but after the funds collected by brandname 
pharmaceutical industries, more than 50% of the budget is 
covered by private industries ($170 million in 2002 against $162 
million). As a consequence, the number of drugs approved has 
increased significantly. The existence of a corrupted environment 
inside the FDA, therefore of a conflict between the principal and 
agent’s goals, cause, indirectly, also difficulties in terms of 
controlling the agent’s activities. Both problems concerning the 
principal-agent theory emerge in this framework.  
The principal agent theory has been studied for more than 
fourty years. Researchers are trying to have a better 
understanding about it and a significant amount of papers have 
been published so far and with different traits. What makes the 
principal-agent model so interesting, is the fact that it can be 
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applied in a significantly different framework. For example, 
principal-agent model has been of interests also for political 
scientists regarding the role of information, asymmetry and 
incentives. In fact, they have tried to explore this theory in a 
more applicable way for political institutions (seeGary Miller, 
2005). Other authors, instead, study the principal-agent model 
under the framework of institutional bodies. Kassim and Menon 
(2003) see a promising understanding of the European 
institutions work through the principal-agent model. In fact, 
they offer a critical analysis of how the principal-agent model 
has been positioned by different theoretical prospective. 
Generally, principals hire agents as a delegator for efficiency 
reason. In fact, the agent should possess special capabilities or 
have a lower opportunity cost in terms of time or effort. A paper, 
written by Hamman, Loewenstein and Weber (2010), pose the 
question whether the principal-agent relationship might be of 
interest without considering the efficiency motivation. In this 
case, the principal might hire an agent for other reasons such as 
self-interested or immoral actions. In fact, both the principal and 
the agent would feel less responsible for the action taken because 
the principal is not taking it directly while the agent is merely 
fulfilling a job contract. Some examples related to this case could 
be all the companies accused of outsourcing production to 
outside firms which are known to have lower ethical norms such 
as less rights for the workers. Another example is also given by 
increasing existence of a new figure in a company often called 
the “firing consultants” whose contribution to the company is 
mainly that of firing employees. In this paper, through different 
experiments, the authors confirm the fact that hiring an agent 
makes the principal feel less responsible. The principal-agent 
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model has been adopted also to explain how stock options and 
bonuses are used in executive compensation (see MacDonald 
and Leslie, 2001).  
My study follows the evidence of a significant contrast 
between people’s attitude towards food especially the ones 
perceived as healthy and actual nutritionists’ judgements about 
those foods. Many food items and drinks are shown in the 
advertisement as healthy but they are not recognized as such by 
specialized people such as doctors or nutritionists. There is a 
significant misunderstanding and confusion and the fact that 
economic profits play a key role can partially explain the 
inconsistent situation. There are, therefore, parties with more 
complete information and others, the consumers, with a lack of 
them, relying in firms and advertisement. The intuition is that 
there is a principal-agent problem in this framework. In fact, the 
US citizens are paying taxes which partially are addressed to 
sustain one of the most important agency within the US 
Department of Health and Human Services: the Food and Drug 
Administration (FDA). Still, there are empirical evidences 
showing a lack in the capability of spreading important health 
notion about nutrition among US citizens which have one of the 
worst diet among the developed countries. My randomized 
online experiment checks whether there exist a principal-agent 
problem where the principal is the tax-payer, therefore the US 
citizens, while the agent is the FDA. I adopt the principal-agent 
model offered by Ross in 1973.   
This work also relates to another strand of the economic 
literature which attempts at identifying and assessing the impact 
of advertising on demand and consumer choices. Bagwell (2007) 
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and Lewis and Rao (2015) provide comprehensive surveys and 
discuss this literature.  
A number of papers find evidence of spillovers from 
advertising in the markets for alcohol and tobacco and other 
regulated goods. Rojas and Peterson (2008) find that advertising 
increases aggregate demand for beer. Eckard (1991) shows that 
regulating or banning advertising on cigarettes has led to more 
concentration in the relevant industry. Ching and Ishihara (2012) 
model advertising spillovers in the pharmaceutical market. 
More specifically, Dubois, Griffith and O’Connell (2017) 
analyse a specific case in which there is a policy suggesting the 
restriction of junk food advertisement in order to fight the 
epidemic obesity. Their analysis follows the recommendations of 
the medical literature calling for restrictions on advertising of 
junk food, citing as an example Gortmaker et al. (2011) where 
they state that “marketing of food and beverages is associated 
with increasing obesity rates” and they study the impact of 
banning advertising in the U.K. market for potato chips—a 
typical junk food market and an important source of junk food 
calories. They simulate the impact of an advertising ban on 
market equilibrium, and they find that banning advertising, 
holding prices fixed, lowers potato chip demand, as well as total 
purchases of potato chip calories, saturated fat and salt. 
However, these health gains are partially offset for two reasons. 
First, some firms respond to the ban by lowering prices, which 
leads to an offsetting increase in potato chip demand. Secondly, 
some consumers switching out of the market choose to substitute 
to other less healthy junk foods. 
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2.3 Misinformation about Food Industry and 
Empirical Evidence 
Among many others, two interesting characteristics are 
easily observable in our modern society. The first one is the fact 
that people living in the developed countries have an extremely 
easy and fast access to information foremost thanks to the easy 
availability of being connected to Internet while the second one 
is the impression that people are significantly misinformed about 
topics that are relevant for their health, which is also supposed to 
be one of the most precious thing for all of us. In particular, I was 
impressed by the damage that can be easily caused by the 
consumption of sugar, in specific, added sugar. Added sugars 
are sugars and syrups put in foods during preparation or 
processing, or added at the table. The topic is even more 
alarming when there is evidence of a strong divergence between 
the maximum amount of added sugar that we are supposed to 
eat, as suggested by the American Heart Association (AHA), and 
the amount that people used to eat in the developed countries. In 
fact, the American Heart Association recommends no more than 
9 teaspoons (tsp) of added sugar a day for men (38 grams) and 6 
for women (25 grams). For children, of course, the suggested 
amount is lower and it ranges between 3-6 teaspoons (12-25 
grams) per day. Since my research is focused in the USA, all the 
data and general information about population behaviour is 
referring to it. The complete discordance between Americans’ 
consumer choice and the suggested sugar intake from the AHA, 
was a good starting point to go further with this study in order 
to understand better all the relationships from the consumer to 
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the sugar market and other key players like FDA (or Food and 
Drug Administration).  
Over the past 50 years, sugar consumption has tripled 
worldwide. The average American consumes approximately 19.5 
teaspoons (or 82 grams) of added sugar daily (see Bethene and 
Ogden, 2013). This amount is approximately two to three times 
more than what is suggested by the AHA. Sugar consumption is 
an important topic because of its connection with health. In fact, 
some of the diseases induced by sugar consumption are 
associated with metabolic syndrome such as: hypertension, high 
triglycerides and insulin resistance through synthesis of fat in 
the liver, diabetes, ageing process (Johson et al., 2009).   
In our society, intended as the one of the developed 
countries11, it is quite easy to eat product with added sugar. In 
fact, only 20% of items in a regular supermarket does not contain 
sugar12. Besides, our ability to sustain a high sugar diet is a very 
new concept in terms of evolutionary times. Only during the last 
decades or at most last century we have the possibility to buy 
sugary products with a very cheap price and in big quantities. In 
fact, sugar has always been very hard to find and mostly it used 
to come from fruits and milk. Sugar it is known to give a boost in 
energy and contains lots of calories therefore people has always 
had a high crave for sugar. This ancient feeling is still in our 
system and this partially explain our continuous need to sugar 
but in evolutionary terms, our body system is not ready to 
manage this sudden abundance of highly refined sugar.  
                                                          
11 This actually holds also for some developing countries such as Mexico where 
the consumption of added sugar is very high. 
12 From the movie: That sugar film. 
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The high desire of sugar that people can easily have, it is due 
to many reasons, apart from the ancient feeling of calories just 
mentioned before. Another reason comes from the fact that when 
we eat sugar, there is a very fast increase in the level of 
glycaemia, followed by a big drop. After assuming sugar, out 
body release insulin which is a hormone that drives the sugar 
inside the cells in order to be used for energy. Insulin gives a 
feeling of happiness and once the sugar is finished, suddenly we 
lose that feeling as well and here comes the need of such a 
wellbeing and that’s how we can be persuaded by our own body 
to assume other amount of sugar. Another aspect of sugar is its 
effect on the brain. Sucrose, commonly known as table sugar, is 
composed by glucose and fructose. Fructose exerts toxic effects 
on the liver which are akin to those of alcohol; in fact, alcohol 
comes from the fermentation of sugar. The effect of sugar on the 
brain is that of encouraging subsequent intake because it does 
not suppress the feeling of being hungry (Lustig et al., 2012).  
For all the above reasons, some doctors claim that added 
sweeteners have a clear potential for abuse therefore they should 
be controlled, like FDA does with alcohol, because the way sugar 
is eaten today make it toxic and it should be regulated. 
According to FDA, fructose is in the list of Generally Regarded 
as Safe (GRAS), which means that food manufacturers can add 
unlimited amounts of it to any food. It can be argued that also 
iron and vitamins A and D are in the GRAS list can be toxic if 
over-consumed but, unlike sugar, they have no abuse potential. 
Another issue concerns the way the amount of added sugar is 
legally shown in the labelling of food and drinks products. 
Products that are labelled as sugar free can still contain artificial 
sweeteners. Moreover, since food manufacturers are not 
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required to notify you on the front of the package when a 
product contains an artificial sweetener, consumers may need to 
check the ingredient list carefully13. 
According to FDA, a food can be labelled with the term “sugar 
free” or “no sugar” if the food contains less than 0.5 g of sugars 
per labelled serving. Moreover, they still can contain sugar 
alcohols, one type of reduced-calorie sweetener. The term 
“lightly sweetened” is not defined by FDA, it is freely used by 
food industries, each applying their own definition. It is good to 
keep in mind that the problem is not one serving but the amount 
of total serving eaten per day.  
The existence of a misinformation regarding the amount of 
added sugar in food and drink products is clearer when it comes 
to analysing the real amount of added sugar contained in what is 
perceived as healthy food or drink. In fact, what is perceived as 
healthy or presented as healthy through specific wording (such 
as sugar free, lightly sweetened) does not mean that it actually is; 
it can be but only if taken in a very small amount. Some 
examples are the following: one bar of Nutri Grain apple 
cinnamon cereal contains 3 tsp of sugar (both naturally and 
added sugars); in one small glass (240 ml) of Tropicana 100% 
pure orange juice there are slightly more than 5 tsp of sugar; one 
small container (170g or 6oz) of Dannon plain no-fat yogurt has 3 
tsp of sugar. Again, another example can be one small glass of 
Jamba juice strawberry smoothie (real whole fruit and 100% 
juice) which contains 17 tsp of sugar. A medium one has 23.5 tsp 
of sugar while a large glass has 31 tsp. If 31 tsp of sugar were 
taken from the original fruit instead of drinking them, then you 
                                                          
13 Information found in “The Sugar Association”. 
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would have to eat approximately: 4 peaches, 9 limes, 30 lemons 
and 30 strawberries. What makes things even more complicated 
is the fact that by law, the gram of sugar contained in each 
product must be list in accordance with The Nutrition Facts 
Label. In the market, there are lots of products that naturally 
contain sugar while other products have sugar in the form of 
added sweeteners. Unfortunately, food labelling laws do not ask 
to companies to differentiate natural sugar from the added one.  
Apart from labelling issues, there are also some others 
related to definitions. In fact, the term sugar is used for table 
sugar or sucrose and not for sweeteners, even though these last 
ones are actually forms of added sugar. Therefore, food makers 
can easily use sweeteners and claim that in their product there is 
no added sugar. Still they have to be mentioned in the label and 
here are some names for sugar that can be find in food labelling: 
agave nectar, brown sugar, cane crystal, cane sugar, corn 
sweetener, corn syrup, crystalline fructose, dextrose, fruit juice 
concentrates, glucose, high-fructose corn syrup, honey, invert 
sugar, maltose, malt syrup, maple syrup, molasses, raw sugar, 
sucrose, syrup. 
There is also an empirical evidence conducted by Healthline 
about the misinformation of Americans regarding the level of 
added sugar present in food, in particular in perceived healthy 
food. Healthline is the fastest growing health information site 
and its goal is that of giving the more accurate information as 
possible on health, medication, suggestions for a healthier 
lifestyle through a comprehensive and informative content14. 
                                                          
14 For further information on Healthline you can check directly their website on 
the following link: 
http://www.healthline.com/health/about-us?ref=footer 
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Healthline conducted a survey from 22nd of September to 5th of 
October 2016 to 3223 Americans from across the US. The survey 
was composed by questions in order to understand their sugar 
consumption habits, their knowledge about added sugar that can 
be find in food and drinks. Findings are statistically significant at 
a 95 percent confidence level and the margin of error is around 
+/- 5 percent. The results show that majority of the respondents, 
around 62%, is aware about the impact of sugar and they do feel 
concerned about it and about its effects on their waistline. 
Besides they feel also guiltier about eating more sugar than 
carbohydrates (22%) or fat (18%). They also show interest in 
taking real action with the intent to decrease their sugar intake 
and 10% of them have even cut off sugar from their daily diet. 
Even though, they also display a lack of information when it 
comes to the amount of added sugar present in some of the most 
common products in US (see table 1): 
 
Table 1. Empirical Evidence on people’s understanding of 
perceived healthy food in terms of added sugar content 
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Note: this table shows how respondents have answered to the question: “Which food 
contains more sugar between the two products shown?”. It means that respondents 
have to choose between product A versus B, then C vs D and so on. Respondent’s 
answer represents the percentage of surveyed people that choose that specific product as 
the one that contains more sugar while the last row list the actual grams of sugar 
contained in one serving of the products mentioned. 
Source: Healthline Survey Data 
 
In this table, there are shown four different questions and the 
respondents have to answer which, between two products, 
contains more added sugar. One of the product is generally 
perceived as healthy therefore they tend to guess that this 
product has less quantity of added sugar. Most of the time it is 
wrong and this is proven by the fact that 70% or people gave a 
wrong answer. These results highlight the misinformation about 
food ingredients and added sugar. 
Similar results, are given in another survey conducted in UK 
at the University of Glasgow15. Again, they interviewed around 
2005 people and asked them to estimate the number of teaspoons 
of sugar present in some of the most popular products in the UK, 
in particular those perceived as healthy. This study, as the one 
conducted in the US, confirm the fact that people used to 
underestimate the level of added sugar, as well as the 
Americans.  
As I mentioned before, sugar has two properties: one is that 
it does not fully supress the feeling of being hungry, and 
secondly, it can create a sort of addiction due to the good feeling 
given by the insulin that is released in our body after assuming 
it. These two characteristics can create a significant place for 
                                                          
15 The details of the results can be seen in the university of Glasgow website:  
http://www.gla.ac.uk/news/archiveofnews/2012/april/headline_230642_en.html 
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profits if added sugar is present in daily food products. In fact, 
the bliss point is a good example. In the field of food products, 
the bliss point is the amount of an ingredient contained in a food 
or drink, such as salt, sugar or fat which is able to maximize the 
pleasure of eating that specific food. When a company gets the 
bliss point right, then the product typically takes off. For 
example, the bliss point for Mountain Dew16 seems to be 
approximately 37 tsp of sugar (without considering the amount 
of other sweeteners such as high fructose corn syrup) in a bottle 
of 1.25 litres.  
In terms of international market trade, sugar present 
significant volumes. Sugar is a commodity and, in many 
countries, it is included in the list of essential commodities. 
Mostly sugar is derived from sugarcane and sugar beet and it is 
produced by more than 130 countries around the world. Though, 
sugarcane represents 80% of global sugar production. From 1980 
to 2014 there is an evident concentration of sugar production 
market. In fact, 37 years ago the top ten countries producing 
sugar accounted for 56% of the global production while now, in 
2014, they account for 75%. According to the data offered by ISO 
(International Sugar Organization17), the top ten sugar producers 
in 2015 are the following: Brazil, India, EU-28, Thailand, China, 
USA, Pakistan, Mexico, Russian Federation, Australia. On the 
other side, global consumption increases on an average of 1.93% 
over the past decade and the main reasons of this raise are 
increasing income, population growth and shifts of dietary 
patterns. The top ten largest consumers are: India, EU-28, China, 
                                                          
16 Mountain Dew is a typical soft drink in the USA. 
17 For further details see their website in the following link: 
http://isosugar.org/sugarsector/sugar 
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Brazil, USA, Indonesia, Russian Federation, Pakistan, Mexico, 
Egypt. 
In particular, the US produce around 7.70 mln t of sugar but 
consume 10.83 mln t of sugar, which means that there is a deficit 
and a need of importing sugar from abroad. In fact, the US is the 
third largest net importers, after China and Indonesia, in mln 
metric tonnes, tel quell, of sugar. 
The combination of all these data from different fields such as 
medical aspects of the effect of sugar, international trade of sugar 
and misinformation of perceived healthy food, pushed me to 
deepen my research for a better understanding of sugar as a 
whole.  
 
 
2.4 The Experiment 
2.4.1 The Randomized Survey Experiment 
 
I implemented the experiment during three week days, 
specifically on the first, second and third of February 2017. I refer 
to this randomized survey experiment as the “omnibus” surveys. 
It is structured in the following way: first of all, it has 
socioeconomic questions such as demographic ones, political 
leaning as well as health questions; secondly, the omnibus 
survey has a treated and a control section, given to different 
randomized people, where the treated, apart from the questions, 
has additional health information and economic implications 
while the control has only the questions; finally, to conclude the 
experiment, there are questions on views of eventual policies, 
personal efforts and trust in governmental actions. 
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My research is focused on the USA for different reasons. It is 
easier to obtain any kind of information regarding the health and 
the food consumption of the population and it is easier also to 
collect more reliable answers from the online survey. In fact, the 
majority of the people using Amazon Mechanical Turk is from 
the USA, where this service was born18. 
 
2.4.2 Data Collection 
 
The omnibus survey was openly posted on Amazon Mechanical 
Turk for three days, specifically from the first to the third of 
February. On Mturk I had to write a brief description of the 
survey and each respondent was payed $0.70 for 5 minutes 
survey in case she\he was assigned to the control group or $1.25 
for 10 minutes survey if assigned to treated group; this means 
that they were payed approximately from $7.5 up to $8.4 hourly 
wage (cf. the US federal minimum hourly wage is $7.2519). 
Other characteristics of the survey are the possibility of taking 
up to one hour to answer all questions so that respondents did 
not feel pressured and in order to avoid mistakes mostly given 
by time constraint. As a comparison, the median hourly wage on 
                                                          
18 Amazon is also trying to put this service in other countries but it takes time 
due to the different taxation present in each country and the difficulty of 
finding an agreement. 
19 See the website of United States Department of Labor: 
https://www.dol.gov/whd/regs/compliance/posters/flsa.htm 
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MTurk in September 2015 was calculated to be around $5.5420 
(cf. the US federal minimum of $7.25).  
In order to ensure the validity of the results, I opted for some 
specific characteristics regarding the way the survey was 
supposed to be launched by MTurk. Firs of all, in order to avoid 
foreign respondents, I asked Amazon to show the survey only to 
those who had US address. Second, I launched the survey during 
East Coast daylight hours on workdays so that I could both limit 
the participation of foreign respondents and decrease 
heterogeneity. Third, to exclude robots, I applied two rules: (i) I 
allowed to take the survey only to respondents with a 
completion rate equal and higher of 95% (ii) before starting the 
survey, we set a CAPTCHA21 for survey access. Forth, I wanted 
to avoid respondents who has a little of experience and are 
serious when it comes to completing a task therefore I allowed 
only respondents who has already completed 50 or 100 tasks. 
Fifth, in order to avoid the same respondent to fill the survey of 
both groups, treated and control, I first launched the treated 
survey, then I blocked the respondents that completed it and 
afterwards, I launched the survey related to the control group. 
Sixth, respondents were told that at the end of the survey there is 
                                                          
20 As a reference see: Stewart, Neil, et al. "The average laboratory samples a 
population of 7,300 Amazon Mechanical Turk workers." Judgment and Decision 
Making 10.5 (2015): 479. 
21 The term CAPTCHA stands for Completely Automated Public Turing Test 
To Tell Computers and Humans Apart. In other words, a CAPTCHA is a 
program which aim is that of protecting websites against bots. This is possible 
the program can generate and grade tests which are possible for humans but 
not for current computer program. A simple example is given by the well-
known distorted text which can be easily read by humans but not by current 
computer programs, at least not yet. 
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a password that they have to put in amazon in order to be paid 
by 24 hours. Seventh, thought Limesurvey, I could obtain the IP 
address of each respondents as a further check. Finally, to 
discourage respondents from skipping some questions, I set a 
compulsory mode for each of them so that the survey can be 
fully completed. 
 
2.4.3 The Omnibus Information Treatment 
 
The treatment group is characterized by additional information 
in comparison to the control one because my aim is that of 
creating a “shock” to the respondents’ knowledge about health 
in reference to food industry, FDA and governmental policies. 
The information is obviously simplified due to time and budget 
constraint and respondents’ concentration constraint. My aim is 
that of testing the existence of a treatment able to move any 
peoples’ opinion and effective action.  
The treatment is composed by three main parts. The first part 
is composed by a set of questions regarding personal 
characteristics such as socioeconomic and demographic 
questions relative to income, family composition, age, ethnicity, 
level of education, employment status etc. Other questions refer 
to health condition and personal attitude towards food industry. 
The second part is composed by a set of information to 
acknowledge people about daily issues regarding food offered 
by the big food industries in terms of sugar content and relative 
health problems. More specifically, I give information regarding 
the amount of hidden added sugar in common food, especially 
on those perceived as healthy by most of the people. I inform 
about some techniques adopted by most of the big firms and 
 31 
 
brand of the food industry who treat sugar as a profitable good 
and this mentality can easily lead to doubts regarding the 
relative healthiness of such consumption. Since this is a health 
issue then some information is given regarding to the role of 
FDA (Food and Drug Administration) about labelling procedure 
and governmental role. Finally, the third part of the questions 
refer to eventual change in daily consumption behaviour of 
respondents after acknowledging the information just mentioned 
above. Though, the main focus is analysing and measuring 
respondents’ answers regarding eventual governmental policies 
and their own efforts in case of willingness to change the current 
situation. 
The randomized survey experiment is fully reported in the 
appendix A.3 of this paper. The italic sentences are the 
additional information valid only for the treatment group. The 
questions are the same for both groups. 
 
2.5 Data and Summary Statistics 
Through Amazon Mechanical Turk service for recruiting 
respondents and Limesurvey software for the creation of the 
survey and data collection, I could launch my randomized online 
survey experiment, or omnibus experiment. Table 1 shows all 
the characteristics of all the respondents that fully completed the 
online survey sample (N=409). To get a deeper understanding of 
the data I decided to compare them to two different nationally 
representative sample of US adults. One of them is a survey 
launched by Columbia Broadcasting Company (CBS) poll in 
2011. As a second comparison, I choose a more representative 
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survey, the American Life Panel (ALP)22, gathered by RAND. 
Those two surveys were chosen for different reasons: easy access 
to their data and similar questions to our online survey. 
To be able to match our MTurk sample with the other two 
surveys, CBS and ALP, I created some weights (see Kuziemko et 
al., 2015) with respect to 16 cells. Those cells are based on some 
of the main characteristics of the samples: gender (2) x age 
brackets (2) x white versus non-white (2) x college degree holder 
versus non-holder (2). The results are shown in the table below: 
 
Table 2. Summary Statistics and Comparison to other polling 
and online data 
 
  mTurk sample CBS election poll American Life Panel 
  (1) (2) (3) 
Male 0.592 0.476 0.417 
Age 35.956 48.99 48.940 
White 0.802 0.739 0.676 
Black 0.083 0.116 0.109 
Hispanic 0.051 0.098 0.180 
Other racial/ethnic group 0.064 0.021 0.041 
Employed (full or part) 0.682 0.587 0.557 
Unemployed 0.046 0.104 0.103 
Married 0.333 0.594 0.608 
Has college degree 0.443 0.318 0.309 
Political views, 2.259 1.586   
      conservative (1) to liberals (3)       
Observations 409 808 1002 
                                                          
22 The American Life Panel is significantly more expensive compared to MTurk; 
in fact, in 2011 the cost was around 3$ per subject per minute and even though 
it is more representative, it still conserves some limitations in terms of sample 
size. 
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Notes: This table shows all the summary statistics of the main variables of the MTurk 
randomized online survey (see column 1). Instead, in column 2 and 3 there are the 
weighted averages of respectively CBS election poll and American Life Panel, the two 
surveys used as a comparison23.  
 
Table 2 shows the main characteristics of the MTurk sample: 
as expected, respondents are younger and there are more males. 
Besides there are slightly more white and less black or Hispanic, 
they are more educated and seems to be more liberal. 
In the next table, instead, there are listed all the main 
personal characteristics of the two groups. In order to check for 
randomness, I calculated the p-values of the two-sample 
proportion test. The results are shown in table 3. 
 
                                                          
23 The dataof the CBS election poll and American Life Panel are online and are 
taken from the personal website of any author of the paper Kuziemko et al. 
2015. 
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Table 3. Summary statistics of the treated and control group 
in terms of covariates 
 
  
Treated Control 
Difference 
(p-values) 
  (1) (2) (3) 
Male 0.563 0.622 0.222 
Age 35.966 35.945 0.985 
White 0.774 0.831 0.150 
Black 0.096 0.070 0.332 
Hispanic 0.067 0.035 0.137 
Asian 0.058 0.045 0.554 
Married 0.322 0.343 0.650 
Has a college degree 0.442 0.443 0.992 
Number of Children 0.740 0.756 0.712 
Weigh (in lbs) 177.101 174.856 0.599 
Disease or allergy 0.216 0.214 0.953 
Unemployed 0.058 0.035 0.272 
Not in labour force 0.077 0.055 0.366 
Voted for Republican in 
2016 0.011 0.837 0.044 
N 208 201 409 
Notes: This table shows all the summary statistics of the main characteristics of the 
MTurk respondents divided into treated and control group (see column 1 and 2). 
Instead, in column 3, there are the p-values of the two-sample proportion test and only 
in two cases there are the p-values of the two tailed t-test statistic for age and weight 
since these two variables are considered continues while all the rest are binary 
variables. 
 
The third column resumes the results of the two-sample 
proportion test and the respective p-values. The null-hypothesis 
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is that between the two proportions, in this case the two groups 
represented by the control and the treated, have no difference. 
The p-values confirm this result almost in any characteristics of 
the interviewed with the exception of the last variables about 
voting for Republican if I consider an alpha equal to 5%. In sum, 
I can assume that the way people answered was surely random.  
 
2.5.1 Survey Attrition 
 
Another important characteristic of the omnibus survey 
experiment is the analyses of the attrition rate. As I already 
mentioned in the section dedicated to MTurk and Limesurvey, I 
built the survey and the relative questions by setting a 
compulsory mode for each of them, in order to avoid distraction 
and the risk that respondents could randomly skip questions 
without noticing. This means that to obtain the code for the 
payment you are supposed to fill all the questions. Besides, I 
allowed only respondents with a completion rate of equal and 
above 95% on the past tasks which itself makes a significant 
selection concerning the reliability of the respondents when it 
comes to filling the survey. As a consequence, the rate of attrition 
is extremely low, approximately 1.7% for the whole sample, 
therefore just 7 people did not complete the online randomized 
survey. More precisely, the control group presents an attrition 
rate of around 2.9% and the treated group of just 0.48%24. Four 
respondents dropped the omnibus survey at the very first page 
                                                          
24 In the case of the control group, just 6 respondents out of 207 did not fill the 
survey while only 1 respondent over 209 did not execute the survey for the 
treated group. 
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of the CAPTCHA code, the rest dropped either at the first two 
questions or at the middle of the survey. Since the overall 
attrition rate is extremely small, I am not going to make further 
analyses.  
Another question arise regarding completed surveys: what is 
the ability of covariates to predict treatment status? Table 3 
displays the results of 13 separate regressions of the following 
form: 
 
Treatmenti = βCovariatei + εi, 
 
where “i” identifies the individuals (the respondents) and the 
dependent variable identifies whether a respondent was 
assigned to treatment or not. For each regression, there is one 
covariate and most of them are already listed in table 2.   
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Table 4. Do covariates predict treatment status for finished 
online surveys? 
 
  Coefficient P-value 
Male -0.061 0.223 
Age 0.000 0.985 
Black 0.087 0.327 
Hispanic 0.167 0.117 
Asian 0.066 0.552 
Other ethnicities -0.312 0.085 
Married -0.024 0.651 
Has a college degree -0.000 0.992 
Number of children -0.002 0.9 
Unemployed 0.129 0.258 
Not in labour force 0.089 0.36 
Voted for Obama in 
2012 0.081 0.17 
Voted for Hilary in 
2016 0.009 0.842 
Note: The coefficients are the results of 13 regressions coming from the following form: 
Assigned to treatmenti = βCovariatei + εi, where all the covariates are listed in the left, 
the coefficient in the second column and the p-values in the last column.  
 
As shown in Table 4, there is only one covariate with a low 
significance level: other ethnicities. Even though, the number of 
other ethnicities is very low, just 5 respondents, and four of them 
happened to be in the control group. Because of this reason, we 
do not consider it as a systematic attrition from the sample.  
In general, it does not seem to exist a specific pattern or 
category of people assigned to the treatment group. I am quite 
lucky in this regard because one might have expected that 
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conservatives or healthier people would have been not very 
satisfied with the additional information and easily create and 
attrition to the online survey. 
 
2.6 Results from the Randomized Online Survey 
In this section, I present three sets of results. The first one relates 
to questions on health food product, food industries and 
responsibilities of the FDA (or Food and Drug Administration). 
The second set of questions analyse eventual policies such as the 
application of a tax on profits of multinational food industries 
producing food with a high content of hidden sugar and 
respondents’ trust in government. Last, I investigate 
respondents’ political engagement and their personal efforts. 
 
2.6.1 Views on Health, Food Industries and their Products 
and FDA 
 
Table 4 displays the effect of the randomized online survey on 
questions related to perceived healthy food, food industries and 
their profits and products, food labelling and FDA. For each 
question, there are two columns: the first one shows the results 
without including the covariates while the second column of 
each question includes standard controls (which, in general, 
correspond to those listed in table 3). For both cases, I include 
racial/ethnic fixed effect. The equation of the linear probability 
model that gives the results for table 5 and 6 valid only for even 
column is the following: 
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Dependent variableie = β1Treatedie + β2Xie + δe + εie  (1)                                                                  
 
Where “i” indexes the individuals, “e” the racial/ethnicity, δe are 
the racial/ethnicity fixed effects. The dependent variable is 
always a binary one therefore I am dealing with a linear 
probability model. “X” represents the set of covariates which 
coincide with the one listed in table 4. For the odd-column, 
instead, the formulation is the same, with the only exception that 
the covariates are not included25.  
As you can see from table 5, including or excluding 
covariates, does not actually make a significant change in the 
results, confirming the results of table 4 where it was assumed 
that, conditional on finishing the online survey, it exists a very 
low correlation between treatment status and standard 
covariates.   
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
                                                          
25 The equation, therefore, will be as follows: Dependent variableie = 
β1Treatedie + δe + εie. 
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Note: The four dependent variables are binary indicator. They are coded as 1 if the 
respondent answers that “drinking one large glass of a perceived healthy food is 
unhealthy or very unhealthy”, agree or strongly agree that “the government should 
intervene and behave towards sugar as strict as with the alcohol”, agree or strongly 
agree in the statement that “food labels are misleading without the need of breaking the 
rules settled by the FDA” and agree or strongly agree in the statement that 
“multinational food industries put profits ahead of people’s health” respectively. To see 
the exact wording and additional information given to the treatment group, check in 
the appendix A.3 from question 19 to question 22. All regressions have racial/ethnic 
fixed effect, even those labelled as “no” covariates. The independent variables are the 
same as the one listed in table 3 and two more variables are added: weight and a dummy 
variable assuming the value 1 in case the respondent has a disease and/or allergy.  
Standard errors in parentheses.  
The level of significance is the following:  
***Significant at the 1 percent level; 
**Significant at the 5 percent level; 
*Significant at the 10 percent level.   
 
As you can see from table 5, the results of the first two 
columns are both highly significant and shows that the treatment 
is associated with a 43-percentage point, in the case of no 
covariates, and 42-percentage-point in the case where dependent 
variables are included. These results refer to the question 
whether it is unhealthy to drink a large glass of a product such 
as a smoothie made with real whole fruit, which is easily 
perceived as healthy. The magnitude of the results that reflect 
the difference between the control and the treatment group is 
quite robust and large. 
The third and fourth columns show the effects on 
respondents’ opinion of whether they agree or not in the claim 
that government should treat sugar as strict as with the alcohol. 
Both of them are statistically significant but with a smaller 
magnitude comparing to the other claims. It presents a 13-
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percentage-poin for the no covariate case and approximately 12-
percentage-point for the case with inclusion of other controls. 
The third question relates to the claim that “food labels are 
misleading because they try to attract potential consumers and 
hide unhealthy ingredients without breaking the rules settled by 
the FDA”. In this case, the treatment is associated with 
approximately a 17-percentage-point, in the case of no controls, 
and 15-percentage-point in the case of inclusion of the covariates. 
In both cases, there is a high level of significance. 
Finally, column 7 and 8 are not significant therefore it seems 
that there is no difference in the answer between the control and 
treated group, partially explained also by a very high level of the 
constant, almost close to 1. The respondents were asked to 
answer whether they agree or not to the claim that multinational 
food industries put profits ahead of people’s health. Such a result 
was actually expected and both groups, by just looking at the 
statistics, seem to agree to such a claim in almost the same 
percentage26.  
In general, I can claim that the omnibus treatment presents 
very strong results in terms of food consumption. It seems that 
people are quite elastic in changing their views about sensitive 
topic such as health and food products which play a central role 
in our daily life and are able to shape our behaviour. By offering 
to people simple and quite exhaustive information, they seem 
                                                          
26 The two groups have almost the same number of respondents each: 201 
respondents in the control group and 208 in the treated one. The percentage of 
people agreeing with the claim on multinational food industry are 95.19% in 
the case of the treated group (corresponding to 198 respondents) and 91.54% in 
the case of the control group (corresponding to 184 respondents). This might 
explain part of the reason why the control “treated” does not show any level of 
significance. 
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willing to adjust their preferences, or at least, their ideas. This is 
the first evidence of a principal-agent problem between the US 
taxpayers and the US government, in particular FDA in charge of 
spreading health knowledge and protecting consumers. 
 
2.6.2 View on Public Policy and Trust in the Government 
 
As I already mentioned, I wanted to analyze also people’s 
opinion in term of eventual policies that can be applied to try to 
improve the actual situation. The first policy presented was that 
of applying a 10% tax on food industries profits if their food 
products were containing a significant amount of hidden added 
sugar27 per serving; the second policy, instead is that of using the 
tax on profits just mentioned to offer to children at the 
elementary school free education on healthy food. Table 6 shows 
the results regarding respondent’s policy preferences. 
 
Table 6. Effect of the omnibus treatment on Policy Preferences 
 
  tax on profits 
use tax for free 
education 
trust in 
government 
  (1) (2) (3) (4)  (5) (6)  
Treated 0.066 0.052 0.036 0.027 -0.03 -0.026 
  (0.048) (0.047) (0.043) (0.042) (0.039) (0.039) 
Constant 0.58*** 0.205 0.74*** 0.361*** 0.21*** 0.173 
  (0.035) (0.145) (0.031) (0.139) (0.029) (0.122) 
Covariates No Yes No Yes No Yes 
N 409 409 409 409 409 409 
                                                          
27 For more information, see also the added information given to the treated 
group on the online survey in the appendix A.3. 
 
 44 
 
Note: The three dependent variables are binary indicator. They are coded as 1 if the 
respondent answers that “s/he agrees in the idea of applying a 10% tax on the profits of 
food industries that produce food with a high level of added sugar per serving”, “s/he 
agrees in using the money collected by the tax to sustain free education in elementary 
school about healthy food”, “s/he trusts in government”. To see the exact wording and 
additional information given to the treatment group, check in the appendix A.3 from 
question 24 to question 26. All regressions have racial/ethnic fixed effect, also those 
labelled as “no” covariates. The independent variables are the same as the one listed in 
table 3 and two more variables are added: weight and a dummy variable assuming the 
value 1 in case the respondent has a disease and/or allergy. 
Standard errors in parentheses. 
The level of significance is the following: 
***Significant at the 1 percent level; 
**Significant at the 5 percent level; 
*Significant at the 10 percent level.   
 
According to the results, none of the two policies offered to 
the randomized online survey happened to report any 
significance level in terms of treatment. This means that both 
groups, treated and control seem to have the same ideas 
regarding policies or, differently, they do not show any 
significant divergence on policies. This conclusion might be 
supported also by the fact that they have the same trust in the 
government, as it is shown in column 5 and 6. In this case, added 
information have no effect on people’s belief because, either 
treated or not, they do not change their original trust in 
government and policies  views.  
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2.7 Political Engagement and Personal Efforts 
The results of table 6 are very interesting and deserve further 
research because there is a common judgement in terms of tax 
policies regardless of the added information given to the treated 
group.  
Table 7 displays summary statistics on demographic and 
policy views only for the control group, therefore there are 
included the respondents who did not receive the additional 
information. I divided them between liberals and conservatives, 
respectively in the first and second column while the third 
column includes both of them together with the moderate group.  
 
Table 7. Summary Statistics for the control group, divided into 
Liberals and Conservatives 
 
  Liberals Conservatives All 
  (1) (2) (3) 
Male 0.611 0.592 0.622 
Age 34.295 39.735 35.945 
White 0.832 0.878 0.831 
Black 0.074 0.041 0.070 
Hispanic 0.042 0.020 0.035 
Asian 0.032 0.041 0.045 
Married 0.211 0.510 0.343 
Has a college degree 0.495 0.388 0.443 
Number of Children 0.537 1.082 0.756 
Weigh (in lbs) 172.147 178.980 174.856 
Disease or allergy 0.232 0.327 0.214 
Unemployed 0.042 0.020 0.035 
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Not in labour force 0.053 0.061 0.055 
Voted for Obama in 2012 0.979 0.265 0.746 
Voted for Republican in 2016 0.011 0.837 0.303 
Voted for Hilary in 2016 0.884 0.102 0.567 
Did not vote or voted for other 
parties in 2016 0.105 0.061 0.129 
Trust Government 0.221 0.286 0.214 
Drinking Jamba Juice (smoothie 
with natural fruit) is unhealthy 0.326 0.163 0.289 
International food industry puts 
profit ahead of people's health 0.926 0.918 0.915 
Food labels are misleading 0.758 0.653 0.721 
Govn't should be strict on sugar as 
with alcohol 0.432 0.265 0.373 
Tax policy on high sugar level food 
industries 0.705 0.367 0.577 
Money from tax policy invested in 
free health education  0.821 0.612 0.731 
Said would petition for tax on 
profits 0.474 0.245 0.388 
Actually signed the petition 0.242 0.102 0.189 
        
N 95 49 201 
Notes: this table shows summary statistics of control group only in terms of 
demographic and policy views. The respondents are split into self-reported liberal 
versus conservative status. The question presented a five-point scale answer: very 
liberal (1), liberal (2), moderate (3), conservative (4), very conservative (5). Column 1 
presents the results regarding liberals therefore less than 3 on scale while column 2 
shows the results concerning conservatives, more than 3 on scale. Finally, column 3 
displays the summary statistics for the control group therefore including liberals, 
conservatives and moderate (equal to 3 on the scale). The full question is reported in the 
Appendix A.3 and it refers to question number 11.  
 
As expected conservatives have more children, seem to be 
older, slightly more white and significantly more likely to be 
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married. On the other side, more liberals have a college degree, 
they would pay more for a healthier food consumption, they are 
significantly more inclined in supporting a tax policy on profits 
of international food industry and they would agree in using the 
money collected to be invested in free education for children. In 
fact, more liberals than conservatives would sign a petition 
asking for a tax on profit on food industries producing 
unhealthy food and they did an effort for that by actually signing 
the online petition. Regarding the trust on government, both 
views, liberals and conservatives, seems to have a quite low 
consideration. 
It seems that Americans do not distance themselves in terms 
of tax policies which can be seen as something far from their 
daily life. This is the reason why I want to analyse whether the 
two group are different by affecting their time and beliefs. In 
fact, the last set of results (table 8) analyses respondents’ view 
about political engagement and personal efforts. For political 
engagement, I refer to the willingness and the consecutive 
actions taken to try to improve the current situation by signing a 
petition. I built an online petition on the website “We The 
People”, created by the White House to give voice to people for 
any concern they have. Of course, the petition should reach a 
precise minimum number of people to be then considered by the 
American Government28. 
                                                          
28 In my case, I built two independent petitions with very similar text, shown in 
the Appendix A.3 under question 26 of the online survey, and I showed one to 
the treated group and the other to the control group. I could obtain all the 
signatures and count them. Even though I decided to show only the online 
website but without making it active. I made this choice because the link that 
“We The People” gave me was not directing immediately to the petition; the 
way to find it was very hard and it would take more than 15 minutes to figure 
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Table 8. Effect of the omnibus treatment on Personal Efforts 
 
  Signed the petition 
  (7) (8) 
Treated 0.112*** 0.116*** 
  (0.043) (0.042) 
Constant 0.192*** -0.246** 
  (0.028) (0.123) 
Covariates No Yes 
N 409 409 
Note: The dependent variable is a binary indicator. It is coded as 1 if the respondent 
answers that “s/he signed an online petition about the first policy mentioned related to 
the 10% tax”. To see the exact wording and additional information given to the 
treatment group, check in the appendix A.3 question 27/28. The regression has 
racial/ethnic fixed effect, also those labelled as “no” covariates. The independent 
variables are the same as the one listed in table 3 and two more variables are added: 
weight and a dummy variable assuming the value 1 in case the respondent has a disease 
and/or allergy. 
Standard errors in parentheses. 
The level of significance is the following: 
***Significant at the 1 percent level; 
**Significant at the 5 percent level; 
*Significant at the 10 percent level.   
 
                                                                                                                               
it out, therefore I just opted for the existence of the link without making it 
active, but people did not know about that. To be sure that people actually 
signed it, I asked, as a following questions, whether they actually signed or not. 
I think that it is quite reliable because some people initially said that they 
would sign the petition, then I showed them the link and afterwards I asked 
them whether they actually signed and those who did not, they just said it in 
the next question. There is little reason to not say the truth because there is no 
punishment. I took question 27 of the online survey in the appendix A.3 as a 
confirmation of that effort.   
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This table is the most important among all results because it 
shows the connection between stated behavior and actual 
behavior. Here the information treatment has an actual effect in 
real life and this fact gives significanat value to the experiment. 
The results are showing that the treatment group is making a bit 
more effort by signing the petition comparing to the control one 
by 11 or 12-percentage-point, respectively in the case without 
and with the covariates.  
Finally, further improvement can be done in this study, such 
as increasing the number of people interviewed and check the 
consistency of the results if N augment. Another important step 
which can be used as a robustness is that of launching a follow-
up survey after some time to check the consistency of people’s 
answers and see whether the treated group of the first round still 
give the same answers by getting the control survey in the 
follow-up. 
 
2.8 Robustness Check 
For the robustness of my results I show the comparison between 
the benchmark results, see table 5 and 6, with the ones of the 
probit model. I used the linear probability model instead of 
probit because I am mostly looking for the average results and I 
am not interested in the ones in the tale. Still, by adopting LPM 
or probit results should be similar and they are shown below in 
table 9 a,b,c and d. 
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Table 9a. Comparison between LPM and Probit 
 
 
LPM Probit LPM Probit 
 
Drinking perceived healthy 
product 
International food industry 
puts profit ahead of 
people's health 
Treated 0.421*** 1.18*** 0.034 0.307 
 
(0.045) (0.137) (0.024) (0.19) 
Constant 0.03 -1.41*** 0.74*** -0.368 
 
(0.15) (0.467) (0.102) (0.692) 
N 409 408 409 385 
Note: The odd columns represents the results of the linear probability model while the 
even ones refers to the probit model. Both have ethnicity fixed effects. The odd columns 
results are the same as the one in table 5. 
Standard errors in parentheses. 
The level of significance is the following: 
***Significant at the 1 percent level; 
**Significant at the 5 percent level; 
*Significant at the 10 percent level. 
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Table 9b. Comparison between LPM and Probit 
 
 
LPM Probit LPM Probit 
 
Food labels are misleading 
Govn't should be strict on 
sugar as with alcohol 
Treated 0.154*** 0.642*** 0.116** 0.318** 
 
(0.039) (0.153) (0.048) (0.131) 
Constant 0.409*** -0.804 0.049 -1.298*** 
 
(0.126) (0.497) (0.166) (0.462) 
N 409 404 409 408 
Note: The odd columns represents the results of the linear probability model while the 
even ones refers to the probit model. Both have ethnicity fixed effects. The odd columns 
results are the same as the one in table 5. 
Standard errors in parentheses. 
The level of significance is the following: 
***Significant at the 1 percent level; 
**Significant at the 5 percent level; 
*Significant at the 10 percent level. 
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Table 9c. Comparison between LPM and Probit 
 
  LPM Probit LPM Probit LPM Probit 
  
Tax policy on high 
sugar level food 
industries 
Money from tax policy 
invested in free health 
education 
Said would petition for 
tax on profits 
Treated 0.052 0.152 0.027 0.099 0.066 0.177 
  (0.046) (0.131) (0.041) (0.146) (0.048) (0.131) 
Constant 0.14 -0.982** 0.422*** -0.22 0.027 -1.386*** 
  (0.165) (0.458) (0.144) (0.524) (0.16) (0.453) 
N 409 408 409 383 409 408 
Note: The odd columns represent the results of the linear probability model while the 
even ones refers to the probit model. Both have ethnicity fixed effects. The odd columns 
results are the same as the one in table 6 and 8. 
Standard errors in parentheses. 
The level of significance is the following: 
***Significant at the 1 percent level; 
**Significant at the 5 percent level; 
*Significant at the 10 percent level. 
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Table 9d. Comparison between LPM and Probit 
 
 
LPM Probit LPM Probit 
 
Actually signed the petition Trust Government 
Treated 0.116*** 0.405*** -0.026 -0.102 
 
(0.042) (0.147) (0.039) (0.148) 
Constant -0.149 -2.245*** 0.017 -1.984*** 
 
(0.144) (0.504) (0.124) (0.623) 
N 409 404 409 404 
Note: The odd columns represent the results of the linear probability model while the 
even ones refers to the probit model. Both have ethnicity fixed effects. The odd columns 
results are the same as the one in table 6 and 8. 
Standard errors in parentheses. 
The level of significance is the following: 
***Significant at the 1 percent level; 
**Significant at the 5 percent level; 
*Significant at the 10 percent level. 
 
As we can see, all tables, from 9a to 9d, show similarities 
between the LPM model and the probit model, both include 
ethnicity fixed effects. In fact, the level of significance is the same 
while the magnitude is higher in the case of the probit model. 
Secondly, I want to compare the stability of the results if I add an 
interaction terms with the treated variable in the list of 
covariates. Therefore, I calculate the effects on the treated 
variable by adding another control variable which is an 
interaction term between treated and male for example. In total, I 
run 5 different LPM regressions with different interaction terms 
each. Table 10 (a,b,c and d) shows the results. 
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2.9 Further Analyses: Interaction Terms 
Table 10a to 10d show the results after adding one interaction 
term in the main regression. More specifically, the first column is 
the benchmark or the same regression as the one presented in 
table 5, therefore the LPM with ethnicity fixed effect. The second 
column represents the same equation but this time I added an 
interaction term between the treated and gender which variable 
is called male. The title of each column explains the covariate 
used for the interaction with the variable treated. Therefore, the 
third column is the interaction with the variable about the 
employment status, the third with the marital status, the forth 
with the binary variable about having one or more children and 
the last one about college attendance. All these variables are 
binaries. 
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Table 10a. Comparison between the benchmark and the results 
of the treated with interaction terms 
 
 
Food labels are misleading 
 
Benchmark Male Unempl. Married Child College 
Treated 0.154*** 0.213*** 0.156*** 0.131*** 0.102** 0.133** 
 
-0.04 -0.061 -0.041 -0.046 -0.044 -0.052 
Male -0.051 0.000 -0.052 -0.05 -0.058 -0.051 
 
(0.045) (0.070) (0.045) (0.045) (0.044) (0.045) 
Unemploy. 0.103* 0.093* 0.126 0.098* 0.089* 0.1* 
 
(0.053) (0.053) (0.128) (0.053) (0.052) (0.053) 
Married -0.051 -0.055 -0.051 -0.086 -0.042 -0.049 
 
(0.05) (0.05) (0.05) (0.072) (0.05) (0.049) 
Child -0.031* -0.03 -0.031* -0.03* -0.071** -0.032* 
 
(0.018) (0.018) (0.019) (0.018) (0.032) (0.018) 
College -0.014 -0.016 -0.014 -0.014 -0.022 -0.038 
 
(0.04) (0.04) (0.041) (0.04) (0.039) (0.065) 
Inter. Term 
(treated*1,2,
3,4,5) 
 
-0.099 -0.037 0.07 0.071** 0.047 
 
 
(0.079) (0.134) (0.087) (0.033) (0.079) 
Constant 0.469*** 0.442*** 0.467*** 0.473*** 0.499*** 0.473*** 
 
-0.114 -0.118 -0.115 -0.115 -0.115 -0.115 
Interaction 
term  
No Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes 
N 409 409 409 409 409 409 
Standard errors in parentheses. 
The level of significance is the following: 
***Significant at the 1 percent level; 
**Significant at the 5 percent level;  *Significant at the 10 percent level. 
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Table 10b. Comparison between the benchmark and the results 
of the treated with interaction terms 
 
 
Tax policy on high sugar level food industries 
 
Benchmark Male Unempl. Married Child College 
Treated 0.052 0.074 0.046 0.055 0.083 -0.024 
 
-0.047 -0.074 -0.048 -0.057 -0.053 -0.065 
Male -0.022 -0.002 -0.019 -0.022 -0.018 -0.022 
 
(0.052) (0.075) (0.053) (0.053) (0.052) (0.052) 
Unemploy. -0.084 -0.087 -0.164 -0.083 -0.075 -0.091 
 
(0.123) (0.124) (0.188) (0.123) (0.124) (0.125) 
Married 0.029 0.027 0.029 0.034 0.024 0.037 
 
(0.058) (0.058) (0.058) (0.081) (0.058) (0.058) 
Child -0.003 -0.003 -0.004 -0.003 0.021 -0.007 
 
(0.023) (0.023) (0.023) (0.023) (0.03) (0.023) 
College -0.004 -0.004 -0.004 -0.004 0.001 -0.09 
 
(0.048) (0.048) (0.048) (0.048) (0.048) (0.069) 
Inter. Term 
(treated*1,2,
3,4,5) 
 
-0.037 0.128 -0.009 -0.042 0.171* 
 
 
(0.096) (0.249) (0.102) (0.037) (0.095) 
Constant 0.205 0.195 0.212 0.204 0.187 0.217 
 
-0.145 -0.148 -0.146 -0.145 -0.146 -0.144 
Interaction 
term  
No Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes 
N 409 409 409 409 409 409 
Standard errors in parentheses. 
The level of significance is the following: 
***Significant at the 1 percent level; 
**Significant at the 5 percent level;  *Significant at the 10 percent level. 
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Table 10c. Comparison between the benchmark and the results of 
the treated with interaction terms 
 
 
Money from tax policy invested in free health education 
 
Benchmark Male Unempl. Married Child College 
Treated 0.027 0.073 0.017 0.07 0.075 0.077 
 
-0.041 -0.065 -0.043 -0.049 -0.047 -0.056 
Male 0.017 0.057 0.021 0.015 0.023 0.017 
 
(0.046) (0.067) (0.046) (0.046) (0.046) (0.046) 
Unemploy. 0.099 0.092 -0.033 0.108 0.113 0.104 
 
(0.082) (0.083) (0.195) (0.081) (0.082) (0.083) 
Married -0.003 -0.007 -0.004 0.065 -0.011 -0.008 
 
(0.05) (0.05) (0.05) (0.068) (0.05) (0.049) 
Child 0.024 0.025 0.023 0.023 0.061*** 0.027 
 
(0.017) (0.017) (0.017) (0.016) (0.023) (0.017) 
College -0.022 -0.023 -0.022 -0.022 -0.014 0.035 
 
(0.042) (0.042) (0.042) (0.042) (0.043) (0.062) 
Inter. Term 
(treated*1,2,
3,4,5) 
 
-0.077 0.211 -0.134 -0.066** -0.113 
 
 
(0.082) (0.202) (0.089) (0.03) (0.083) 
Constant 0.36*** 0.339** 0.372*** 0.353** 0.333** 0.352** 
 
-0.139 -0.14 -0.139 -0.138 -0.139 -0.139 
Interaction 
term  
No Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes 
N 409 409 409 409 409 409 
Standard errors in parentheses. 
The level of significance is the following: 
***Significant at the 1 percent level; 
**Significant at the 5 percent level; *Significant at the 10 percent level. 
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Table 10d. Comparison between the benchmark and the results 
of the treated with interaction terms 
 
 
Trust Government 
 
Benchmark Male Unempl. Married Child College 
Treated -0.026 0.037 -0.007 -0.028 -0.016 -0.08 
 
-0.039 -0.062 -0.04 -0.045 -0.043 -0.052 
Male 0.042 0.096 0.033 0.042 0.043 0.041 
 
(0.043) (0.061) (0.043) (0.043) (0.043) (0.043) 
Unemploy. 0.047 0.036 0.305 0.046 0.049 0.041 
 
(0.1) (0.099) (0.194) (0.1) (0.1) (0.101) 
Married 0.091* 0.086* 0.092* 0.086 0.089* 0.096* 
 
(0.05) (0.052) (0.05) (0.067) (0.051) (0.051) 
Child 0.032 0.033* 0.033* 0.032 0.039 0.029 
 
(0.02) (0.02) (0.02) (0.02) (0.028) (0.02) 
College -0.024 -0.025 -0.024 -0.024 -0.022 -0.086 
 
(0.04) (0.04) (0.04) (0.04) (0.04) (0.058) 
Inter. Term 
(treated*1,2,
3,4,5) 
 
-0.105 -0.411* 0.01 -0.014 0.123 
 
 
(0.081) (0.214) (0.09) (0.034) (0.079) 
Constant 0.173 0.144 0.149 0.173 0.167 0.182 
 
-0.122 -0.118 -0.121 -0.122 -0.122 -0.121 
Interaction 
term  
No Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes 
N 409 409 409 409 409 409 
Standard errors in parentheses. 
The level of significance is the following: 
***Significant at the 1 percent level; 
**Significant at the 5 percent level; *Significant at the 10 percent level. 
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The results of table 10a to 10d are very interesting in 
understanding people’s behaviour toward daily habits in food 
and drink consumption. In fact, when it comes to the sentence 
claiming that food labels are misleading, there is a treatment 
effect and in particular for those who have children. People who 
were in the treated group and have children and had the chance 
to understand the confusion given by the food labels through the 
added information, seem to be even more worried about such 
topic. Again the same people show more interested in offering 
the collected taxes from the unhealthy companies to give free 
teaching to pupils about health education. Instead, in the 
question related to apply tax policy to companies who sell 
product with high content of added sugar there is no treatment 
effect. Though, college people from both group seem to be more 
prone to such policy. Last, in the question related to the trust on 
government, there is no treatment effect but in both groups, the 
unemployed people seem to have even less trust than the others 
on the US government. Thanks to interaction terms, the results 
have a more define shape and meaning. I applied the interaction 
term to all the remaining questions but they have no significant 
coefficient. Those tables are listed in the appendix A. 
 
2.10 Conclusions 
The randomized online survey experiment launched through 
Amazon Mechanical Turk and Limesurvey in the USA, show the 
existence of a principal-agent problem, which reference model is 
the one shown by Stephen Ross in 1973, between the US 
taxpayers and US government in terms of health, drink and food 
consumption and protection. Due to a controversial environment 
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where information is easy to obtain and mostly free while people 
daily habits seem to be unhealthy about topics such as added 
sugar intake, healthy food and drink items, food industry, 
governmental policies and personal efforts. All these topics are 
not random but they follow a precise red line which connect all 
of them: added sugar content on food and drink perceived as 
healthy. My aim is checking the existence of any treatment effect, 
and therefore a principal-agent problem, by giving additional 
information to the treatment group with respect to the control 
group. 
The first set of results on healthy products and multinational 
food industries show the presence of treatment effect with a high 
level of significance and a very important magnitude. In fact, the 
highest peak reached by the treatment effect is 40-percentage-
point to 12-percentage-point. This is a strong evidence showing 
that principal-agent problem does exist because the US agency, 
FDA, in charge of sharing health knowledge to the taxpayers, 
seems to be weak in this goal. In fact, if you give simple and 
clear information to the people, they show a change in their 
thought and even more, they make an effort for such a change. 
The second set of results do not show any treatment effects. 
Questions are related to eventual policies that the government 
can apply but results do not show any level of significance. This 
means that the two groups have very similar ideas on that topic 
and, after a deepen analyses, it might be possible that this result 
is driven by the pre-existence of a low trust in the government 
from both groups.  
The third set of results show again the presence of treatment 
effects when it comes to make some effort in term of time and 
personal efforts. The treated group that received the additional 
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information seems to be more prone to spend some time in 
understanding the petition and put their name for supporting it. 
The free information show an effect not only on people’s thought 
but also on people’s real actions. All the results are supported by 
a set of robustness checks by running not only a linear 
probability model but also a probit model. Besides, a deeper 
study is done by adding another covariate as interaction term 
with the variable “treated” and results give a clearer shape to the 
previous one. As a conclusion, the main results show the clear 
presence of a principal-agent problem in one of the most 
developed countries, the USA. 
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Chapter 3  
Family versus School Effect 
on Individual Religiosity: 
Evidence from Pakistan 
 
3.1 Introduction  
Since September 11, in international security debates madrasas 
(Islamic schools) have been associated with Islamic militancy. 
This concern has been particularly strong about madrasas in 
Pakistan as many Taliban leaders were schooled in madrasas on 
the borderland of Pakistan and Afghanistan (Rashid 2010). 
Consequently, many development agencies have attempted to 
invest in madrasa modernisation programmes29. Survey based 
studies aimed at comparing students from madrasas to those in 
modern schools and colleges in terms of their socio-economic 
background, attitudinal differences and the levels of trust they 
                                                          
29 United States, for instance, provided an aid package to General Musharraf’s 
government soon after September 11 for implementation of a madrasa reform 
program. Due to major distrust of the religious community on the United States 
as well as on General Musharraf the program failed to enlist most madrasas 
with the result that the program was closed in 2007. 
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have on their peers as well as the broader society have also 
grown (Mwaura et al. 2008; Asadullah et al. 2015). The starting 
assumption guiding such interventions, and also many existing 
studies, is that madrasa enrolment leads to heightened levels of 
religiosity. This assumption, however, is often not properly 
tested or is at best measured through very simplistic questions 
about participation in ritual practices. The results presented in 
this paper question such assertions.  
Drawing on survey data on girls in final years of madrasa 
and modern colleges in urban Pakistan, we show that it is 
difficult to argue that levels of religiosity between the two 
groups are divergent. On most counts of religious behavior the 
students from the two groups do not show statistically 
significant differences. In fact, even college girls show very high 
levels of religiosity, which is understandable in society with high 
level of religious prevalence. Further, our probit analysis shows 
that when we control for students’ socio-economic profile and 
attitudes, on few counts of religiosity madrasa effect does 
emerge but it disappears as soon as we control for parental level 
of education. Within the broader literature on sociology of 
education regarding school versus family effect in shaping 
individual religiosity, the findings of this study thus weigh in 
favour of the latter30. 
                                                          
30 Traditionally drawing on evidence from Catholic or Jewish schools in the 
West, academics have been keen to demonstrate the effect of religious schools 
on students’ social attitudes including their levels of religiosity (Barrett et al. 
2007; Tritter 1992). Competing evidence instead emphasizes the effect of 
household religiosity levels both in shaping the preference for religious schools 
(Cohen-Zara and Sander 2008; Sander 2005) as well as the levels of religiosity 
(Hill 2011). Religious beliefs are transmitted from parents to children in both 
direct and indirect ways (Benson et al. 1989; Bisin and Verdier 2001). Yet other 
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We started this study because of the dissimilarity between a 
general secular school and a madrasa school and this fact can 
support the belief of an expected difference in terms of the level 
of religiosity. There have been many madrasa schools in 
different countries and with different goals. In our study, we 
focus on female madrasa located in the urban area of Pakistan. 
More specifically, madrasa schools are Islamic schools and they 
exist since centuries ago. Historically, female madrasa system 
started operating in Pakistan only in mid to late 1970s whereas 
the male madrasa network has operated in South Asia since the 
twelfth century. Traditionally, madrasas were places for training 
the socio-political elites in Muslim societies covering modern as 
well as religious subjects (Hefner and Zaman 2007). However, 
under the colonial and post-colonial period and the consequent 
establishment of western educational institutions in Muslim 
countries, madrasas lost their importance and focused only on 
religious subjects. Today, in all Muslim countries, there are some 
kind of madrasa networks, either formal or informal, which goal 
is that of imparting specialized Islamic knowledge in parallel to 
the state schooling system. Starting from primary level, the 
bigger madrasas run all the way to providing specialized 
degrees in Islamic subjects, which are equivalent to a master 
                                                                                                                               
studies have shown even broader societal factors having an impact on one’s 
religiosity. One of them is the nation itself (Kelley and De Graaf 1997) with its 
traditions and customs, which tend to remain similar over the years and 
therefore reinforce people’s way of living and thinking. Outside the nuclear 
family there are many figures that can also exercise influence such as friends 
(see Spilka, Hood, Hunsberger and Gorsuch 2003) and classmates and teachers 
inside a school environment (Benson et al. 1989). Instead of finding any 
madrasa effect we find that mother’s education has a positive effect on 
allowing girls to adopt more liberal religious norms. 
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degree in Islamic Studies from a government university31. 
However, in some countries, such as Pakistan, madrasas have 
attracted the international attention especially after September 11 
mainly because of the expected association between madrasas 
and Islamic militancy. Since we are dealing only with female 
madrasa, the main concern is that girls might absorb more 
conservative Islamic norms, comparing to girls attending secular 
schools. This is the reason why madrasas in Pakistan are a good 
case to test how participation in a religious versus secular school 
effects an individual’s level of religiosity.  
Our research aims to analyse and connect two branches of 
the literature dealing with education and level of religiosity as 
well as parental influence on their children. More precisely we 
are interested in the religious impact of educated female student 
in Pakistan as well as the influence on female level of religiosity 
controlling for parental level of education. They key role is 
played by the intergenerational level of education and the 
subsequent effect on the level of religiosity. The initial 
framework is focused on the analysis of the effect on the level of 
religiosity based on the attendance of madrasa or secular college 
and after that, we introduce the concept of parental level of 
education. In some countries, such as Pakistan, education and 
level of religiosity are connected because there exist schools, 
called madrasa, where student have to attend subject such as 
literature, history, maths as well as religious classes. Our first 
question is: is it the level of religiosity affected by attending a 
                                                          
31 The secular educational institution equivalent to female madrasas is female 
colleges, which offer a four-year bachelor degree program to girls of similar 
age. Girls come to both these institutions after completing their matric (Grade 
10) in a high school thus having similar educational background. 
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madrasa or a secular school? And if so, does the level of parental 
education have any influence in that? 
Only few decades ago it has been given a particular weight 
and importance to religiosity in terms of effect on economic 
development (Deneulin and Rakodi, 2011). In fact, religion has 
been typically not included in the list of determinants of 
economic growth. Differently was proved, by the use of 
instrumental variables by Barro and McClearly, 2003. They claim 
that growth depends on the degree of believing relative to 
belonging. Besides, economic performance increases thanks to 
the effect of religious beliefs on individual traits. Religion plays a 
key role as it is encountered into the list of determinants, either 
positive or negative of economic growth (see also Grier 1997; 
Noland 2005). 
Differently from religion, education has been recognized 
from early stage as a significant determinant in terms of 
development and growth. The effect of education has been 
studied broadly and from different aspects. On one side, there 
are the micro labour studies which analyses the monetary return 
to schooling (Cohen and Soto, 2007) while, on the other side, 
there are macro studies focused on effect of education on GDP 
growth rate (Krueger and Lindahl, 2000). Another branch of 
literature, instead, has empirically shown the positive effect of 
growth on schooling (Bils and Klenow 2000). In our paper, we do 
not explain causality but we show some interesting relationship 
by interconnecting all this literature in our empirical study. 
The structure of the paper is as follows. Section 3.2 shows the 
main works of the related literature; Section 3.3 presents the 
context of Pakistan and the core features of the madrasa and the 
regular schooling system. Section 3.4 outlines the survey design 
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and empirical evidence. Section 3.5 presents the probit model 
and key results while Section 3.6 shows the robustness checks. 
Finally, section 3.7 concludes.    
 
 
3.2 Related Literature  
Since the beginning of the twentieth century, it was strongly 
recognized the important role played by religion in terms of 
social change. On the other side, only lately, it has been 
recognized its importance as a determinant of growth. Finally, 
nowadays religion plays a key role not only on social activities 
but also personal choices which summed together can create a 
social movement or trend or economic growth (Guiso, Sapenza 
and Zingales, 2003). For instance, Barro and McClearly (2003), 
claim that growth depends on the degree of believing relative to 
belonging. Besides, economic performance increases thanks to 
the effect of religious beliefs on individual traits. Religion plays a 
key role as it is encountered into the list of determinants, either 
positive or negative of economic growth (see also Grier 1997; 
Noland 2005). Our main interest lies in the interconnection 
between religion and one of the most important part that can 
lead to an economic growth: education.  
It has been proven, that it exists a positive relationship 
between group membership, such as a religious group 
worshiping a specific faith, and education (see Glaeser E. and 
Bruce I. Sacerdote, 2008). The public rhetoric, or secularization 
thesis, has often sustained the natural common sense of some 
“stylized facts” related to religiosity such as: i) with the 
improvement of science and technology, religion must inevitably 
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decrease; ii) the more an individual is educated and the less 
religious he or she becomes; iii) indoctrination leads to deviant 
religions32. Along the decades, these three claims have been 
proved in different ways to be false (see Stark and Bainbridge 
1985, Hadden 1987, Greeley 1989). Not only religion is related to 
a higher level of education but there is also evidence (see 
Boppart et al., 2013) where the educational performance is 
affected by religion via home effort and education expenditure. 
This phenomenon happens when conservative political attitudes 
has a prevalence comparing to the other political views. 
Therefore, religious heritage is not included into the set of 
characteristics that do not allow economic progress. They 
conclude claiming that the role played by religion can be subject 
to changes over time along with sociocultural changes. Another 
evidence shown in Sacerdote and Glaeser (2001) is that religious 
attendance increases significantly with education across 
individuals.  According to Lehrer (1999), there is evidence to 
sustain that in some cases religion is considered to be a 
determinant of education attainment. As it is shown, there is a 
strong literature who supports the positive relation between 
religion and education. 
Another part of literature, related to our final topic, is the 
relationship between parents and offspring in terms of influence 
of the parents on education, religiosity, lifestyle of their children 
and so on and so forth. Becker and Tomes (1986) try to explain 
this relationship through models of income transmission and 
inequality. In this case, they consider the offspring with an initial 
level of endowments given by their natural parents. The Markov 
                                                          
32 These three styled facts are mentioned also in the paper of Iannaccone and 
Finke (1996). 
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process is used to define the transmission of the endowment 
which can be subject to either an increase or an erosion. Besides, 
they affirm that more educated parents brings to more educated 
offspring. Even though, if the parents’ level of education is 
particularly high, then their children are more likely to pursue a 
higher level comparing to the mean of the considered population 
but not comparing to their own parents. Another aspects is that 
parents can influence the human capital of their children and 
even their future earnings by spending on their skills, health and 
so on. The parental influence can be extended to the economic 
position, motivation of their children (see Haveman and Wolfe, 
1995).  Another study highlights the evidence of specific 
associations between parents and their children (see Taubman-
Ben-Ari, Mikulincer and Gillath). Bisin and Verdier (2001), for 
instance, support the thesis that religious beliefs are transmitted 
from parents to children in both direct and indirect ways. In fact, 
their study starts with the assumption that cultural attitudes, 
such as preference, norms, the role of religion, the importance of 
education and so on, are considered to be endogenous with 
respect to socioeconomic system. More specifically, there are 
many evidences suggesting the high dependence of children’s 
preferences on those of their parents. 
Our study lies in between of the two streams of literature 
mentioned above. On one side, there is a branch of literature 
supporting the existence of a relation between schooling and 
religiosity while on the other side, there is evidence of 
interconnection between parents and their offspring in terms of 
religiosity, schooling, lifestyle and so on. Our goal is that of 
embracing both literatures therefore, we try to understand the 
relationship between educated and religious parents and level of 
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religiosity of their children, attending either a religious or a 
secular college. 
 
 
3.3 Background: Secular Schools and Madrasas in 
Pakistan  
Madrasas, Islamic schools, are a centuries old institution of 
learning in the Islamic world. Traditionally, madrasas were 
places for training the socio-political elites in Muslim societies 
covering modern as well as religious subjects (Hefner and 
Zaman 2007). However, with the establishment of western 
educational institutions in Muslim countries during the colonial 
period, madrasas became marginalized and came to focus purely 
on study of religious subjects. Having lost its socio-economic 
significance, madrasas in the colonial and post-colonial period 
failed to attract the socially and economically more affluent 
classes drawing more and more children from lower income 
groups. In all Muslim countries, today some kind of madrasa 
network (formal or informal) aimed at imparting specialized 
Islamic knowledge runs in parallel to the state schooling system.  
The graduates of these institutions are trained mainly to take on 
a position as religious teachers, mosque imams, etc. However, in 
some countries, such as Pakistan, madrasas have become focus 
of international attention since September 11 because of an 
alleged association between madrasas and Islamic militancy.  
Such concerns mainly stems from evidence that many of the 
Taliban leaders had studied in madrasas in Pakistan. Actual 
profiles of militants in Pakistan, however, show that a very small 
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number actually comes from madrasas. There are also other 
concerns about madrasa education: focused purely on religious 
subjects, it is argued to breed sectarianism and intolerance and 
reinforce a patriarchal value system. Such concerns are also 
expressed about female madrasas, which unlike the male 
madrasas are normally not associated with militancy33. It is 
assumed that girls in madrasas absorb conservative Islamic 
norms, which restricts their well-being, such as allowing men to 
have four wives at any given time when women must secure a 
divorce before remarrying; women inheriting half the share of 
men; or need of two female witnesses against one male witness 
in matters of commerce. Girls in madrasas are argued to imbibe 
these restrictive religious norms and thereby limit their well-
being.  
Madrasas in Pakistan thus present a good case to test how 
participation in a religious versus secular school effects an 
individual’s level of religiosity. A country of over 180 million, 
Pakistan shares many features common to developing countries. 
Despite rapid urbanization an estimated 62 percent of the 
population still residing in the rural areas. GDP per capita 
income during 2012-2013 was US$ 1,368 (Ministry of Education 
2014). State has traditionally prioritized spending on building 
military defense over investment in human capital. Education 
sector has thus consistently underperformed due to lack of 
adequate resources as well as poor governance. While there are 
many private institutions of excellence from primary to tertiary 
level, the state education system at the primary and secondary 
                                                          
33 One exception was Jamia Hafsa, a female madrasa in Islamabad that in 2007 
supported an armed resistance against General Musharraf’s government for the 
latter’s unqualified support of US ‘war on terror’.  
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level is severely underperforming. Consequently, the education 
landscape in Pakistan is highly mixed. The overall literacy rate is 
only 58 percent and an estimated 6.7 million children remain out 
of school (Ministry of Education 2014).  
The poor education standards in state schools have in turn 
made many parents even from poor families to send their 
children to low-fee private schools (Andrabi et al. 2006a). 
Accordingly to UNESCO Institute for Statistics, close to 35 
percent of children in Pakistan34 are now going to private schools 
many of them catering to children from poor families (Andrabi 
et al. 2006a). Madrasas education is yet another alternative to the 
poor state schooling system. Starting from primary level, the 
bigger madrasas run all the way to providing specialized 
degrees in Islamic subjects, which are equivalent to a master 
degree in Islamic Studies from a government university. The 
actual number of madrasa students as share of total population 
is estimated to be relatively small (Andrabi et al. 2006b). 
However, their influence in the society through becoming 
religious teachers and preachers is much greater than reflected in 
the numbers. Female madrasas primarily offer a four-year 
specialized Islamic Studies program for girls in the age range of 
16-20 years. The secular educational institution equivalent to 
female madrasas is female colleges, which offer a four-year 
bachelor degree program to girls of similar age. Girls come to 
both these institutions after completing their matric (Grade 10) in 
a high school thus having similar educational background.  
The expansion in demand for female madrasas in recent 
years has been particularly strong. Female madrasa system 
                                                          
34 Data available online, accessed on 11 December 2016. 
http://data.worldbank.org/indicator/SE.PRM.PRIV.ZS 
 79 
 
started operating in Pakistan only in mid to late 1970s whereas 
the male madrasa network has operated in South Asia since the 
twelfth century. Yet within forty years, female madrasas have 
come to constitute 20 per cent of the total madrasa population in 
Pakistan. Given their growing numbers, it is thus important to 
assess concerns that madrasa education can restrict female 
agency by making women endorse restrictive gender norms35. 
This paper thus focuses on comparing the religiosity between 
students of madrasas and college girls to see if being in a 
madrasa indeed increases girls’ religiosity and their preference 
for absorbing more conservative religious norms that restrict 
their own agency.  
It is important to highlight that recently, the number of 
studies related to madrasas have increased considerably and 
mostly because, after September 11, they were constantly linked 
with Islamic militancy. Madrasa schools became a sort of target 
for the western policies aiming at a process of Islamic de-
radicalization since some of the Taliban leaders located in the 
border between Pakistan and Afghanistan were trained in this 
type of schools. As explained in Bano 2015: “Reforming 
madrasas has been an officially recognized part of the soft side of 
the US ‘war on terror’, which has mainly relied on use of military 
force including drones. Madrasa reforms have mainly focused 
on introducing modern subjects in madrasa curriculum with the 
view that it will increase madrasa students’ access to formal job 
market therefore reducing appeal for militant Islam”. For this 
reason the religious and the secular schools are comparable in 
terms of subjects studied and future job aspirations but still they 
                                                          
35 For a discussion on how religious or cultural norms can make women form 
self-confining preferences see Kabeer (1999).  
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are not perfectly the same. Madrasa prepares better for religious 
studies while college schools are more prepared for other 
specific subjects.  
Madrasa and secular schools have the main difference based 
on the fact that the former includes a significant number or 
religious hours, differently from the latter. The reasons driving 
parents’ (or girls’) decision to enroll one of the two schools are 
different, as shown in some interviews to the parents (see Bano 
2010). In fact, some are drivine by the job market condition, the 
cost of the school, the location o the personal girl aspiration. 
Each family has a quite high number of siblings comparing to 
the average in the more developed countries. It is culturally 
recognized as good to have at least one child attending a 
madrasa school. Since one the of major subject is Islamic studies, 
generally students prone to increase their Islamic knowledge 
tend to enroll or because forced by the parents. College schools 
are more advanced for other subjects because they dedicate more 
time to them and less time to religious studies. What we can 
assure is that the reasons of sending a child into a madrasa or 
into a college school are extremely different and they depend 
from numerous variables such as family background, economic 
condition, students desire. There is no specific bias in term of 
school preference because the reasons differ significantly and the 
coice of one school to another can be easily seen as random. In 
the next chapter, we are going to deepen our research in term of 
level of religiosity of female students by introducing the research 
design and the empirical evidences. 
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3.4 Research Design and Empirical Evidence  
The survey was implemented in Lahore and Rawalpindi, two 
important cities of Punjab, the most populated and politically 
resourceful province in Pakistan. Lahore is the provincial capital 
and Rawalpindi is twin city to Pakistan’s federal capital, 
Islamabad. A leading madrasa and a leading college were 
selected in both the cities. The selected institutions were from 
among the most prominent institutions representative of their 
school type in each city. Delavande and Zafar (2015) in their 
study of trust levels between madrasa and college students in 
Pakistan use very similar rationale for selecting Lahore and 
Rawalpindi as the field sites and for focusing on the most 
prominent institutions of each type to develop their student 
sample. Students were selected randomly from the two school 
types using the school register. A total of 282 girls were selected 
from the two colleges and 195 girls were selected from the two 
madrasas. In each institution, the survey was implemented by 
seating all the sampled girls in large hall, normally made 
available by the participating school. The questions were read 
out aloud by a research assistant and students were required to 
mark their response directly on the questionnaire. It took on an 
average an hour to complete the questionnaire. The 
questionnaire had six main sections: individual characteristics, 
family profile and socio-economic background, state of health, 
locus of control, levels of religiosity, and future aspirations.  
Special thought was given when developing questions aimed 
at measuring religiosity. There is a rich literature, especially 
within sociology of religion, dedicated to identifying the various 
components of religious behavior that together arguably help 
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determine individual or collective levels of religiosity. 
McAndrew and Voas (2011) in a paper titled Measuring 
Religiosity Using Surveys, argue that religion being highly 
complex phenomenon is multidimensional in construct. Noting 
that there is a difference between religious affiliation (nominal 
association with religion by birth) and religious commitment 
(attitudes, behavior and values), they argue religiosity to be 
concerned with the latter. While it is agreed in the literature that 
quantification of religiosity is possible, there are no clear 
standards regarding which of the following aspects, preferred by 
different studies, should be measured: belief, practice, formal 
membership, informal affiliation, ritual initiation, doctrinal 
knowledge, moral sense, core values, or how one regards others. 
Consequently, studies attempting to measure the impact of 
school type on levels of religiosity focus on different dimensions 
of religiosity shaped by what to the authors of those studies is 
the most convincing measure of religiosity in the given context.  
Studies on madrasas have normally simply focused on 
questions about ritual practice.  The questionnaire developed for 
this survey instead focused on capturing three core dimensions 
of religiosity: ritual practice, the degree of conviction in fairness 
of Islamic rulings, and aspirations to be close to God. Such a 
three-dimensional approach was thought to provide more 
meaningful understanding of one’s religiosity than one just 
focusing on levels of ritual practice. It is widely acknowledged in 
studies on religiosity that ritual observance is often not the most 
accurate measure of one’s level of religious conviction (Barrett et 
al. 2007). Participation in ritual practices can be motived by 
various factors such as a desire to express conformity with 
expected group norms especially in contexts where lack of 
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observance of the rituals can lead to exclusion from the group. 
The need to differentiate between responses to publicly 
observable rituals and private religiosity has therefore been 
emphasized routinely in the studies attempting to measure 
levels of religiosity (Barrett et al. 2007).  
Since madrasas in Pakistan are boarding facilities, it is 
difficult to treat ritual practice as the best indicator of religiosity 
as group effect in this case could be expected to have higher 
impact. Therefore, in this case, the other two dimensions of 
religiosity were seen to be more important: conviction in the 
fairness of Islamic norms, and stated aspiration to be close to 
God. The survey instrument thus developed explicit questions to 
measure these three dimensions of religiosity. Ritual practice 
was measured by asking respondents if they performed a 
specific religious ritual and if yes then how frequently. Ritual 
practices covered included both obligatory Islamic rituals as well 
as some optional ones: five compulsory prayers plus the optional 
tahajjud (midnight prayer); fasting in Ramadan, and levels of 
giving under the compulsory Islamic obligation of zakat as well 
as the optional forms of giving sadeeqa and kheerat.  
Belief in fairness of Islamic norms was tested by narrating 
some of the basic Islamic rulings on gender which from a liberal 
perspective are seen to deny women their basic rights—such as 
men having the permission to have four wives, women having 
half the inheritance, and two witnesses required for one male 
witness in matters of commerce— and asking the girls, if in their 
view, by giving men that right, Islam gives women lower status 
than men.  
Aspiration to be close to God was measured by asking a 
number of questions within the section on aspirations that could 
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help measure one’s desire for religious piety. Key dimensions 
covered were: aspirations to have time, place, and freedom to 
pray and pray regularly; to have the time, a place, and freedom 
to read the Quran and to read the Quran regularly; to have the 
time, freedom, and the means to do Hajj; to have religious virtue 
in eyes of those around you; to have religious virtue in her own 
eyes, and to have religious virtue in the eyes of Allah. 
Table 1 presents chi-square results for the two groups on 
selected counts of religiosity. Typically, in those cases it is used t-
test difference in means. In our case, due to the fact that most of 
the variables are dummies, we can only test for the chi-square. 
The number of female students answering to each question is 
always different and the number of female students belonging to 
madrasa or college is not the same as well. The percentage of the 
answers are not the same therefore we want to test whether this 
difference is random or not. As we can see, in almost all the 
cases, there is not enough evidence to suggest an association 
between school type and selected dimensions of religiosity 
because all the different distributions are just random. The few 
exceptions, by looking at the p-values, are the first two questions 
relative to ritual practice. We can claim that, by doing a simple 
statistic analyses, there is no empirical evidence regarding the 
eventual difference in the level of religiosity of female madrasa 
student compared to college students, with only few exceptions 
related to the first three questions about the ritual practice. 
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Table 1. Levels of Relisiotisy for Madrasa and College 
 
 
Madrasa Secular 
  
 Mean S.D. Mean S.D. X2 p-value 
a) Ritual Practice 
How many times do you pray in the 
day? 
5.240 0.460 3.547 1.482 221.502 0.000 
Do you donate Zakat? 0.500 0.501 0.694 0.461 16.6577 0.000 
Do you donate Sadaqa? 0.965 0.184 0.901 0.298 7.0101 0.008 
Do you donate Kheerat? 0.876 0.330 0.900 0.299 0.6564 0.418 
Have you completed the Arabic 
recitation of the Quran (at least) one 
time? 
0.985 0.118 0.968 0.174 1.5719 0.210 
b) Convictions on Fairness 
Do you think that, by allowing men to 
marry four wives, Islam gives women 
lower status than men? 
0.104 0.308 0.069 0.254 0.732 0.392 
Do you think that, by giving women half 
the inheritance rights of men, Islam gives 
women lower status than men? 
0.080 0.272 0.056 0.230 1.134 0.287 
By giving female witnesses half the 
weight of male witnesses in a court of 
law, Islam gives women lower status 
then men? 
0.028 0.215 0.169 0.375 16.476 0.200 
c) Aspired Levels of Closeness to God 
Do you aspire to have the time, a place, 
and freedom to pray and to pray 
regularly? 
0.990 0.098 0.996 0.059 0.000 0.999 
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Do you aspire to have the time, a place, 
and freedom to read the Quran and to 
read the Quran regularly? 
0.995 0.069 0.964 0.184 0.0207 0.886 
Do you aspire to have the time, freedom, 
and the means to do the Haaj? 
1.000 0.000 0.982 0.132 2.923 0.087 
Do you aspire to have religious virtue in 
the eyes of those around her? 
0.980 0.138 0.931 0.252 0.000 0.976 
Do you aspire to have religious virtue in 
her own eyes? 
0.990 0.098 0.985 0.119 0.482 0.487 
Do you aspire to have religious virtue in 
the eyes of Allah? 
1.000 0.000 0.982 0.132 2.880 0.090 
Source: Own data  
Note: The answer of each question is a dummy therefore where 1 and 0 correspond 
respectively to the answer “yes” or “no”, with the only exception concerning the first 
question on ritual practice. The answer of question 1 goes from 0 to 6 and each value 
corresponds respectively to the following response: one, two, three, four, five, five plus 
night prayer. 
 
Thus, looking across the sub-variables of levels of religiosity, it is 
difficult to argue that madrasa education leads to significantly 
higher levels of religiosity. On the two most critical measures of 
levels of religiosity, desire for closeness to good, and conviction 
in fairness of Islam, the girls in colleges show equally high scores 
(see Bano, 2015). Besides, in her paper, Bano explains another 
aspects concerning the results offered by the table 1 as follows: 
“It is also relevant to consider that ethnographich fieldwork 
carried out in Pakistan shows that group-effect in madrasas 
rather than personal convinction in religion is most likely the 
main reason explaining the relatively higher number of prayers 
per day for madrasa girls comparing to college. In fact, in 
madrasas, students have to attend prayers and daily Quran 
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reading as part of publicly visible rituals. To measure if actually 
madrasa students have a significantly higher level of religiosity, 
there is the need of furthering the reaserch at a slightly deeper 
level as shown in the next chapter.”. 
 
 
3.5 The Model  
Many studies have suggested and empirically proved the 
presence of parental influence, either direct or indirect, on the 
religiosity of their offspring (Martin, White and Perlman 2003). 
We show similar results in case of madrasa education and 
college students through a probit model, similar to one used by 
Asadullah and Chaudhury (2010), using level of religiosity as a 
dependent variable. 
 
= CMiβ1 + Piβ2 + Ziβ3 + vi,    (1) 
                                                                                                                                
where “i” is an index identifying each student interviewed 
whereas “j” is an index indicating the number of the question 
related to the level of religiosity which corresponds to the 
dependent variable (j=1,2,3,4). CM is a dummy specifying 
whether a female student is going to a secular school or to a 
madrasa whereas P contains personal characteristics and attitude 
of female students including accommodation, level of education, 
health condition, number of hours spent per day watching 
television; Z identifies a list of household characteristics of the 
respondent.  
There are few variables that need further explanation. Female 
student level of education completed is a categorical variable 
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which range goes from 1 to 4 as follows: 1=middle school 
completed, 2=Matric/O Level completed; 3=F.A./F.Sc./A Level 
completed; 4=B.A./B.Sc./B.Com/B.Ed level completed. Rate of 
health is another categorical variable ranging from 1 to 5 and the 
values correspond to the following questions: 1=very good; 
2=good; 3=normal; 4=poor; 5=very poor. The limit of this variable 
is the answers come from a subjective point of view of each 
student because there was no doctor to check their health status. 
Level of internal locus of control is again a categorical variable 
and the students were expected to give a preference to the 
following statement: “I believe my chances of success depend on 
my own abilities”. The variable ranges from 1 to 4 where: 
1=agree strongly; 2=agree; 3=disagree; 4=disagree strongly. 
Since we are interested in assessing the role of parental 
education on the level of religiosity of female students, we re-
write Eqn. (1) in the following form: 
 
= CMiβ1 + Piβ2 + Ziβ3 + E iβ4 + vi.     (2) 
 
The second equation has the same notation and specification 
of the first one except for the presence of the additional covariate 
E which is a categorical variable identifying the level of 
education of the father and mother of each female student36. In 
case of a positive and significant coefficient of the added 
variable, we can expect the presence of educated parents effect.  
                                                          
36 The variable indicating the level of education of the mother and father is a 
categorical variable and it has the following values:  
1= none, 2=primary, 3=middle, 4= matric/O Level,  
5= FA/FSc/A-Levels, 6=BA/BSc/BCom/BEd, 6=MA/MSc/MCom/more; 7= 
professional. 
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Table 2 is a summary of the main characteristics of female 
students regarding personal attributes, household information, 
parental economic background and level of education. All given 
information is filtered according to the school type, either 
madrasa or secular. Most of the variables are dummies, three of 
them are categorical and continuous, as explained in note 1. 
We can already see some main differences between madrasa 
and secular female students. The former live in an 
accommodation provided by the madrasa and have limited or no 
access to the television while the situation is reverse for college 
girls. Both groups seem to have, on average, almost the same 
level of education and rate of health as well as the dummy 
regarding the presence of any disability. Surprisingly madrasa 
students are more likely to have a higher level of internal locus 
of control though the difference is not so significant.  
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Table 2. Female students’ main characteristics by school type 
Variables Madrasa     Secular     
  Mean 
Std. 
dev. 
 N Mean Std. dev.  N 
Personal characteristics and 
attitudes 
            
Live in an accommodation 
provided by the school 
0.642 0.481 187 0.182 0.387 269 
Female student level of 
education completed 
2.574 0.805 195 2.491 0.536 277 
# of hours spent per day 
watching tv 
1.841 1.464 189 3.408 1.582 277 
Presence of disability 0.005 0.072 194 0.003 0.060 277 
Rate of health 2.386 0.852 194 2.563 0.901 277 
Level of internal locus of 
control 
1.936 0.897 189 1.712 0.635 274 
Aspire have job on your own 0.830 0.376 171 0.792 0.406 270 
              
Parental profile and economic 
background 
            
Mother alive 0.964 0.186 195 0.972 0.166 282 
Father alive 0.933 0.250 195 0.911 0.284 282 
1st, 2nd, 3rd..child of your 
parents 
3.588 2.104 187 2.861 1.686 274 
Father income 15382 14434 188 114394 561352 235 
Father own any land 0.831 0.375 190 0.736 0.441 269 
Father read newspaper 0.533 0.500 182 0.765 0.424 269 
              
Level of religiosity             
Fasting during Ramadan 0.989 0.101 195 0.904 0.295 282 
Donating sadaqa 0.961 0.192 183 0.901 0.299 263 
Read translated Qur'an 0.118 0.323 195 0.330 0.471 282 
Willing to allow your 
husband marry another wife 
0.526 0.506 138 0.166 0.373 276 
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Source: own survey data. 
Most of the data are dummies with the exception of level of education completed, # of 
hours spent watching tv per day, rate of health, level of locus of control, the number of 
child born corresponding to each girl interviewed in order inside the family, and father 
income. This last one is a continuous variable. The level of education completed has the 
following values:1=Middle school completed; 2=Matric/O Levels; 3= F.A./F.Sc./A 
Levels; 4=B.A./B.Sc./B.Com/B.Ed. The rate of health is rated as: 1= very good; 2=good; 
3= normal; 4=poor; 5= very poor. The level of locus of control is rated according to the 
answer of the statement “I believe my chances of success depend on my own abilities” 
as follows: 1=agree strongly; 2=agree; 3=disagree; 4=disagree strongly. 
 
Interesting differences and similarities are visible in parental 
profile and economic background of students from the two 
categories of educational institutions. Girls from both the 
madrasas as well as secular colleges generally have both parents 
alive but madrasa girls seem to have more elder siblings and 
record lower father income comparing to their counter parts in 
colleges. College girls on the average also have more fathers who 
read newspaper. When compared to students in colleges, 
madrasa girls seem to have a little higher level of religiosity as 
expressed through their responses to questions about fasting 
during Ramadan, giving sadaqa and having the willingness to 
allow their husband to marry another wife but a lower one in 
regard to reading translated Qur’an. 
We are mostly interested in analysing the existence of a 
possible educated parental interaction effect on female students’ 
level of religiosity. Table 3 (a and b) reports the marginal effects 
of the probit model for eight sets of regressions where the 
dependent variable is the level of religiosity measured through 
four questions on religiosity. The dependent variable is a binary 
result following the answers that female students gave to the 
following questions: “Do you fast during Ramadan?”; “Do you 
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regularly donate money under the form of sadaqa?”; “Have you 
read the Qur’an with translation?” and “Will you be willing to 
allow your husband to marry another wife?”. The answer of the 
first question is either “occasionally”, then the dependent 
variable takes the value of 0, or “always” therefore y is equal to 
1. The answer of the second question is either positive, and in 
that case it takes the value of 1, or negative therefore the 
dependent variable is equal to 0. Regarding the third question, 
we consider as zero all the answers giving “no” or “some parts” 
as a response and 1 if the response was “the entire Qur’an”. 
Finally, the last question is a simple dummy which takes the 
value of 1 for a positive answer or zero otherwise.  
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Table 3a. Probit model of determinants of students’ 
characteristics and household profile towards level of religiosity 
measured with three different variables, with and without 
control for parental education (only marginal effects are listed) 
  
  
Fast during Ramadan Donate sadaqa 
  
  (Eqn. 1) (Eqn. 2) (Eqn. 1) (Eqn. 2) 
Attended madrasa 0.068* 0.033 0.076* 0.069 
  (0.036) (0.031) (0.039) (0.042) 
Level of mother 
education 
  -0.020**   0.005 
    (0.009)   (0.006) 
Level of father 
education 
  0.014*   -0.009 
    (0.007)   (0.007) 
N 298 293 283 278 
Pseudo R2 0.179 0.252 0.160 0.171 
Note: Standard errors in parentheses. * significant at 10%; ** significant at 5%; *** 
significant at 1%. Only marginal effects are listed. 
Source: own survey data. 
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Table 3b. Probit model of determinants of students’ 
characteristics and household profile towards level of religiosity 
measured with three different variables, with and without 
control for parental education (only marginal effects are listed) 
 
  
Read translated Qur'an 
Allow your husband 
  marry another wife 
  (Eqn. 1) (Eqn. 2) (Eqn. 1) (Eqn. 2) 
Attended madrasa -0.175** -0.059 0.192* 0.167 
  (0.075) (0.088) (0.102) (0.120) 
Level of mother 
education 
  0.001   -0.036* 
    (0.021)   (0.021) 
Level of father 
education 
  0.058*** 
  
0.037* 
    (0.020)   (0.020) 
N 275 271 230 228 
Pseudo R2 0.198 0.242 0.120 0.138 
Note: Standard errors in parentheses. * significant at 10%; ** significant at 5%; *** 
significant at 1%. Only marginal effects are listed. 
Source: own survey data. 
 
Regression results reported in table 3a (column 1-2) explores 
the level of religiosity given by the question about fasting during 
Ramadan. In our specification, the key determinant is the 
variable related to madrasa attendance. After controlling for 
personal attitudes and household socio-economic background 
listed already in table 2 (which are not shown in table 3a and b 
for space constraint), we find that madrasa female students are 
almost 7% more likely to fast during Ramadan comparing to 
their secular school peers. However, as soon as we add two 
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covariates (column 2) related to the level of education of girls’ 
parents, the madrasa effect disappears. The first column refers to 
equation 1 whereas the second column to equation 2 and so on 
and so forth for each of the following questions. An interesting 
result is that the higher is the level of mother education less 
likely is the probability of a girl to fast during Ramadan. 
However, the relationship runs in the opposite direction in case 
of educated father. It seems that a more educated mother allows 
the daughter greater degree of freedom in choosing which ritual 
practices to observe. More educated fathers, however, seem to 
encourage higher degree of religious observance within the 
household.       
 Almost the same pattern appears to hold also in the other 
two cases regarding donating sadaqa and the girls’ being willing 
to allow their husband to have another wife. As soon as we 
control for the level of parents’ education (see column 4 of table 
3a and 3b), madrasa attendance loses significance but father 
education shows a positive relation with a girls’ willingness to 
allow her husband to have another wife. In fact, in the fourth 
question, students are almost 4% more likely to allow their 
husband to have a second wife, the higher the level of father 
education (column 4 table 3b) while the opposite result with 
almost the same magnitude happens in the case of mothers with 
higher education. The results related to the second question (“Do 
you regularly donate money in the form of sadaqa?”), do not 
show any significance relationship to the parental level of 
education but, at the same time, once we control for parental 
level of education, madrasa attendance effect again disappears.  
These results become even more interesting, when we see the 
answer to the third question aimed at measuring religiosity on 
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which there is a significant difference in response, ‘Have you 
read the Qur’an with translation?’  Since there is a negative sign 
in front of the estimate it means in case of this question we have 
a “college effect37” instead of “madrasa effect”. Yet, again this 
school type effect disappears after controlling for parents’ level 
of education. Further, the more educated the father is, almost 7% 
more likely is the female students in reading Qur’an with 
translation. When it comes to interpreting the significance of this 
question for an individual’s level of religiosity, we should keep 
in mind that all the girls responded positively to reading the 
Qur’an in its original language namely Arabic. Thus, those who 
are trying to read the translated version in addition to the Arabic 
version are trying to understand its actual meaning more deeply 
by reading it in their mother tongue. 
Summarizing the above results, according to equation 1, our 
results do report the existence of madrasa attendance effect or 
certain important dimensions of one’s level of individual 
religiosity, however, this effect disappears when we control for 
parental education. There appears to be a distinct and significant 
correlation between parental education and female students’ 
level of religiosity. It is especially evident through analysis of 
questions one (Do you fast during Ramadan) and question four 
(Will you be willing to allow your husband to marry another 
wife?). Our data shows that higher educated mothers are more 
supportive of breaking traditional mind set than the fathers. 
                                                          
37 With college effect, we indicate that a difference in the level of religiosity 
between the two groups does exist and it is higher for college girls. This case, 
though, is very rare and it appears only for the question asking about reading 
the Qur’an with translation. 
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Gender development programs thus need to focus more targeted 
programmes towards changing the attitudes of the fathers.  
 
3.6 Further controls  
Our results are supported by a set of 16 regressions which 
represent our robustness checks; they are all summarized in 
table 4 (a and b) and 5 (a and b). We tried to add one and two 
variables to check whether the results given by the marginal 
effects still confirm our findings. Table 4a and 4b show eight 
regressions which are the same as the ones presented in the 
benchmark table (table 3a and 3b) with the only difference that, 
this time, we added one more variable concerning female 
students’ desire or ambition: a dummy variable asking whether 
she has any aspiration of having a job on her own (where 1 
corresponds to an affirmative answer and zero otherwise). Table 
4a and 4b reports the results which are identified by the 
following equations:  
 
 = CMiβ1 + Piβ2 + Ziβ3 + Jiβ4 + vi ,   (3)                                                                                                                                                                                    
 
= CMiβ1 + Piβ2 + Ziβ3 + Jiβ4 + E iβ5 + vi38.  (4)                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                
 
Notation and specification of the above equations are the 
same as Eqn. (1) and (2); the only difference is the addition of the 
                                                          
38 In this equation you can notice that Z is the same as the one in Eqn. (1 and 2) 
because it includes the same variables listed in table 3 related to family socio-
economic background of female students. The same holds for P, as far as 
personal characteristics and attitudes variables of female students is concerned. 
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dummy J which identifies the aspiration of having a job on your 
own.  
Table 5a and 5b represent another robustness check which 
differentiates from the previous table because, apart from the 
aspiration question, we have added another dummy variable: 
female students were asked whether their father reads 
newspaper (if positive then the variable assumes the value of 1, 
otherwise 0).  The set of eight regressions have, therefore, 
another identification which slightly differs from the previous 
one as follows: 
 
 = CMiβ1 + Piβ2 + Ziβ3 + Jiβ4 + Niβ5 + vi,      (5)                                                                                                                                                                                  
 
= CMiβ1 + Piβ2 + Ziβ3 + Jiβ4 + Niβ5 + E iβ6 + vi. (6)                                                                                         
 
In this case, another variable (N) is added which reports the 
dummy related to the question about whether or not the girl’s 
father reads a newspaper on daily basis.  
For all the dimensions of religiosity analysed in table 4 and 5 
(both a and b), madrasa effect disappears again as soon as we 
control for parental level of education and the level of 
significance is almost the same as for the ones in table 3a and 3b; 
“college effect” persists in question 3. Another interesting point 
to note is the repeated negative sign in front of mother’s level of 
education; again, it confirms the fact that it is less likely that a 
higher educated mother has a positive effect on the level of 
religiosity of her daughter(s). On the other side, father level of 
education presents constantly a positive sign therefore a female 
student is 1% (in the case of fasting during Ramadan) or 4% (in 
the case of allowing your husband to marry another wife) more 
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likely to be more religious, in terms of practical actions, the 
higher the level of education of the father.  In sum, the result that 
madrasa effect disappears once we control for parental level of 
education persists in all robustness checks. 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 100 
 
Table 4a Rob. Check 1. More variables: aspire to have a job on 
your own (only marginal effects are listed) 
 
  Y1: Fast during Ramadan Y2: Donate sadaqa 
  
    
  (Eqn. 7) (Eqn. 8) (Eqn. 7) (Eqn. 8) 
Attended madrasa 0.066** 0.032 0.072* 0.06 
  (0.032) (0.027) (0.038) (0.039) 
Level of mother 
education 
  -0.019**   0.003 
    (0.009)   (0.005) 
Level of father 
education 
  0.013*   -0.008 
    (0.007)   (0.006) 
Aspire to have a job on 
your own 
-0.061* -0.042* -0.046 -0.041 
  (0.036) (0.025) (0.037) (0.036) 
N 289 285 274 270 
Pseudo R2 0.203 0.277 0.182 0.196 
Note: Standard errors in parentheses. * significant at 10%; ** significant at 5%; 
*** significant at 1%. Only marginal effects are listed. 
Source: own survey data. 
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Table 4b Rob. Check 1. More variables: aspire to have a job on 
your own (only marginal effects are listed) 
 
  Y3: Read translated Qur'an Y4: allow your husband 
  
  
marry another wife 
  (Eqn. 7) (Eqn. 8) (Eqn. 7) (Eqn. 8) 
Attended madrasa -0.179** -0.043 0.187* 0.166 
  (0.075) (0.091) (0.104) (0.122) 
Level of mother education   0.010   -0.036* 
    (0.022)   (0.021) 
Level of father education   0.056***   0.037* 
    (0.020)   (0.020) 
Aspire to have a job on your 
own 
0.104 0.095 0.024 0.011 
  (0.077) (0.073) (0.072) (0.072) 
N 266 263 227 225 
Pseudo R2 0.212 0.257 0.120 0.136 
Note: Standard errors in parentheses. * significant at 10%; ** significant at 5%; *** 
significant at 1%. Only marginal effects are listed. 
Source: own survey data. 
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Table 5a Rob. Check 2. More variables: aspire own job and father 
read news (only marginal effects are listed) 
 
  Y1: Fast during Ramadan Y2: Donate sadaqa 
  
    
  (Eqn. 9) (Eqn. 10) (Eqn. 9) (Eqn. 10) 
Attended madrasa 0.075** 0.033 0.068* 0.059 
  (0.030) (0.024) (0.039) (0.038) 
Level of mother education   -0.017**   0.003 
    (0.008)   (0.005) 
Level of father education   0.009   -0.008 
    (0.006)   (0.007) 
Aspire to have a job on your 
own 
-0.060* -0.038* -0.044 -0.041 
  (0.034) (0.022) (0.039) (0.037) 
Father read newspaper 0.038* 0.028* -0.006 -0.000 
  (0.021) (0.017) (0.016) (0.016) 
N 286 282 273 269 
Pseudo R2 0.231 0.309 0.184 0.197 
Note: Standard errors in parentheses. * significant at 10%; ** significant at 5%; *** 
significant at 1%. Only marginal effects are listed. 
Source: own survey data 
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Table 5b Rob. Check 2. More variables: aspire own job and father 
read news (only marginal effects are listed) 
 
  Y3: Read translated Qur'an Y4: allow your husband 
  
  
marry another wife 
  (Eqn. 9) (Eqn. 10) (Eqn. 9) (Eqn. 10) 
Attended madrasa -0.152** -0.045 0.185* 0.165 
  (0.076) (0.093) (0.106) (0.123) 
Level of mother 
education 
  0.012   -0.035* 
    (0.023)   (0.021) 
Level of father 
education 
  0.047**   0.038* 
    (0.021)   (0.021) 
Aspire to have a job on 
your own 
0.104 0.095 0.026 0.013 
  (0.076) (0.074) (0.072) (0.072) 
Father read newspaper 0.160*** 0.077 0.009 -0.016 
  (0.061) (0.064) (0.061) (0.066) 
N 263 260 225 223 
Pseudo R2 0.233 0.261 0.120 0.135 
Note: Standard errors in parentheses. * significant at 10%; ** significant at 5%; *** 
significant at 1%. Only marginal effects are listed. 
Source: own survey data 
 
 
3.7 Selection bias issue  
The robustness checks just shown in the previous chapter, 
support, from one side, the robustness of the main results shown 
in table 3. On the other side, there is still another methodological 
concern that raises. Initially, in our study, the marginal effects of 
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our probit model show a difference between the level of 
religiosity of the two groups of students. Even though, this 
difference disappears once we control for mother and father 
level of education. This result might also indicate that parental 
education is at least equally or more relevant to the level of 
religiosity of female students than madrasa versus college 
education. The methodological concern is about the fact that 
there could be some form of selection bias or endogeneity bias 
due to the socio-economic differences among the two groups of 
students. In fact, the distribution of female students over 
categories could have been done in a selective way and not 
random. In fact, female student could have been enrolled to a 
madrasa instead of a secular school because of the will of very 
religious parents or because of socio-economic background or 
the way madrasa are perceived and valued by the society as a 
whole. The reasons can be different but all of them undermine 
the randomness of the survey. Although, aware of the fact that 
only an instrumental variable can solve this issue, we try to 
include the selection bias problem into the empirical 
specification through the estimation of the Heckman selection 
model (Heckman 1976, 1979). 
Heckman selection model, which in our case corresponds to 
the two step estimation, includes two processes related to each 
other which are defined by two equations.  
The first equation determining the sample selection is called 
the “selection equation” and it is the following (Greene, 2012): 
 
Zi = w’iγ + u1i 
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This is the equation for the probit estimates where “i” are the 
observations, “z” is the dummy variable arising the selection 
problem while “w” is the set of covariates explaining the 
dependent variable and “u” represents the error term. With our 
dataset, the selection equation corresponds to the following: 
 
CMi =  Xiβ1 + E iβ2 + vi 
 
Where “i” is an index identifying each student interviewed, 
“CM” is the dummy regarding the enrolment into a madrasa or a 
secular school. The independent variables are related to the 
socio-economic background of the female students available in 
the dataset (X): father income, a dummy whether the father own 
any land, the number of child among siblings, the level of 
mother and father education and a dummy on whether at least 
one of the parent can speak English. This last one is the variable 
that does not appear in the regression model.  We added parents’ 
level of education (E) because it is possible that it is correlated 
with the decision of sending their children to a madrasa or a 
secular school. This correlation could exist because, for example 
madrasa schools are located in places where mostly skilled 
people are living or because low educated people has been 
trained into a madrasa school and do not recognize any benefit 
of a further education. 
The second equation of the Heckman selection model is the 
regression model or “regression equation”: 
 
Yi = v’iß + u2i; 
 
And the following has to hold: 
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u1 ~ N(0,1) 
u2 ~ N(0,σ) 
corr(u1,u2) = ρ 
Again, “i” identifies the observations, “Y” is the dependent 
variable of the model being analyzed while “v” is the set of 
explanatory variables and “u” is the error term. 
Translated into our dataset, the regression equation 
corresponds to the following one: 
 
= CMiβ1 + Piβ2 + Ziβ3 + vi 
and  
= CMiβ1 + Piβ2 + Ziβ3 + E iβ4 + vi. 
 
where “i” is an index identifying each student interviewed 
whereas “j” is an index indicating the number of the question 
related to the level of religiosity which corresponds to the 
dependent variable (j=1,2,3,4). The above equations are the same 
as equation 1 and 2, with and without parental education E39. In 
fact, the regression includes as a dependent variable the level of 
religiosity and the covariates are the same as the one listed in 
table 2.  
Our model regression calculates unbiased estimates when 
ρ=0 and biased otherwise. We suspect the existence of selection 
bias therefore the two above equations, the regression and the 
selection equation, are related to each other through the non-zero 
correlation between their error terms. Through Heckman 
                                                          
39 To avoid repetition, the explanation of the variables is the same listed in 
equation 1 in chapter 3.5, the model. 
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selection model, we try to estimate consistent estimates for the 
parameters present in our model. 
Our interest is mostly on the effects of the unmeasured 
characteristics of the surveyed female students on the choice of 
being enrolled on either a madrasa or a secular school. The 
coefficients of the explanatory variables cannot give this kind of 
information because it is not available but we can still obtain it 
through the residuals of the probit regression in the selection 
model. Thanks to them, it can be created a selection bias control 
factor called Lambda which corresponds to the Inverse Mill’s 
Ratio (see also Guo, Shenyang, and Fraser, 2014). Lambda is a 
summarizing measure able to represent the effects of the 
unmeasured characteristics related to the enrolment decision. 
For this reason, lambda is added as an additional independent 
variable into the main equation because also the unmeasured 
characteristics effects are related to the level of religiosity. This is 
the process behind the creation of unbiased coefficient. The 
tables below show the results of the Heckman selection model: 
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Table 6a. Heckman selection model 
  Eqn. 1 Eqn. 2 Eqn. 1 Eqn. 2 
  Fast during Ramadan Donate sadaqa 
Regression model         
Attending madrasa 0.089* 0.05 0.103** 0.099* 
  (0.046) (0.097) (0.047) (0.051) 
Level of mother education   -0.042   0.006 
    (0.034)   (0.019) 
Level of father education   0.009   -0.008 
    (0.029)   (0.013) 
Constant 0.333* 0.286 0.812*** 0.83*** 
  (0.186) (0.368) (0.169) (0.171) 
Select            
Father income 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000 
  (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) 
Father own any land -0.002 -0.002 0.229 0.229 
  (0.217) (0.217) (0.3) (0.3) 
Number of child among 
siblings 
0.005 0.005 0.000 0.000 
  (0.051) (0.051) (0.079) (0.079) 
Level of mother education -0.06 -0.06 -0.15 -0.15 
  (0.063) (0.063) (0.103) (0.103) 
Level of father education -0.061 -0.061 -0.037 -0.037 
  (0.068) (0.068) (0.104) (0.104) 
Parent speak English 0.169 0.169 -0.121 -0.121 
  (0.209) (0.209) (0.318) (0.318) 
Constant 1.368*** 1.368*** 2.343*** 2.343*** 
  (0.379) (0.379) (0.596) (0.596) 
Rho -0.147 1.00 0.304 0.316 
Sigma 0.248 0.58 0.026 0.26 
Mills         
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Lambda -0.037 0.58 0.079 0.082 
  (0.266) (0.993) (0.324) (0.67) 
N 287 287 294 294 
Note: Standard errors in parentheses. * significant at 10%; ** significant at 5%; *** 
significant at 1%. Only marginal effects are listed. 
Source: own survey data. 
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Table 6b. Heckman selection model 
  Eqn. 1 Eqn. 2 Eqn. 1 Eqn. 2 
  Read translated Qur'an Marry another wife 
Regression model         
Attending madrasa -0.024 0.009 0.244** 0.224** 
  (0.195) (0.162) (0.115) (0.114) 
Level of mother education   0.001   -0.026 
    (0.053)   (0.024) 
Level of father education   0.021   0.045** 
    (0.046)   (0.021) 
Constant 0.355 0.344 0.208 0.124 
  (0.779) (0.584) (0.266) (0.323) 
Select            
Father income 0.000 0.000 0.000** 0.000** 
  (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) 
Father own any land -0.044 -0.044 -0.377 -0.377 
  (0.222) (0.222) (0.255) (0.255) 
Number of child among 
siblings 
-0.011 -0.011 -0.017 -0.017 
  (0.051) (0.052) (0.051) (0.051) 
Level of mother education -0.06 -0.06 0.281*** 0.281*** 
  (0.065) (0.065) (0.072) (0.072) 
Level of father education -0.063 -0.063 0.072 0.072 
  (0.070) (0.07) (0.075) (0.075) 
Parent speak English 0.2 0.2 0.637*** 0.638*** 
  (0.212) (0.212) (0.245) (0.245) 
Constant 1.432*** 1.432*** -0.889** -0.889** 
  (0.387) (0.387) (0.376) (0.376) 
Rho 1.00 1.00 0.133 0.264 
Sigma 1274 0.955 0.371 0.369 
Mills         
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Lambda 1274 0.955 0.05 0.097 
  (1.238) (1.382) (0.094) (0.153) 
N 278 278 297 296 
Note: Standard errors in parentheses. * significant at 10%; ** significant at 5%; *** 
significant at 1%. Only marginal effects are listed. 
Source: own survey data. 
 
One of the most important outcome of the table above is 
given by the value labeled as “lambda” (rho*sigma). In fact, the 
lambda coefficient, if significant, shows whether there is 
selection bias and what is its direction. In the case of a significant 
and positive coefficient, this would mean that the madrasa 
students compared to the secular ones, present unmeasured 
characteristics positively related to the level of religiosity. By 
looking at our table, though, lambda does not show any 
significance level. 
Regarding the coefficients of the level of religiosity and 
parental education, they are always higher than the original 
model and this divergence might be due to selection bias issues. 
Moreover, only for the first level of religiosity, fasting during 
Ramadan, we can see that by adding parental level of education 
the significance of being enrolled into a madras or a college 
school disappears, therefor there is no madrasa effect. Another 
observation is that mother and father level of education is almost 
never significant, with the only exception of father education in 
the last case where female students were asked whether they 
agree their husband to marry another wife. In this case it is 
positive and it contributes in increasing the level of religiosity of 
their offsprings. There are indeed some caveats regarding our 
methodology. Though, even by adopting Heckman selection 
model, we are not able solve completely the problem of the 
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selection bias, which partially relates also to endogeneity. In fact, 
there still holds the doubt that those students enrolling into a 
madrasa are more likely to have a higher level of religiosity. 
Besides, we have to consider also measurement errors, which is 
quite possible due to the fact that we cannot actually check, for 
example, whether father income is actually what the father earns 
and maybe, the research assistant could have made a mistake 
while inserting the data into the computer or simply they might 
have misinterpreted some handwriting. Again, there can be 
many omitted variables which are supposed to be essential for 
our initial analysis on the level of religiosity. Unfortunately, the 
distance and the difficulty to communicate from abroad with the 
female students did not help to ask other important questions 
that could be added on the regression at the time when the study 
initiated. Another reason that drive to endogeneity is the 
simultaneous causality. The possible solution for this problem 
can be the use of an instrumental variable. One example can be 
the distance from the closest mosque from the place where the 
female students were living at the time of the interview. These 
data are not available for the moment, but if the budget 
constraint for the research in Pakistan can be overcome, this data 
can still be collected by the assistant researchers that every five 
years go to Pakistan for further interviews to the same female 
students as they try to keep track of them as much as they can 
along their life. Another solution can be that of adopting a quasi 
natural experiment for the identification by being cautious of 
possible internal validity concerns. Moreover, it would be 
interesting to deepen our research to understand the relevance of 
the “college effect” and to see if it shows a specific pattern as we 
have shown in case of “madrasa effect”. 
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3.8 Conclusion 
We contribute to that part of literature focused on the analyses of 
education and level of religiosity as well as parental influence on 
their offspring. We analyse female students attending either 
madrasa or secular colleges in urban area of Pakistan. Is it the 
level of religiosity affected by attending a madrasa or a secular 
school? And if so, does the level of parental education have any 
influence in that? Our results suggest that assumptions about 
madrasa attendance effect on student’s level of religiosity in 
Pakistan are exaggerated. Apart from the fact that we found no 
significant difference between the levels of religiosity of madrasa 
girls as compared to those in modern colleges, our analysis 
shows that any differences in religious outlook are influenced 
not by religious school attendance but by a number of socio-
economic differences in the profile of the two groups, most 
noticeably the difference in the level of education of their 
parents. Most importantly, our results demonstrate a strong 
effect of mother’s education on a student’s ability to exercise 
more progressive choices and exercise greater freedom to choose 
whether or not to undertake religious rituals or conform to 
conservative religious norms that can be confining of her agency, 
such as allowing a husband to have a second wife. Involving 
mothers in gender empowerment programs aimed at young girls 
is thus likely to prove an effective strategy. At the same time, the 
links that we have found between higher levels of fathers’ 
education and increased religiosity in girls highlights the need to 
design interventions targeted directly at male family members to 
make them active agents in gender empowerment programs. 
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Chapter 4  
Catching-up Trajectories 
over Global Value Chains 
 
4.1 Introduction  
In the recent years, global production sharing has increased and 
has boosted trade in intermediate inputs. Researchers have 
focused their efforts in trying to develop new measures of trade, 
consistent with these changes. Another strand of research has 
started to consider persistent factors which are interconnected 
with output and trade performance, such as institutional quality. 
In this work, we aim at providing an empirical contribution 
on these subjects, by trying to interpret the interdependence 
between production, input choices and specialization path. For 
this purpose, we stress the role of international sourcing of 
intermediates and labor force educational attainments on output 
performance. Moreover, we include economic and financial 
institutional quality along with traditional Heckscher-Ohlin 
factor endowments as sources of comparative advantage. 
We find that there is a certain degree of substitutability 
between domestic and international sourcing of intermediate 
inputs as well as between labor force with different skill levels. 
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These findings suggest that the policy implications based on 
potential benefits of greater involvement in global supply chains 
may not be straightforward. Moreover, consistently with recent 
empirical studies, we find that there is a strong positive effect of 
both economic and financial institutions on specialization, 
controlling for traditional Heckscher-Ohlin determinants. 
This work is organised as follows. Section 4.2 reviews the 
literature on the subject and the motivation related to the paper. 
Section 4.3 introduces the dataset. Section 4.4 describes the 
empirical specification and presents the findings and section 4.5 
adds some robustness checks. Finally, section 4.6 concludes. 
 
4.2 Motivation and Literature Review  
This work adds to the recently growing literature on 
institutions as a further determinant of comparative advantage 
along with other traditional sources of international trade theory, 
in the light of the boost of trade in intermediate inputs and the 
emergence of global value chains. The theoretical literature has 
highlighted the relationship of interdependence between agents 
along a sequential production process and their specialization 
within the stage of the value chain (Costinot, 2012; Costinot et al, 
2012). Additionally, Costinot (2009) suggests that the quality of 
labor force education and institutional characteristics are both 
relevant sources of specialization in the more complex 
industries. In this paper, we exploit these insights in two ways. 
First, we estimate a production function common to all the 
countries and sectors, in order to underline the contribution of 
labor specialization and international sourcing from abroad to 
country-sectoral output. Then, we assess the interdependence of 
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production and specialization pattern, considering the (economic 
and financial) institutional component. Hence, we attempt to 
generalize the interdependences between specialization patterns 
and production performances in a Heckscher-Ohlin framework 
with a globally common technology and emphasize the role of 
institutional quality as a determinant of comparative advantage. 
With respect to previous empirical studies, our focus is at the 
macro-level. We do this making use of a novel panel dataset at 
country-sector level and employing new appropriate measures 
of comparative advantage (Wang et al, 2013) to encompass the 
phenomena of global supply chains and trade in value-added40. 
Our findings confirm the relationship of dependence between 
specialization and production and the role of both economic and 
financial institutions as determinants of comparative advantage. 
There are at least two strands of literature related to this 
paper. First, we explore this subject in the light of the growing 
interest of academics on the role of global value chains and the 
upsurge of trade in intermediate inputs and trade in value-
added. Secondly, this work relates to the recently growing 
empirical and theoretical literature on the institutions as sources 
of comparative advantage. 
The first strand of literature related to our work originates 
from the intensification of trade in intermediate goods, both 
among developed and less developed economies, due to the 
fragmentation and increase in complexity of production chains 
                                                          
40 The concepts of trade in value added and value added in trade are made 
clear by Stehrer (2012). 
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globally. Over 10 years, between 1995 and 2006, trade in 
intermediate goods and services increased 6.2 % yearly while 
intermediated services increased 7% on a yearly average. 
Miroudot et al (2009) find that more than half of international 
trade is represented by intermediate goods and services, that are 
not consumed directly but are used as inputs in the subsequent 
production process. The growth rate of trade in intermediate is 
the same as that of trade in final goods. Therefore the shares of 
intermediate and final goods and services have remained 
basically constant. In the age of globalisation and increasing 
fragmentation of production processes worldwide, this stable 
ratio between trade in intermediates and final goods may be 
explained by the fact that the internationalisation of trade has 
boosted both flows at the same pace. 
Our work is linked to the broader branch of research linking 
trade and development. Recent analysis include Taglioni and 
Wrinkler (2014), who discuss the effects of participation to global 
value chains in particular for businesses on development, and Zi 
(2014) who provides a theoretical framework. This work adds to 
the literature on the static and dynamic gains from trade through 
access to new imported intermediate goods, starting from Romer 
(1987) and Rivera-Batiz and Romer (1991). However, Koopman 
et al (2012) underline that the boost in intermediate trade renders 
standard trade statistics and measures less reliable and there is 
therefore need of a new framework which can capture the value 
flows embodied in trade. Their work is one of the first attempts 
to provide a common framework to decompose gross trade 
measures into value-added components with exact definitions 
and taking into account double counted items. Johnson and 
Noguera (2012) provide significant evidence of differences 
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between gross trade measures and novel value-added statistics 
in depicting bilateral production sharing relationships. 
This novel approach has, of course, several implications like 
on the assessment of the comparative advantage, based on 
traditional gross trade figures. Wang et al (2013) propose a more 
comprehensive framework with respect to Koopman et al (2012) 
aimed at decomposing trade flows at the bilateral sector level 
into several value-added and double counted components. 
Therefore, they improve the well-known Balassa (1965)’s 
revealed comparative advantage index by taking into account 
forward-looking trade flows, that is domestic and international 
production sharing. In our work, Wang et al (2013)’s new 
revealed comparative advantage represents the main point of 
specialization path at country-sector level. 
The second strand of literature related to this work relates to 
the interdependence between institutional quality and 
specialization pattern. The first empirical works on the impact of 
contracting institutions on comparative advantage are by Nunn 
(2007), which focuses on the hold-up problem, and by 
Levchenko (2007), which includes property rights in the 
definition of institutions. In the traditional model of contractual 
incompleteness (Williamson, 1985), the investments undertaken 
by a supplier of an input have a greater value within the 
relationship with the buyer of the input. Imperfect contract 
enforcement incentivizes the buyer to renegotiate the conditions 
of the agreement with the supplier. Under poor contract 
enforcement, the risk of hold-up by the input buyer renders 
production of the input supplier more costly and inefficient. 
Levchenko (2007) provides a general equilibrium model in 
which contract incompleteness is considered as an institutional 
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characteristic which varies across countries and sectors. In the 
model, the author implies that high quality contracting 
institutions are a source of comparative advantage in countries 
and sectors where the risk of hold-up is more prominent, that is 
where the relationship-specific investments are higher. Nunn 
(2007) is the first to define and measure contract intensities, that 
is the relationship-specific investment intensities of goods. 
Similarly, Acemoglu et al (2007) propose a theoretical framework 
which implies that differences in contracting institutions 
generates differences in comparative advantages. While many 
empirical studies focus on the impact of contracting institutions 
on horizontal specialization (across sectors), some study its 
impact on vertical specialization (Essaji and Fujiwara, 2012). 
While Nunn defines the concept of contract intensity, Levchenko 
instead defines institutional dependence. To sum up, there is 
already broad evidence that contracting institutions have an 
impact on trade and are a source of comparative advantage. 
Nunn and Trefler (2013) provide a rather extensive review of the 
empirical and theoretical literature on the relationship between 
institutions as a source of comparative advantage and 
international trade. The authors cite studies on different types of 
institutions affecting comparative advantage: contracting 
institutions, financial development institutions (Beck, 2003; 
Manova, 2008) and labor market institutions (Costinot, 2009). 
The empirical studies control for methodological problems such 
as omitted-variables bias and reverse causality. Institutions may 
be correlated with other country or industry characteristics (for 
instance, infrastructure) which have an impact on the 
specialization. In order to avoid the omitted-variables bias, the 
already cited empirical studies include fixed effects as well as 
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country-sector interaction terms and Heckscher-Ohlin factor 
endowments. On one hand, several types of institutions 
influence the specialization path in certain sectors; on the other 
hand, countries with a comparative advantage in institution-
intensive industries are more incentivized to invest in the quality 
of those institutions. Among other studies, Nunn (2007) 
addresses the issue of reverse causality between institutional 
quality and country specialization in specific sectors with the use 
of legal origins as instrumental variable. Financial environment 
can affect the specialization pattern of a country in several ways. 
The theoretical studies on the effect of financial market on 
comparative advantage highlight the role of credit constraints 
and sector differences in investments costs. For instance, Beck 
(2002) finds that countries with better developed financial 
systems have a comparative advantage in sectors where fixed 
costs are higher, such as manufacturing. However, Beck does not 
deal with endogeneity issues in a convincing manner. Chor 
(2010) examines all the institutional explanations of previous 
studies simultaneously and finds that, despite the effect of each 
institutional explanatory variable on trade pattern is small, all 
the determinants are significant. The institutional determinants 
employed by Levchenko (2007) and Nunn (2007) are particularly 
relevant, even after controlling for traditional sources of 
comparative advantage in a Heckscher-Ohlin setup such as 
relative factor endowments. 
In the light of the existing literature, our work has two main 
objectives. First, we estimate country-sector production function, 
by considering a shared common technology. Our objective is to 
emphasize the contribution of factor endowments and in 
particular that of different labor skills and of international 
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sourcing of intermediate inputs. The translog functional form 
allows us to estimate input substitutability, marginal returns and 
technological rate of change with a high degree of flexibility. 
Secondly, we investigate the channels through which 
specialization endogenously affects output performance. Along 
with traditional endowments determinants, economic and 
financial institutions are found to be relevant sources of 
comparative advantage and of the interdependence mechanism 
among specialization pattern, its determinants and production 
level. 
 
 
4.3 Data and Descriptive Statistics  
In this work, we mainly use three data sources for analysis: the 
World Input-Output Database (WIOD) which represents our 
basis, the Worldwide Governance Indicators (WGI) by 
Kaufmann et al (2009) and the Financial Development Indexes 
by the International Monetary Fund, where we source 
respectively economic and financial institution variables. 
Firstly, we exploit the World Input-Output Database (WIOD) 
which is one of the most up-to-date set of Inter-Country Input-
Output tables. It was created by a consortium of European 
research institutions and financially supported by the European 
Commission. Timmer et al. (2012) provide an extensive 
description of the WIOD database, its strengths and weaknesses, 
construction methods and sources. The dataset ranges from 1995 
to 2011, it covers 40 countries worldwide and 35 sectors. By 
looking at the single columns of the yearly World Input Output 
Tables (WIOT), we can highlight the traded value contribution of 
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intermediate inputs on the gross output at country-sector level 
and distinguish between domestic production sharing, that is the 
gross trade value of intermediate inputs sourced from other 
sectors in the country, and the value of foreign sourcing of 
intermediate inputs from abroad. 
In an additional section called Socio-economic Account, the 
WIOD also includes information on prices and quantities of 
factor inputs with country-industry data on employment 
(number of workers, wages and educational attainment), capital 
stocks, gross output and value added at current and constant 
prices at the industry level. The country-industry employment 
levels are broken up into three skill categories (high, medium 
and low) which follow the educational attainment classification 
of the International Standard Classification of Education 
(ISCED). 
The WIOD also contains all the information on final 
consumption absorbed domestically and gross export. Following 
Wang et al. (2013), we calculate a new measure of trade 
specialization, in the light of a higher fragmentation of 
production processes. While Balassa’s (1965) revealed 
comparative advantage (RCA) index is based on total gross 
exports, Wang et al.’s (2013) propose a new measure of revealed 
comparative advantage (NRCA, for short) which substitutes total 
gross exports with a forward-looking measure of domestic value 
added, derived from their disaggregated decomposition method 
of the WIOD gross exports. 
Due to a large number of missing values, we consider only 
the WIOD up to 2009 and we exclude Taiwan from the analysis 
in order to overcome the issue of data availability, as different 
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sources do not always distinguish between China and Taiwan or 
do not have data specifically on Taiwan. 
Secondly, we make use of the Worldwide Governance 
Indicators by Kaufmann et al (2009) employed by previous 
empirical studies as measures for institutional quality. The WGI 
is a panel dataset covering more than 200 countries since 1996 of 
six indicators of several dimensions of governance such as Voice 
and Accountability, Political Stability, Government Effectiveness, 
Regulatory Quality, Rule of Law and Control of Corruption. For 
the purpose of our analysis, we focus on one of the areas of WGI, 
that is the respect of citizens and the state for the institutions, 
and consider one specific variable, Rule of Law. Following the 
existing empirical literature, we use Rule of Law as a proxy for 
the quality of economic institutions. In particular, the WGI’ Rule 
of Law measures perceptions of the agents with respect to 
contract enforcement, property rights, police, courts and the 
probability of violence and crime. For an extensive analysis of 
the construction of the indexes and the potential bias related to 
survey data, we refer you to Kaufman et al. (2011). 
Thirdly, we include a recently developed dataset by the 
International Monetary Fund on financial development 
indicators covering 176 countries over the period between 1980 
and 2013 (Sahay et al, 2015). We focus on financial institutions 
only, including both bank and nonbank institutions such as 
insurance firms, mutual and pensions funds and other 
organizations. The financial institution index is constructed on 
the basis of twelve measures, grouped into three categories, 
depth, access and efficiency. Each index is normalized between 
zero and one. We refer you to Sahay et al (2015) for deeper 
analysis of the construction methods of the index. 
 131 
 
To sum up, our empirical study combines several still 
relatively unexploited data sources in the light of increasing 
importance of global value chains. The whole sample consists of 
39 countries, 35 sectors over a time span of 15 years from 1995 to 
2009. A more ample description of the data and the construction 
of the variables is provided in the appendix. 
 
4.3.1 Descriptive Statistics 
Table 1 provides summary statistics for the variables employed. 
Different country and year coverage are the reason why database 
sample sizes differ. There is considerable cross-country variation 
over the period considered and this is measured by the within-
standard-deviation. The mean values reflect the fact that the 
sample consist mainly of developed economies, since WIOD 
includes mostly European countries. 
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Table 1. Summary statistics 
 
Variable Obs Mean Std. Dev. 
Std. Dev. 
Within Min Max 
Real Gross 
Output 20235 414.69 1302.37 318.68 0.00 22525.65 
Capital 18950 66642.95 448422.20 78515.06 0.00 14100000.00 
High-Skill Labor 20340 299.31 1192.33 337.78 0.00 32592.52 
Medium-Skill 
Labor 20340 1068.23 5324.48 823.36 0.00 139872.40 
Low-Skill Labor 20340 1447.83 18016.14 968.67 0.00 518911.20 
Foreign inputs 19905 29.52 106.66 67.99 0.00 7771.90 
Domestic inputs 19905 178.33 577.22 206.29 0.00 14104.41 
Rule of Law 15015 0.88 0.82 0.11 -1.13 2.00 
Rule of Law - 
distance from the 
mean 15015 0.00 0.82 0.11 -1.97 1.11 
Financial 
Institutions 20475 0.60 0.20 0.10 0.05 0.97 
Financial 
Institutions - 
distance from the 
mean 20475 0.00 0.18 0.06 -0.42 0.31 
 
 
Table 2 gives pairwise correlation coefficients of the variables 
employed in the regressions. There is a strong correlation 
between real gross output and domestic inputs. This may be 
explained by the impact of domestic market size on participation 
in international production sharing. In fact, a large domestic 
market renders the country less dependable on foreign 
intermediates and more prone to sell the intermediate goods 
both internally and abroad (Kowalski et al, 2015). Medium-skill 
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labor force is correlated with both high-skill and low-skill 
employment and suggests some degree of complementarity 
between labor force with medium levels of education. The 
indicators of economic institutional quality (WGI Rule of Law) 
and financial institutions (IMF) are highly correlated with each 
other, as well as with their distance from the mean values. 
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Table 2. Pairwise correlation 
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Real Gross 
Output 1.00 
          
Capital 0.49 1.00 
         High-Skill 
Labor 0.46 0.15 1.00 
        Medium-
Skill Labor 0.26 0.06 0.71 1.00 
       Low-Skill 
Labor 0.08 0.01 0.22 0.61 1.00 
      Domestic 
inputs 0.92 0.34 0.41 0.26 0.09 1.00 
     Foreign 
inputs 0.44 0.09 0.15 0.11 0.03 0.56 1.00 
    
Rule of Law 0.11 0.08 -0.10 -0.17 -0.10 0.08 0.08 1.00 
   Rule of Law - 
distance 
from the 
mean 0.11 0.08 -0.10 -0.17 -0.10 0.07 0.08 0.99 1.00 
  Financial 
Institutions 0.16 0.09 -0.00 -0.04 -0.03 0.15 0.15 0.71 0.69 1.00 
 Financial 
Institutions-
distance 
from the 
mean 0.15 0.09 -0.02 -0.06 -0.04 0.14 0.13 0.76 0.76 0.92 1.00 
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We compare the traditional Balassa’s RCA and the NRCA based 
on the value-added decomposition by Wang et al. (2013) of the 
WIOD. Following Want et al (2013), we provide two examples of 
how traditional and value-added measures of RCA can differ 
and lead to misleading conclusion. The food, beverages and 
tobacco sector in China presents a comparative disadvantage 
over the time span considered while, in India, the sector shows a 
comparative advantage. Using the novel index with forward-
looking value-added measures, the revealed comparative export 
position of the two countries is reversed: China has a 
comparative advantage and India does not. 
Conversely, the analysis of the NRCAs in sector of retail 
trade gives a brighter picture of the Indian market with respect 
to the Chinese market, while the old RCAs follow opposite path. 
Graph 1 provides a clear representation of the dynamics of the 
indexes of the 2 sector in the 2 Asian countries. 
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Graph 1 - RCA Indexes for Exports 
 
 
RCA and NRCA indexes calculated for Chinese and Indian Sector 3 (Food Beverages 
and Tobacco) and Sector 21 (Retail Trade) using WIOD. 
 
We will skip all the considerations about the magnitudes and the 
quantitative significance of both indexes but we will focus 
instead only on the qualitative property of signaling a revealed 
comparative advantage or disadvantage. 
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Table 3. Comparison between NRCA and RCA 
 
  NRCA 
 RCA Disadvantage Advantage Total 
Disadvantage 51.92 10.55 62.47 
Advantage 5.06 32.46 37.53 
        
Total 56.98 43.02 100 
 
 
In more than 80 percent of the country-sectors over the time 
period under consideration, both measures are consistent with 
each other, that is either they both reveal a comparative 
advantage or a comparative disadvantage in the exporting sector 
of the country. However, the NRCA seems to overestimate more 
often a comparative advantage rather than underestimate a 
comparative disadvantage with respect to the traditional RCA. 
In fact, the share of observations when the NRCA is greater than 
1 while the RCA is lower than 1 is almost twice the share of the 
opposite case (10.6 percent compared to 5.1 percent). 
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Table 4. Comparison RCA vs NRCA India and China 
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c1 
agriculture, hunting, 
forestry and fishing 
1.530 0.860 down A 0.820 0.980 down A 
c2 
mining and 
quarrying 
0.438 0.898 down D 0.229 0.388 down D 
c3 
food, beverages and 
tobacco 
0.437 0.937 down A 0.513 0.950 stable D 
c4 
textiles and textiles 
products 
0.175 0.961 down A 0.851 0.984 down A 
c5 
leather, leather and 
footwear 
0.621 0.989 down A 0.292 0.989 down A 
c6 
wood and products 
of wood and cork 
0.443 0.663 down-up A 0.271 0.527 down-up 
A-
D-
A 
c7 
pulp, paper, 
printing and 
publishing 
0.445 -0.56 up D 0.161 0.950 down D 
c8 
coke, refined 
petroleum and 
nuclear fuel 
0.579 0.788 down D 0.278 0.953 up-down 
D-
A 
c9 
chemicals and 
chemical products 
0.489 0.771 stable A=D 0.079 0.892 up-down 
D-
A-
D 
c10 rubber and plastics 
0.184 0.776 
up-down-
up 
A 0.354 -0.078 up  D 
c11 
other non-metallic 
mineral 
0.427 0.939 down A 1.456 0.995 down A 
c12 
basic metals and 
fabricated metal 
0.207 -0.66 up A 0.203 0.624 stable D 
c13 machinery, nec 0.194 0.980 up D-A 0.039 0.839 up D 
c14 
electrical and 
optical equipment 
0.462 0.970 up A 0.034 0.993 up D 
c15 
transport 
equipment 
0.127 0.969 up D 0.017 0.996 up D 
c16 
manufacturing, nec, 
recycling 
0.064 0.946 
up-down-
up 
A 2.057 0.953 up A 
c17 
electricity, gas and 
water supply 
0.950 -0.63 up A  1.358 -0.785 down 
A-
D 
c18 construction 0.897 0.103 stable D 1.600 -0.135 up A 
 139 
 
(down) 
c19 
sale, maintenance 
and repair of motor 
vehicles retail sale 
of fuel 
0.000       0.472 -0.670 stable D 
c20 
wholesale trade and 
commission trade, 
except of motor 
vehicles 
0.435 0.896 
up-down-
up 
D-A-D-
A 
0.466 -0.903 up D 
c21 
retail trade, except 
of motor vehicles; 
repair of household 
goods 
1.243 0.477 up D 1.740 0.062 stable A 
c22 
hotels and 
restaurants 
0.435 0.953 down A 2.733 0.971 up A 
c23 inland transport 
0.566 0.468 down A 0.328 0.812 
up-down-
up 
A 
c24 water transport 0.583 0.910 up D-A 0.123 0.941 down D 
c25 air transport 
0.198 0.470 
up-down-
up 
D-A-D 0.174 0.351 
stable 
(down) 
D 
c26 
other supporting 
and auxiliary 
transport activities, 
activities of travel 
agencies 
0.328 0.982 down D 0.198 0.902 
stable 
(down) 
D 
c27 
post and 
telecommunications 
0.181 0.032 up  D-A  0.546 0.857 up 
D-
A 
c28 
financial 
intermediation 
0.671 0.733 down-up D 0.916 0.897 
stable 
(up) 
A 
c29 real estate activities 
0.508 -0.01 down-up D 3.435 0.983 
stable 
(up-down) 
A-
D 
c30 
renting of M&Eq 
and other business 
activities 
0.206 0.916 up D 1.009 0.992 up 
D-
A 
c31 
public admin and 
defence; 
compulsory social 
security 
0.160 0.019 
stable 
(up) 
D 0.000       
c32 education 
0.244 0.328 
up-down-
up 
D 0.228 -0.218 up D 
c33 
health and social 
work 
0.664 -0.30 up D-A 0.397   up D 
c34 
other community, 
social and personal 
services 
1.011 0.717 up-down  D-A-D 0.916 -0.107 
stable 
(up) 
A 
c35 
private households 
with employed 
persons 
0.000       37.917 -0.120 
stable 
(up) 
A 
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Legend: 
Average difference: if > 0.49 (italic numbers), big difference between RCA and 
NRCA; 
Correlation: if > 0.75 (italic numbers), high correlation while if bold numbers, 
negative correlation; 
Comparative: A=Advantage, D=Disadvantage. 
 
The dataset presented in table 4 shows in details the difference 
between NRCA and RCA. The first column is the average 
difference between NRCA and RCA along all the years available. 
The second column shows the level of correlation between the 
two while the column called trend represents the development 
of the country into consideration along the years regarding the 
evolution of the new method of calculation, NRCA. The last 
column identifies the presence of a comparative advantage or 
disadvantage in the case of NRCA only. 
 
4.4 Empirical Strategy 
4.4.1 Baseline Results  
 
Our aim is to analyse the effect on a global scale of trade in 
intermediate inputs on output at country-sector level and how 
international sourcing of input factor interacts with 
specialization. 
For the purpose of our analysis, we adopt a production 
function as a starting point since it is both the basis of modern 
growth accounting and a straightforward way to link the 
simultaneous impact of multiple inputs to the industry 
aggregate output level. We deal with macro data, more precisely 
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39 countries around the world and each country presents data 
about 35 industries41. The time interval covers the period that 
goes from 1995 to 2009. 
Among all the different functional forms, we choose the 
transcendental logarithmic (translog) production function as the 
most appropriate for our objective. The translog function can be 
interpreted as a generalization of the Cobb-Douglas production 
function and has been widely used empirically for its simplicity 
and great flexibility. Unlike the Cobb-Douglas production 
function, it imposes no a priori restrictions on the structure of 
technology and it is not claimed any restriction regarding 
elasticities of substitution and returns to scale (Kim, 1992). The 
limitations of those restrictions highly increase whenever the 
number of factors of production is more than two, as proved by 
Uzawa (1962) and McFadden (1963). 
This functional form allows us to estimate the effect of 
several input factors on the aggregate industry output level, 
assuming a homogenous technology common to all countries 
and sectors, still with a high degree of approximation. 
The form of the translog function is the following: 
 
 
                                                          
41 It should be more precise to consider the data as meso data instead of simply 
macro data. Even though this notation does not affect the methodology both 
meso and macro data use the same econometric technique. Besides, in the 
literature this notation is not important. 
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where is real value of gross output,  are factors of 
production and  is the time trend adopted for the identification 
of technical change. The subscripts, c, k and t, identify 
respectively the country, the sector and the year while the 
superscripts, i and j, identifies the several input factor covariates. 
We are considering: real capital, total hours worked by three skill 
categories of labor force (high, medium and low-skill workers),  
domestic and foreign intermediates. Finally,  represents the 
error term. 
We include intermediate inputs, divided into domestic and 
foreign, among the production factors. Domestic intermediate 
inputs are generated by the trade among industries within the 
same country while foreign intermediate inputs are all the 
imported production factors. The latter are relevant because they 
capture offshoring and outsourcing activities and represent the 
connection with international trade as a driver of growth. 
Previous empirical literature has emphasized different 
channels through which trade in intermediates can affect 
economic performance. Various trade and endogenous growth 
models, such as Romer (1987), incorporate foreign intermediate 
inputs and argue that access to new imported inputs is an 
important source of both static and dynamic gains. 
A greater availability of input types generates gains in 
productivity in the short term and economic growth is 
stimulated in the long-run by the creation of new varieties 
domestically. 
There are different ways how intermediate imports can affect 
economic outcomes. The first is the complementarity channel. By 
increasing the variety of inputs used in the production process, 
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economic agents can benefit from larger complementarity 
between them. Complementarity stems from imperfect 
substitutability among intermediate inputs as in the love-of-
variety model of Krugman (1979) and refers to the idea that the 
combination of different intermediate inputs can create gains 
that are larger than the sum of the parts (Halpern et al, 2015). 
Empirical studies such as those of Fenstra (1994) and Broda an 
Weinstein (2006) document the gains from trade deriving from 
new imported varieties in the total volume of trade. Jones (2011) 
provides a theoretical contribution to explain how intermediate 
inputs are relevant for economic development and how they can 
drive large income differences across countries. He supports a 
long-standing approach in development economics that 
complementarities effect along different stages of the supply 
chain are crucial driver for output and economic growth 
(Hirschman, 1958). 
Economic growth is also fostered by international trade 
through the transfer of foreign technologies integrated in high-
quality intermediate imports and learning spillovers. A further 
benefit deriving from access to international sourcing of 
intermediates consists of input cost effect and enhanced 
competitiveness. 
We test the static relationship between trade in intermediates 
and growth by estimating the nonlinear separable and joint 
effects of domestic and imported intermediates on output in a 
flexible way thanks to the translog specification. Our focus is on 
the complementarity channel between internationally sourced 
and domestically produced inputs and the mechanisms already 
described in literature (love of variety; technological spillover, 
access to cheaper inputs). 
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The specification of three different levels of skills for labor as 
explanatory variables allows the detection of nonlinear 
relationships with output and complementarity or 
substitutability in effects among the labor cohorts. 
Despite many models based on Cobb-Douglas production 
function assume perfect labor-labor substitutability, empirical 
evidence, such as in the work by Autor et al (1998), suggests that 
workers with different skill levels are less than perfect 
substitutes. 
Skill and factor biased technological change and international 
outsourcing, that is import of intermediate inputs from abroad, 
are seen as major factors contributing to labor demand shifts in 
favor of more educated workers (among others see Feenstra and 
Hanson, 1996; Acemoglu and Autor, 2011). They are also 
considered to play a central role in reshaping the job structure 
towards the so-called polarization trend. Job polarization refers 
to the phenomenon of decline in middle-skill employment in 
favour of higher- and lower skill positions (Autor, et al.,2006). 
Horgos (2011) underlines the role of elasticity of substitution 
among labor force with different skills in the relationship 
between outsourcing and labor demand shifts: the higher it is, 
the larger the effect of outsourcing, similarly to technological 
progress, on employment disruptions. 
These static labor-labor relationships with growth may be 
harmful for employment creation if, for instance, substitutability 
in effects between high and low skill workers means that a 
smaller number of workers is necessary to produce the same 
amount of output. 
The translog production function does not impose any 
assumptions about the market structure and input factor 
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substitutability. Restrictive models will produce biased 
estimated compared to the nonhomothetic model (Kim, 1992). 
Therefore it provides a more flexible characterization of the 
model. 
From a theoretical standpoint, the translog production 
function is considered to be extremely flexible because it allows 
to analyze both the direct and indirect effects of explanatory 
variables through the quadratic and interaction terms. More 
specifically, the presence of quadratic terms allow for non-linear 
relationship between the input factors and the output level while 
the interaction terms also allow for analysis of substitutability 
and complementarity in effects. 
According to the equation describing the translog function, 
the model consists of 36 explanatory variables: apart from the 
intercept and the 7 linear covariates, we have a set of 21 
interacted variable terms and 7 quadratic terms. 
A noteworthy variable is the time trend, T, for the 
identification of the technical change. The rate of technical 
change is calculated as the elasticity of output with respect to 
time. The formula is the following: 
  
  
 
The rate of technical change is dependent on the level of input 
used and is both time and country-sector specific. Technological 
progress (or regress) as well as regulation changes may affect the 
sign of the rate of technical change. 
 The rate of technical change can be split into two effects 
(Wylie, 1990): the first two terms of the above equation represent 
the pure or autonomous effect of technology per se, which is a 
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neutral shift on the production independent on input factors; the 
last term represent the biased technical change which shows its 
effects through the use of various inputs.  
The first results of the worldwide translog production 
function with a panel fixed effect estimation are shown in table 6, 
column 2 Base, in the appendix B section. 
Out of 36 coefficients, 27 are statistically significant. The 
variables of capital and its interactions with high and low-skill 
workers, the interaction terms between labor groups and 
intermediate inputs with the exception of that between medium-
skill-labor and domestic intermediate input are all non-
significant. 
The coefficients of the sets of variables describe three main 
effects. The sign and magnitude of the input covariates 
coefficients show the linear effect on the dependent variable, that 
is real gross output. The interaction terms depict the existence of 
a substitution effect or a complementary effect among the 
variables taken in consideration and in accordance with the sign 
of the coefficient, respectively negative or positive. Finally, the 
quadratic variables coefficients suggest the existence of a non-
linear effect on output, either increasing or decreasing 
depending on the sign, respectively positive or negative. 
Despite the single parameters of a translog function are not 
easily interpretable, the coefficients of the interaction terms in 
our estimation present both positive and negative signs, 
therefore they suggest the presence of both complementarity or 
substitutability in effects between the two interacted variables, 
independently of the other direct and indirect effects through 
other variables. 
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We mainly focus our analysis on the results regarding the 
joint effects of the  intermediate input variables and the labor 
cohorts by skill level. 
The negative coefficients of the interaction term between 
imported and domestic intermediates indicates the presence of a 
substitution in input effects on growth. Ignoring the direct effects 
of the inputs and their interactions with other production factors, 
the combined impact of foreign sourced and domestic 
intermediates is negative on output. 
This result adds up to the findings on complementarity 
channels of trade in intermediates and economic performance. 
When disentangled from other effects, the simple interaction 
between intermediate input endowments sourced domestically 
and from abroad affects output negatively. For instance, 
substitutability in effects means that an increase in the import of 
foreign intermediates, due to international outsourcing and 
offshoring activities, generates a reduction in output through the 
interaction with those sourced from the domestic market. 
Static and dynamic complementarities effects deriving from 
combing imperfectly substitutable domestic and foreign input 
varieties in production may be more than counterbalanced by 
economic gains due to replacement of cheaper and higher 
quality intermediate inputs from abroad and shared supplier 
spillovers from domestic firms (Kee, 2015). 
All the parameters of the interaction terms among the three 
different skill levels are highly statistically significant. The 
coefficients of the interaction between the high-skill and low-
skill labor force is negative while the parameters relative to the 
interactions of the medium-skill labor with the other two labor 
groups are positive.  
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Overlooking the impact of the other parameters, substitution 
in effects between workforce with high and low educational 
attainments is consistent with some degree of imperfect 
interchangeability among the groups. 
The estimates of joint labor variable terms imply that the 
workers skill distribution affects economic growth. The 
acceleration during recession of phenomena in the global labor 
market such as job polarization (that is the decline of middle-
skill occupations in favour of higher and lower skill 
employment) and crowding-out of less educated are consistent 
with the signs of the coefficients in our estimation. 
This finding supports policies with the intent to counteract 
the downsides of unequal skill distribution and its impact on 
employment and economic growth. 
Another piece of information that can be extrapolated from 
the translog functional form of the worldwide production 
function is the existence of positive or negative non-linear effects. 
All of the quadratic terms coefficients are positive, 
demonstrating, therefore, the presence of positive nonlinear 
relationship between factor inputs and output. This means that 
the increase in one of the inputs, ceteris paribus, leads to an 
increase of the marginal outputs. Irrespectively of the level of 
other factor endowments of a country, an increase of one of the 
input, such as capital, will generate an increase of the marginal 
output at any starting point. 
The evidence of substitutability, complementarity and non-
linarites in effects can be better shown by the graphs of the 
marginal effects of the variable analysed.  
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Graph 2. Marginal Effect for High and Low-skilled workers 
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Predictive margins of high- and low-skill labor at average values of other inputs using 
baseline estimation of the translog production function Table 6 – Column I (18881 
observations 39 countries, 35 sectors, 15 years) 
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Graph 3. Marginal Effect for Domestic and Foreign inputs 
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Predictive margins of domestic and foreign intermediates at average values of other 
inputs using baseline estimation of the translog production function Table 6 – Column 
I (18881 observations 39 countries, 35 sectors, 15 years) 
 
 
Graph 2 and graph 3 in the annex section show the effect of the 
quadratic and interaction terms of the high-skill and low-skill 
labor variables and the foreign and domestic intermediate input 
factors. The marginal effects are shown at specific points within a 
confidence interval of 95%. 
The graphs illustrates the marginal effect of each single 
variable, first, and then of the squared variable and finally the 
interaction term. The marginal effect of the single variable 
reveals whether there is an increasing or a decreasing effect due 
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to an increase of that precise variable that is being analysed, 
disregarding scale and interaction effects. All the single variables 
show a positive linear prediction for each increasing input level, 
reflecting the results given in the regression as well. The 
marginal effect of the quadratic term of all the variables confirm 
the presence of increasing marginal returns and the marginal 
effect of the two interaction terms mentioned before has a 
negative slope, illustrating, therefore, the existence of a 
substitution effect between the two variables considered. 
The results relative to the single variable are mostly positive 
with three exceptions: capital, medium-skilled workers and time 
trend, which show a negative sign instead. The sign is showing 
whether the effect of a marginal increase in each input, keeping 
fixed all the others, will cause an increase or a decrease in the 
real gross output, our dependent variable, not considering 
potential nonlinearities and complementarities with other factors 
in effects. 
Furthermore, we have computed the logarithmic marginal 
products, that is the output elasticities of the inputs, and the 
technical change rate. Each elasticity and technical change rate is 
computed at the mean, median and 75th percentile values of 
each variable. Table 5 reports all the input elasticities and the 
rate of technical change. For each, we isolate the autonomous 
effect and the biased effects. 
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Table 5. Output elasticities 
 
Output Elasticities at the population mean values 
  Direct Effect Quadratic Effect Autonomous effect Biased Effect Total 
Capital -0.0125 0.2878 0.2753 -0.3085 -0.0331 
High-Skill Labor 0.0305 0.0345 0.0650 -0.0536 0.0114 
Medium-Skill Labor -0.1377 -0.1754 -0.3131 0.4397 0.1267 
Low-Skill Labor 0.0503 0.0137 0.0640 -0.0505 0.0136 
Domestic Inputs 0.8774 1.3286 2.2059 -3.0278 -0.8219 
Foreign Inputs 0.4803 0.7768 1.2571 -1.8280 -0.5708 
Technical Change Rate -0.0183 0.0017 -0.0166 0.0093 -0.0073 
Output Elasticities at the population median values 
  Direct Effect Quadratic Effect Autonomous effect Biased Effect Total 
Capital -0.0125 0.2905 0.2780 -0.3242 -0.0462 
High-Skill Labor 0.0305 0.0345 0.0650 -0.0542 0.0109 
Medium-Skill Labor -0.1377 -0.1759 -0.3136 0.4384 0.1248 
Low-Skill Labor 0.0503 0.0137 0.0641 -0.0512 0.0128 
Domestic Inputs 0.8774 1.3519 2.2293 -3.0628 -0.8335 
Foreign Inputs 0.4803 0.7901 1.2705 -1.8561 -0.5857 
Technical Change Rate -0.0183 0.0018 -0.0165 0.0097 -0.0068 
Output Elasticities at the population 75th percentile values 
  Direct Effect Quadratic Effect Autonomous effect Biased Effect Total 
Capital -0.0125 0.3113 0.2988 -0.3631 -0.0643 
High-Skill Labor 0.0305 0.0381 0.0687 -0.0598 0.0088 
Medium-Skill Labor -0.1377 -0.1908 -0.3285 0.4644 0.1359 
Low-Skill Labor 0.0503 0.0150 0.0654 -0.0579 0.0074 
Domestic Inputs 0.8774 1.4774 2.3547 -3.3039 -0.9492 
Foreign Inputs 0.4803 0.8564 1.3368 -2.0195 -0.6828 
Technical Change Rate -0.0183 0.0024 -0.0159 0.0108 -0.0050 
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Apart from the medium-skill labor input which shows a 
divergent effect pattern, all the input autonomous effects are 
positive while the interacted effects are negative at the average, 
median and 75th percentile values of the population considered 
for the estimation. 
Similarly to the medium skill workforce variable, the rate of 
technical change computed shows a negative autonomous effect 
and a positive biased technical change, mainly driven by the 
effect of the interaction with intermediate imports. 
A visual representation of the autonomous and biased effects 
is given by the example in graph 4. It shows the nonlinear effect 
of imported intermediate inputs on real gross output at five 
different levels of domestic intermediate market size, controlling 
for the average values of the other inputs. In all cases, the impact 
of foreign intermediates is non-linear and positive only after a 
certain point. However, the gap between the effects at different 
levels of domestic inputs shrinks along with greater sourcing of 
intermediates from abroad and eventually the impact of 
intensification in international sourcing overwhelms the impact 
of combination of both. This corroborates the idea that 
complementarity channels between intermediates are overcome 
by substitutability in effect if the level of sourcing from abroad is 
over a certain threshold. 
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Graph 4. Marginal effect of foreign intermediate inputs 
 
 
Predictive margins of foreign intermediates at percentile values of domestic 
intermediates and at average values of other inputs using baseline estimation of the 
translog production function Table 6 – Column I (18881 observations 39 countries, 35 
sectors, 15 years). 
 
 
Analogously, the relative impact of increasing highly skilled 
workforce with respect to low-skilled labor is diminishing, as 
shown in graph 5. However, substitutability in effects shows up 
only for high levels of endowment of both labor groups. This 
implies that country-sector size may have a role in skill 
distribution and their complementarity in effects. 
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Graph 5 - Marginal effect of high-skill labor 
 
 
Predictive margins of high-skill labor at percentile values of low-skill labor and at 
average values of other inputs using baseline estimation of the translog production 
function Table 6 – Column I (18881 observations 39 countries, 35 sectors, 15 years). 
 
 
4.4.2 Endogenous Treatment with New Revealed 
Comparative Advantage 
 
In accordance with the theory, we tried to explain which are the 
variables that influence and affect the world output. We adopt 
inputs and intermediate goods as our best explanatory variables 
and we improve the literature by taking advantage of WIOD 
dataset therefore we use three different labor-skills for the 
workers and domestic and foreign inputs as intermediate goods. 
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Even though, we should consider the fact that WIOD 
presents some measurement errors42. Besides, the results that we 
can see in Table 6 column 1, show, overall, a strong correlation 
between inputs and worldwide output, but this is not enough to 
infer causality. In fact, there can be many omitted determinants 
of world output that can be correlated with inputs or 
intermediate goods. This problem may introduce a positive bias 
in the OLS estimates. Even though, there are many methods that 
can overcome the problem of omitted variable bias and one of 
those is instrumental variable, for instance, therefore we should 
find a good instrument for intermediate goods. Actually, we 
decided to solve this problem differently. 
 
Table 6. Production function in translog and simultaneous 
  Baseline Treatreg I Treatreg II Treatreg III Treatreg IV Treatreg V Treatreg VI 
                
Capital -0.0125 -0.0163 0.00920 0.00922 -0.0154 -0.0152 0.00919 
  (0.0135) (0.0130) (0.0142) (0.0142) (0.0130) (0.0130) (0.0142) 
High-Skilled 
Labor 
0.0305* 0.0415** 0.0285 0.0285 0.0411** 0.0411** 0.0285 
  (0.0170) (0.0161) (0.0192) (0.0192) (0.0161) (0.0161) (0.0192) 
Medium-Skilled 
Labor 
-0.138*** -0.123*** -0.112*** -0.112*** -0.124*** -0.125*** -0.112*** 
  (0.0266) (0.0260) (0.0303) (0.0303) (0.0260) (0.0260) (0.0303) 
Low-Skilled 
Labor 
0.0503** 0.0560** 0.0500* 0.0501* 0.0567** 0.0576*** 0.0500* 
  (0.0209) (0.0223) (0.0257) (0.0257) (0.0223) (0.0222) (0.0257) 
Domestic 
Inputs 
0.877*** 0.689*** 0.702*** 0.702*** 0.687*** 0.687*** 0.702*** 
  (0.0309) (0.0290) (0.0344) (0.0344) (0.0290) (0.0290) (0.0344) 
Foreign Inputs 0.480*** 0.521*** 0.535*** 0.535*** 0.523*** 0.524*** 0.535*** 
  (0.0283) (0.0263) (0.0305) (0.0305) (0.0263) (0.0263) (0.0305) 
Time -0.018*** -0.034*** -0.038*** -0.038*** -0.034*** -0.034*** -0.038*** 
                                                          
42 In fact, surprisingly, there are some negative intermediate inputs. This does 
not have any economic meaning but these values exist in order to balance the 
WIOD dataset as a whole because it is supposed to be a closed account.  
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  (0.00221) (0.00250) (0.00313) (0.00313) (0.00250) (0.00250) (0.00313) 
                
Substitutability 
and 
Complementari
ty effects               
                
Capital*High-
Skilled-Labor 
-0.00248 -0.005*** -0.005*** -0.005*** -0.005*** -0.005*** -0.005*** 
  (0.00171) (0.00168) (0.00200) (0.00200) (0.00168) (0.00168) (0.00200) 
Capital*Mediu
m-Skilled-Labor 
0.0404*** 0.0299*** 0.0318*** 0.0318*** 0.0299*** 0.0300*** 0.0318*** 
  (0.00206) (0.00200) (0.00239) (0.00239) (0.00200) (0.00200) (0.00239) 
Capital*Low-
Skilled-Labor 
-0.00115 -0.007*** -0.009*** -0.009*** -0.007*** -0.007*** -0.009*** 
  (0.00123) (0.00120) (0.00150) (0.00150) (0.00120) (0.00120) (0.00150) 
Capital*Domest
ic Inputs 
-0.048*** -0.023*** -0.024*** -0.024*** -0.023*** -0.023*** -0.024*** 
  (0.00194) (0.00218) (0.00265) (0.00265) (0.00218) (0.00218) (0.00265) 
Capital*Foreign 
Inputs 
-0.011*** -0.008*** -0.007*** -0.007*** -0.008*** -0.008*** -0.007*** 
  (0.00166) (0.00162) (0.00189) (0.00189) (0.00162) (0.00162) (0.00189) 
Capital*Time -0.002*** -0.001*** -0.001*** -0.001*** -0.001*** -0.001*** -0.001*** 
  (0.000174) (0.000182) (0.000225) (0.000225) (0.000182) (0.000182) (0.000225) 
High-Skilled 
Labor*Medium-
Skilled Labor 
0.0037*** 0.00243* 0.000923 0.000925 0.00244* 0.00248* 0.000922 
  (0.00139) (0.00132) (0.00149) (0.00149) (0.00131) (0.00131) (0.00149) 
High-Skilled 
Labor*Low-
Skilled Labor 
-0.004*** -0.003*** -0.00261* -0.00261* -0.003*** -0.004*** -0.00261* 
  (0.00124) (0.00119) (0.00135) (0.00135) (0.00119) (0.00119) (0.00135) 
High-Skilled 
Labor*Domesti
c Inputs 
0.00313 0.0119*** 0.0138*** 0.0138*** 0.0118*** 0.0118*** 0.0138*** 
  (0.00234) (0.00223) (0.00260) (0.00260) (0.00222) (0.00222) (0.00260) 
High-Skilled 
Labor*Foreign 
Inputs 
-0.00280 -0.008*** -0.009*** -0.009*** -0.008*** -0.008*** -0.009*** 
  (0.00218) (0.00202) (0.00228) (0.00228) (0.00202) (0.00202) (0.00228) 
High-Skilled 
Labor*Time 
-0.001*** -0.001*** -0.0004** -0.0004** -0.001*** -0.001*** -0.0004** 
  (0.000145) (0.000138) (0.000165) (0.000165) (0.000138) (0.000138) (0.000165) 
Medium-Skilled 
Labor*Low-
Skilled Labor 
0.00385** 0.00357** 0.00297 0.00297 0.00350** 0.00352** 0.00298 
  (0.00182) (0.00171) (0.00194) (0.00194) (0.00170) (0.00170) (0.00194) 
 158 
 
Medium-Skilled 
Labor*Domesti
c Inputs 
-0.033*** -0.021*** -0.025*** -0.025*** -0.021*** -0.021*** -0.025*** 
  (0.00329) (0.00310) (0.00375) (0.00375) (0.00310) (0.00310) (0.00375) 
Medium-Skilled 
Labor*Foreign 
Inputs 
-0.00289 0.00640** 0.00622** 0.00621** 0.00641** 0.00639** 0.00621** 
  (0.00292) (0.00265) (0.00312) (0.00312) (0.00265) (0.00265) (0.00312) 
Medium-Skilled 
Labor*Time 
0.0014*** 0.0016*** 0.0016*** 0.0016*** 0.0016*** 0.0015*** 0.0016*** 
  (0.000223) (0.000213) (0.000263) (0.000263) (0.000213) (0.000213) (0.000263) 
Low-Skilled 
Labor*Domesti
c 
-0.00135 0.0052*** 0.0086*** 0.0086*** 0.0053*** 0.0053*** 0.0086*** 
  (0.00209) (0.00190) (0.00233) (0.00233) (0.00190) (0.00190) (0.00233) 
Low-Skilled 
Labor*Foreign 
Inputs 
-0.000087 0.000688 0.0000219 0.0000231 0.000666 0.000665 0.0000272 
  (0.00185) (0.00167) (0.00195) (0.00195) (0.00167) (0.00167) (0.00195) 
Low-Skilled 
Labor*Time 
-0.001*** -0.001*** -0.001*** -0.001*** -0.001*** -0.001*** -0.001*** 
  (0.000149) (0.000144) (0.000178) (0.000178) (0.000144) (0.000143) (0.000178) 
Domestic 
Inputs*Foreign 
Inputs 
-0.09*** -0.103*** -0.104*** -0.104*** -0.103*** -0.103*** -0.104*** 
  (0.00249) (0.00264) (0.00301) (0.00301) (0.00264) (0.00264) (0.00301) 
Domestic 
Inputs*Time 
0.001*** -0.0007** -0.000625 -0.000625 -0.0008** -0.0007** -0.000626 
  (0.000325) (0.000326) (0.000396) (0.000396) (0.000325) (0.000325) (0.000396) 
Foreign 
Inputs*Time 
0.0017*** 0.0035*** 0.0036*** 0.0036*** 0.0034*** 0.0034*** 0.0037*** 
  (0.000265) (0.000260) (0.000314) (0.000314) (0.000260) (0.000260) (0.000314) 
Return to Scale 
effects 
              
                
Capital*Capital 0.0130*** 0.0097*** 0.0094*** 0.0094*** 0.0097*** 0.0097*** 0.0094*** 
  (0.000860) (0.000877) (0.00103) (0.00103) (0.000876) (0.000876) (0.00103) 
High-Skilled 
Labor*High-
Skilled Labor 
0.002*** 0.0018*** 0.0021*** 0.0021*** 0.0018*** 0.0018*** 0.0021*** 
  (0.000376) (0.000353) (0.000408) (0.000408) (0.000353) (0.000353) (0.000408) 
Medium-Skilled 
Labor*Medium-
Skilled Labor 
-0.009*** -0.012*** -0.01*** -0.01*** -0.012*** -0.012*** -0.01*** 
  (0.00179) (0.00163) (0.00187) (0.00187) (0.00163) (0.00163) (0.00187) 
Low-Skilled 
Labor*Low-
Skilled Labor 
0.0007*** 0.0012*** 0.0012*** 0.0012*** 0.0012*** 0.0011*** 0.0012*** 
  (0.000253) (0.000233) (0.000274) (0.000274) (0.000233) (0.000233) (0.000275) 
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Domestic 
Inputs*Domesti
c Inputs 
0.0800*** 0.0615*** 0.0607*** 0.0607*** 0.0614*** 0.0614*** 0.0607*** 
  (0.00156) (0.00189) (0.00216) (0.00216) (0.00189) (0.00189) (0.00216) 
Foreign 
Inputs*Foreign 
Inputs 
0.0507*** 0.0509*** 0.0506*** 0.0506*** 0.0509*** 0.0510*** 0.0506*** 
  (0.00134) (0.00138) (0.00161) (0.00161) (0.00138) (0.00138) (0.00161) 
Time*Time 0.0002*** 0.0003*** 0.0002*** 0.0002*** 0.0003*** 0.0003*** 0.0002*** 
  (0.000053) (0.000052) (0.000064) (0.000064) (0.000052) (0.000052) (0.000064) 
Dummy NRCA 
(New Revealed 
Comparative 
Advantage 
  -0.130*** -0.119*** -0.119*** -0.131*** -0.131*** -0.119*** 
    (0.00367) (0.00445) (0.00445) (0.00366) (0.00365) (0.00445) 
constant -1.370*** -0.0132 -0.342** -0.342** -0.0200 -0.0156 -0.342** 
  (0.100) (0.144) (0.168) (0.168) (0.145) (0.145) (0.168) 
                
                
TREATMENT 
EQUATIONS 
              
New Revealed 
Comparative 
Advantage - 
Dummy Var. 
              
                
Capital/Labor 
(lagged) 
  0.000*** 0.000** 0.000** 0.0000*** 0.000*** 0.000** 
    (0.000006) (0.000007) (0.000007) (0.000006) (0.000006) (0.000007) 
High-Skilled 
Labor/Low-
Skilled Labor 
(lagged) 
  -0.016*** -0.017*** -0.017*** -0.016*** -0.016*** -0.017*** 
    (0.00224) (0.00258) (0.00258) (0.00223) (0.00223) (0.00258) 
High-Skilled 
Labor/Medium-
Skilled Labor 
(lagged) 
  -0.0398** -0.0528** -0.0529** -0.046*** -0.048*** -0.0527** 
    (0.0167) (0.0209) (0.0209) (0.0168) (0.0168) (0.0209) 
Foreign 
Inputs/Domesti
c Inputs 
(lagged) 
  -0.0129 -0.0290* -0.0289* -0.0167 -0.0171 -0.0290* 
    (0.0111) (0.0152) (0.0152) (0.0110) (0.0109) (0.0152) 
Exchange Rate 
(lagged) 
  -0.015*** -0.0244** -0.0246** -0.0133** -0.0142** -0.0246** 
    (0.00583) (0.0107) (0.0107) (0.00585) (0.00584) (0.0107) 
Economic 
Institutions 
(Rule of Law) 
    0.0929***       0.0953*** 
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(lagged) 
      (0.0139)       (0.0188) 
Economic 
Institutions 
(Rule of Law) - 
distance from 
the mean 
(lagged) 
      0.0933***       
        (0.0139)       
Financial 
Institutions 
(lagged) 
        0.195***   -0.0146 
          (0.0452)   (0.0753) 
Financial 
Institutions - 
distance from 
the mean 
(lagged) 
          0.278***   
            (0.0483)   
Costant   -0.093*** -0.155*** -0.074*** -0.204*** -0.088*** -0.148*** 
    (0.0136) (0.0198) (0.0182) (0.0289) (0.0137) (0.0407) 
                
Observations 18881 17458 12175 12175 17458 17458 12175 
adj. R-sq 0.998             
 /athrho    1.227*** 1.150*** 1.150*** 1.231*** 1.233*** 1.150*** 
    (0.0234) (0.0291) (0.0291) (0.0233) (0.0232) (0.0291) 
/lnsigma   -2.155*** -2.226*** -2.226*** -2.154*** -2.154*** -2.226*** 
    (0.00946) (0.0118) (0.0118) (0.00942) (0.00939) (0.0118) 
Wald Test of 
Indep. Eq. (Prob 
> Chi2 )  
0 0 0 0 0 0 0 
Standard errors in parentheses 
Source: WIOD dataset, Kaufmann et al (2009) Worldwide Governance                              
Indicators (WGI), IMF Financial Development Indexes 
*p<.1; **p<.05; ***p<0.1. 
 
First of all, we checked for the existence of endogeneity by 
calculating the endogenous treatment with a simultaneous 
equation. In this case, we add another variable in our base 
regression, a dummy variable, the New Revealed Comparative 
Advantage. 
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It is important to highlight that by using NRCA we actually 
end up having the same problem as with RCA regarding the 
magnitude of the comparative advantage. With both measures 
we cannot, again, calculate the exact magnitude because of 
asymmetry due to the existence of a left bound. Even though, 
this is not a problem for us because we use this variable as a 
dummy which assumes the value of 1 if there is a comparative 
advantage and the value of 0 if there is a comparative 
disadvantage43. 
We can, therefore, affirm that the dummy variable 
determines the pattern of trade. It reflects Heckscher-Ohlin 
model which is based on Ricardo’s theory of comparative 
advantage44. According to this theory, there is no need for any 
country to be the best in anything in order to take advantage 
from trade. In fact, the reasons from trade are various. There can 
be an advantage from trade if there exists a difference in 
technology (see Ricardo’s theory), or differences in resource of 
endowments (see Heckscher-Ohlin model). Other cases of 
advantage from trade are due to the presence of economies of 
scale in process of goods production or if either demand or 
preferences differ between countries. Another reason could be 
the presence of subsidy programs or government tax because 
these policies can have a deep effect on prices charged for goods 
and services. Since we are taking into consideration many 
countries around the world (39 countries in total), the Ricardian 
model is recalling us about a relevant point: it does exist a 
                                                          
43 The comparative advantage or disadvantage is referring to a specific firm, 
into a specific country for a precise year. 
44 Dornbusch et al (1977) distinguish among continuum of goods in a Ricardian 
model but we do not apply this disctinction. 
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possibility of competition between an industry in a developed 
country and in industry in a less-developed country (LDC) 
regardless of the fact that LDC industries have a much lower 
labor costs. Even though, Ricardo assumes that the presence of 
comparative advantage is possible thanks to the international 
differences in productivity of the only one factor of production 
taken into consideration, labor. This assumption is a bit narrow 
therefore we prefer to believe that trade is partly explained by 
differences in labor productivity and in countries’ resources.  
For the moment, in our model, we imply that the only source 
of trade is resources differences and comparative advantage is 
affected by the relative abundance of factors of production and 
the technology of production. In fact, the latter affects the 
relative intensity of the different factors of production. In this 
case, the interaction between abundance and intensity is 
emphasized. Therefore, two main topic of interest are the 
proportion of availability of the different factors of production in 
the different countries and the proportion of the same factor of 
production that are used in order to obtain the different goods.  
In our case, we are considering the H-O model, based on 
Ricardo’s theory, through the addition of the NRCA dummy 
variable in our base regression. We have, therefore, a binary 
endogenous variable45. This is also the reason why we adopt a 
simultaneous regression where the first regression is our base 
line where we add the NRCA dummy variable and the second 
equation has the above mentioned dummy variable as 
dependent variable and a set of covariates. 
                                                          
45 Vella and Verbeek (1999) use a similar approach with censored endogenous 
variable. 
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The latter are in the form of ratio in accordance with the H-O 
model where the main concept deals with different endowments 
of factors of production among countries which are represented 
as ratios. In our model, the factors of production are capital, 
labor and intermediate goods, therefore, our covariate for capital 
is the ratio between real fixed capital stock in US dollars46 over 
the number of persons engaged (in thousands). Labor, instead, is 
represented by two different ratios; one of them is the ratio of the 
share in total hours of hours worked by high-skilled persons 
engaged over the share in total hours of hours worked by 
medium-skilled persons engaged. The second variable that 
represent labor is the ratio of the share in total hours of hours 
worked by high-skilled persons engaged over the share in total 
hours of hours worked by low-skilled persons engaged. In this 
case we have only two covariates for labor instead of three 
because of the risk of multi-collinearity. The domestic and 
foreign value of trade is defined by the ratio between foreign and 
domestic inputs. Another ratio is added, apart from the factors of 
production, and it is the exchange rate. This decision is a 
consequence of the fact that the original data are all in national 
accounts and the exchange rate has been used to convert the data 
into US dollars. 
All the covariates are not in log anymore because we take 
them in level and we calculate the ratio therefore it does not 
make sense to apply the logarithm in this case.  
Another characteristics is that all the covariates of the second 
equation are lagged because it is more meaningful from an 
                                                          
46 Recall that we have the value of real fixed capital stock in national currencies 
(where 1995 is the base year) therefore we need to multiply it by the exchange 
rate in order to get its value in US dollar. 
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economic point of view. In fact, we assume that these covariates 
in ratio explain the presence of a comparative advantage or 
disadvantage which is calculated at the end of the year. This 
means that the relative factor of production of the year before 
can explain the comparative advantage of the year after.  
The results of the simultaneous equations, are shown in table 
6, column 3. As we can see from the table, most of the 
coefficients are again highly significant and NRCA dummy 
variable is one of them as well. Even though, the main result of 
this regression is the fact that the Wald test of independence 
equation is rejected which means that there actually is a 
dependence between the two equations and we did not solve the 
problem of endogeneity by the system of simultaneous 
equations. There should be some other relevant covariates to be 
added in the second equation of the simultaneous system that 
can release the endogeneity problem. 
 
4.4.3 System of Simultaneous Equations and Institutions 
 
In accordance with the theory, as we already mentioned in 
the literature review, institutions should be a key point in 
overcoming the problem of endogeneity by adding it as index, in 
the second equation of the simultaneous system. It will be 
considered as part of the group of covariates that determine the 
path of trade given by the existence of comparative advantage. 
We use a system of simultaneous equations, keeping as a 
reference the approach offered by Angrist (2001). 
 We have two different index representing institutions, 
economic institution and financial institution, which has been 
explained in the third section (see 3.2 and 3.3). We have two 
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different regressions for each index and the number of 
observations changes as well. One difficult task is that of 
choosing the right existing index for institution because, as it is 
widely known, this is quite a multifaceted index. In fact, it is 
defined as the level of political stability or rule of law or the level 
of democracy in a country and so on and so forth. The best index 
is for institution is the one that reflects better the dependent 
variable. In our case, our dependent variable is the pattern of 
trade given by the comparative advantage therefore we think 
that economic institution and financial institution are best for 
describing our NRCA dummy variable. The first index is the 
economic institution index representing the rule of law 
developed by Kaufmann et al. (2009 and 2011) which covers all 
the countries that we are analyzing but not the whole time 
interval that we are considering. In fact, the years included in the 
Kaufmann index are 1996, 1998, 2000 and from 2002 up to 201447. 
We include the index in the second equation in a lagged form. 
We lose some information due to the fact the WGIs are not 
available for each year of our sample; since data in some years is 
missing the number of observations is lower; however, this does 
not render our analysis ineffective. We run the same regression 
but this time, instead of the index itself, we calculate and we add 
the distance of the economic institution from the mean, in order 
to get a more meaningful information. 
The results are shown in table 6, column 4 and 5. 
Interestingly, in both cases we obtain almost the same 
magnitude for the coefficients and almost the same standard 
error. Almost all the covariates are highly significant including 
                                                          
47 We will use the index up to year 2009 because this is the upper bound that is 
available from WIOD. 
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NRCA and the rule of law index, both lagged and distance from 
the mean. There are also few non-significant covariates such as 
the square of middle-skilled workers, the interaction terms 
between middle-skilled and high-skilled workers, medium-
skilled workers and foreign inputs, low-skilled workers and 
time. Even though, the results are rejecting again the hypothesis 
of independent equation (see Wald test, last row). 
In order to check the robustness of our conclusions, we run 
other regressions by adopting another index for institution. In 
fact, the type of index that you can choose may affect sometimes 
quite significantly your results which, as a consequence, loose 
part of their robustness. Our second index for institution is a 
recently developed measures of financial development by 
International Monetary Fund (Sahay et al, 2015). The financial 
institution index captures the financial institutions quality. We 
add this index as part of the covariates that determine the path of 
trade and comparative advantage in the second equation of the 
simultaneous system. First, we simply add the index and then 
we try by adding the distance from the mean of the same index. 
The results are shown in table 6 column 6 and 7. 
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Table 7. Robustness check: three groups of countries and Cobb-
Douglas 
  
Group 1 Group 2 Group 3 
Cobb-
Douglas   
Capital 0.0527*** -0.717*** 0.327* 0.439*** 
  (0.0152) (0.0690) (0.167) (0.00443) 
High-Skilled Labor 0.150*** -0.0558 0.789*** 0.00689*** 
  (0.0283) (0.0399) (0.172) (0.00236) 
Medium-Skilled Labor -0.251*** 0.181 -1.043*** 0.158*** 
  (0.0321) (0.112) (0.342) (0.00592) 
Low-Skilled Labor 0.0131 -0.235** 0.156 0.0117*** 
  (0.0219) (0.116) (0.263) (0.00290) 
Domestic Inputs 0.611*** 1.439*** 0.330** 0.203*** 
  (0.0388) (0.0968) (0.156) (0.00613) 
Foreign Inputs 0.648*** 0.324*** 0.0736 0.310*** 
  (0.0341) (0.0864) (0.125) (0.00573) 
Time -0.0178*** -0.0620*** -0.0205 -0.0102*** 
  (0.00238) (0.00840) (0.0156) (0.000391) 
          
Substitutability and 
Complementarity effects         
          
Capital*High-Skilled-
Labor -0.0253*** 0.00689* 0.00348   
  (0.00286) (0.00417) (0.00788)   
Capital*Medium-Skilled-
Labor 0.0542*** -0.0191*** -0.0396***   
  (0.00272) (0.00731) (0.0148)   
Capital*Low-Skilled-
Labor 0.00564*** 0.0398*** 0.00801   
  (0.00134) (0.00586) (0.00968)   
Capital*Domestic Inputs -0.0109*** -0.0803*** -0.0794***   
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  (0.00256) (0.00592) (0.00739)   
Capital*Foreign Inputs -0.0267*** -0.0104* 0.000416   
  (0.00214) (0.00580) (0.00588)   
Capital*Time 0.000223 0.00165*** -0.00108*   
  (0.000201) (0.000579) (0.000630)   
High-Skilled 
Labor*Medium-Skilled 
Labor -0.00467* 0.00603** 0.0255*   
  (0.00282) (0.00258) (0.0134)   
High-Skilled Labor*Low-
Skilled Labor -0.00668*** -0.00780** -0.0466***   
  (0.00202) (0.00361) (0.0128)   
High-Skilled 
Labor*Domestic Inputs 0.0238*** 0.000780 -0.00325   
  (0.00437) (0.00522) (0.00879)   
High-Skilled 
Labor*Foreign Inputs 0.0132*** -0.00837** -0.00102   
  (0.00392) (0.00381) (0.00708)   
High-Skilled Labor*Time -0.000244 -0.001*** -0.000209   
  (0.000259) (0.000275) (0.000763)   
Medium-Skilled 
Labor*Low-Skilled 
Labor 0.0151*** 0.00413 0.0607**   
  (0.00265) (0.0101) (0.0299)   
Medium-Skilled 
Labor*Domestic Inputs -0.0238*** -0.0139 0.0597***   
  (0.00439) (0.0104) (0.0196)   
Medium-Skilled 
Labor*Foreign Inputs -0.0243*** 0.0102 -0.0342**   
  (0.00378) (0.00866) (0.0160)   
Medium-Skilled 
Labor*Time 0.00143*** 0.000975 0.0122***   
  (0.000298) (0.000859) (0.00179)   
Low-Skilled 
Labor*Domestic -0.0145*** -0.0256*** -0.0285**   
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  (0.00292) (0.00837) (0.0128)   
Low-Skilled 
Labor*Foreign Inputs -0.00236 0.00819 0.0393***   
  (0.00249) (0.00725) (0.0117)   
Low-Skilled Labor*Time -0.00071*** -0.000495 -0.0088***   
  (0.000192) (0.000571) (0.00115)   
Domestic Inputs*Foreign 
Inputs -0.0853*** -0.128*** -0.0439***   
  (0.00272) (0.00901) (0.0110)   
Domestic Inputs*Time -0.00160*** -0.00165* -0.0041***   
  (0.000380) (0.000986) (0.00135)   
Foreign Inputs*Time 0.00120*** 0.00367*** 0.00219*   
  (0.000303) (0.000805) (0.00124)   
Return to Scale effects         
          
Capital*Capital 0.00290*** 0.0427*** 0.0418***   
  (0.00101) (0.00248) (0.00431)   
High-Skilled 
Labor*High-Skilled 
Labor 0.00172*** 0.00453*** -0.0103***   
  (0.000649) (0.000817) (0.00193)   
Medium-Skilled 
Labor*Medium-Skilled 
Labor -0.0101*** 0.000459 -0.00827   
  (0.00258) (0.00642) (0.0200)   
Low-Skilled Labor*Low-
Skilled Labor -0.000286 -0.00647 -0.0179   
  (0.000276) (0.00486) (0.0127)   
Domestic 
Inputs*Domestic Inputs 0.0511*** 0.108*** 0.0628***   
  (0.00177) (0.00552) (0.00730)   
Foreign Inputs*Foreign 
Inputs 0.0591*** 0.0663*** 0.0216***   
  (0.00159) (0.00431) (0.00402)   
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Time*Time 0.000416*** 0.000127 0.00126***   
  (0.0000592) (0.000146) (0.000196)   
constant -0.606*** 3.949*** 3.651 -3.433*** 
  (0.105) (0.945) (2.527) (0.128) 
Observations 14374 3502 1005 18881 
adj. R-sq 0.999 0.998 0.997 0.994 
Standard errors in 
parentheses;         
Source: WIOD dataset;         
*p<.1; **p<.05; ***p<0.1.         
  
Again, we obtain the same results as the economic institution 
index. Almost all the coefficients are highly significant, including 
NRCA and the new index for institution, both the lagged and the 
distance from the mean. Only few interaction terms are not 
significant: the interaction between high and medium skilled 
workers, medium and low skilled workers, low skilled workers 
and time. The index, therefore, explain part of the path of trade 
and determines part of the presence of comparative advantage 
but it does reject the hypothesis of independence. 
The last column of the table is showing the results given by 
adding both institutional lagged index. As expected, only one of 
the two is significant, the economic institution. In fact, the 
second index, the financial institution index, is more narrow and 
related mostly to the financial sector while the economic 
institution one includes the financial sector as well. The Wald 
test is rejected once more. We get the same results also by adding 
both indexes but this time, we consider only the distance from 
the mean of each index. The last column of table 6 shows the 
results. 
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All of these regressions confirm previous empirical findings 
that institutions are a further source of comparative advantage; 
however neither financial nor economic institution is the key 
variable that breaks down the relationship of endogeneity 
between the specialization pattern and the output performance. 
Since, even after considering long-term determinants such as 
institutional quality, we cannot exclude the hypothesis of 
independence between value-added-based comparative 
advantage and production choices, we might argue that there 
may be some other overlooked sources of specialization, which 
also impact on the production outcomes. Recent literature 
strands are giving more weight not only to formal institutions, 
which we have considered, but also to informal institution48 as 
one of those drivers able to either facilitate or hinder trade and 
therefore specialization. Nunn and Trefler (2013) explore the 
recent literature on how alternative institutions and enforcement 
systems emerge when formal contracting institutions are absent 
or weak. Interaction dynamics, firm boundaries, networks as 
well as beliefs and culture all impact on production choices and 
specialization to an extent that still need a great amount of 
further investigation. 
 
 
4.5 Robustness Checks  
Our initial results are confirmed by some robustness checks 
aggregated in table 7. All the findings regarding the 
                                                          
48 For informal institution we consider all non-State rules and\or enforcement 
(see also James E. Anderson in “Trade and Informal Institution” (2008). 
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substitutability effect and scale effect are the result of a 
production function regression in the form of a translog function 
including all countries encountered in WIOD (39 counties 
worldwide). We decided to run the same regression but this time 
we included a sample of countries. We created three different 
sample of group of countries and we obtained the same findings 
as the one with the entire population. All the three groups 
confirm the presence of substitutability between high and low 
skilled workers and between domestic and foreign inputs. The 
presence of scale effects is confirmed as well. As a matter of fact, 
there are economies of scale for all the squared variables taken 
into consideration. In conclusion, all the results of the three 
different groups of countries confirm the baseline regression 
therefore support our findings. 
The use of the translog functional form instead of the 
commonly used Cobb-Douglas production function is supported 
by the theory. Cobb-Douglas production function is quite simple 
to estimate and interpret but it has a significant limitation 
regarding its simplistic assumptions. In fact, it does not allow for 
variability of the partial elasticity of substitution (Cobb and 
Douglas 1928). On top of that, we have positive and diminishing 
marginal product therefore α and β49 are values restricted 
between 0 and 1. In this work, we estimate the transcendental 
logarithmic production function (translog for short). It is instead 
more flexible as it allows for employing also more than two 
inputs and relaxes the restriction on the constant elasticity of 
substitution (Berndt and Christensen 1973). Besides, it is a 
                                                          
49 In general, in the case of a Cobb-Douglas production function, α identifies 
the output elasticities of capital and labor, respectively. 
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flexible and attractive form also because it combines linear and 
quadratic terms (Christensen et al. 1973). 
Another robustness check that is not included in the 
appendix B section is given by the use of pooled OLS instead of 
panel fixed effects. In fact, by using the within estimator, most of 
the results were not significant. It is true that panel fixed effect 
allows us to control all the variables that describe those 
characteristic of each country or sector that does not change 
along the years. Even though our translog function was chosen 
for its flexibility and for the time trend variable which will have 
to disappear because of the within estimator. In fact, the 
estimator applies the difference from the mean and the time 
trend will always be equal to zero because it does not change 
across the observations along one specific year. In other words, it 
is considered as a constant.  
The above reasons motivated us to adopt OLS fixed effect as 
our estimator. We calculated therefore the fixed effect that 
corrects the intercept of each country sector considered in the 
dataset. The slope, therefore, is common for all the countries but 
the intercept changes for each country sector. Thanks to this 
estimator we are assuming that the time trend is independent. 
Our translog functional form considers the technical change and 
its interaction with each variable so that they can vary across 
time. This is another reason why OLS fixed effect is highly 
suggested instead of panel fixed effect. In fact, by definition, we 
cannot choose panel fixed effect and then add a time trend 
variable. Therefore, pooled OLS is the best suggested in this case, 
where we assume independence of the time variable. This 
independence is measured through the interactions of the 
covariate time trend with all the other variables. Our interest is 
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to analyze how the technical change interacts with the other 
factor of production. 
 
 
4.6 Conclusion 
There is a growing attention on novel assessments of trade and 
production performance and their short and long term 
determinants, in the light of the emergence of international 
value-added based supply chains. In this paper, we give a 
contribution on the empirical studies on institutions as sources of 
comparative advantage and the interdependence with 
production performance by making use of a relatively 
unexploited panel dataset, the WIOD. 
First, we highlight the contribution of intermediate input 
sourcing from abroad and different education levels of labor 
force to growth. We find that there is a certain degree of 
substitutability between foreign and domestic intermediate 
inputs, such that a crowding-out effect cannot be excluded at 
different stages of economic integration. 
Therefore, policymakers should be cautious about 
considerations on the benefits of greater participation to global 
value chains. Similarly, we find that the interdependence 
between labor inputs at different skill levels might create an 
obstacle to job creation in the development process along the 
value chain. 
Secondly, we find that both economic and financial 
institutions represent a relevant determinant of the comparative 
advantage based on value-added and are long-term sources of 
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the relationship of interdependence between specialization and 
production performance.  
Further study can be carried out to qualify specialization 
patterns, for instance with a metafrontier production approach, 
in order to introduce potential technological inefficiencies under 
different stages of country development. With respect to data 
limitations, it would be necessary to enlarge the sample by 
considering more countries and distinguishing them on the basis 
of a development stage. 
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Annex 
Table 1. List of countries in WIOD-dataset 
 
European 
Union     
North 
America 
Latin 
America 
Asia and 
Pacific 
Austria Germany Netherlands Canada Brazil China 
Belgium Greece Poland 
United 
States Mexico India 
Bulgaria Hungary Portugal     Japan 
Cyprus Ireland Romania     
South 
Korea 
Czech 
Republic Italy 
Slovak 
Republic     Australia 
Denmark Latvia Slovenia     Turkey 
Estonia Lithuania Spain     Indonesia 
Finland Luxembourg Sweden     Russia 
France Malta 
United 
Kingdom       
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Table 2. List of industries in WIOD-dataset 
 
Code NACE Description 
1 AtB Agriculture, Hunting, Forestry and Fishing 
2 C Mining and Quarrying 
3 15t16 Food, Beverages and Tobacco 
4 17t18 Textiles and Textile Products 
5 19 Leather, Leather and Footwear 
6 20 Wood and Products of Wood and Cork 
7 21t22 Pulp, Paper, Paper, Printing and Publishing 
8 23 Coke, Refined Petroleum and Nuclear Fuel 
9 24 Chemicals and Chemical Products 
10 25 Rubber and Plastics 
11 26 Other Non-Metallic Mineral 
12 27t28 Basic Metals and Fabricated Metal 
13 29 Machinery, Nec 
14 30t33 Electrical and Optical Equipment 
15 34t35 Transport Equipment 
16 36t37 Manufacturing, Nec; Recycling 
17 E Electricity, Gas and Water Supply 
18 F Construction 
19 50 
Sale, Maintenance and Repair of Motor 
Vehicles Retail Sale of Fuel 
20 51 
Wholesale Trade and Commission Trade, 
Except of Motor Vehicles 
21 52 
Retail Trade, Except of Motor Vehicles; Repair 
of Household Goods 
22 H Hotels and Restaurants 
23 60 Inland Transport 
24 61 Water Transport 
25 62 Air Transport 
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26 63 
Other Supporting and Auxiliary Transport 
Activities; Activities of Travel Agencies 
27 64 Post and Telecommunications 
28 J Financial Intermediation 
29 70 Real Estate Activities 
30 71t74 
Renting of M&Eq and Other Business 
Activities 
31 L 
Public Admin and Defence; Compulsory Social 
Security 
32 M Education 
33 N Health and Social Work 
34 O 
Other Community, Social and Personal 
Services 
35 P Private Household with Employed Persons 
36   
Financial intermediation services indirectly 
measured (FISIM) 
37   Total 
38   Final consumption expenditure by households 
39   
Final consumption exp. by non-profit 
organisations serving households 
40   
Final consumption expenditure by 
government 
41   Final consumption expenditure 
42   Gross fixed capital formation 
43   Changes in inventories and valuables 
44   Gross capital formation 
45   Exports 
46   Final uses at purchasers' prices 
47   Total use at purchasers' prices 
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Table 3. Definition of skills in WIOD SEA 
 
WIOD skill-
type 
1997 
ISCED 
level 1997 ISCED level description 
Low 1 
Primary education or first stage of basic 
education 
Low 2 
Lower secondary or second stage of basic 
education 
Medium 3 (Upper) secondary education 
Medium 4 Post-secondary non-tertiary education 
High 5 First stage of tertiary education 
High 6 Second stage of tertiary education 
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Appendix A  
 
Appendix for Chapter 2 
A.1 Amazon Mechanical Turk and Limesurvey  
To implement the online survey in the US in a short time I used 
the service offered by Amazon, known as Amazon Mechanical 
Turk. It was created in 2005 and its name comes from an 
amusing historic event of the 18th century50. MTurk is a 
crowdsourcing web service which aim is that of coordinating the 
supply and the demand of task which can be completed only by 
human intelligence. More specifically, it is an online labour 
market where two figures play a key role: the employees, called 
                                                          
50 The historic event related to the name given to the service offered by amazon 
happened in 1769 when a Hungarian nobleman called Wolfgang von Kempelen 
was able to amaze Europe thanks to his invention: a mechanical chess-playing 
automaton which almost defeated every opponent. This mechanical tool was 
accompanied by a life-sized wooden mannequin dressed with a fur-trimmed 
robe and a turban which contributed to call it Kempelen’s “Turk”. The 
mannequin was seated behind a cabinet and became well-known in all Europe. 
In order to persuade people in believing in his invention, Kempelen used to 
slide open the cabinet’s door to reveal part of the mechanism behind it: a set of 
gears, cogs and springs. Kempelen managed to convince people that his 
invention was able to make decisions using only artificial intelligence. Actually, 
the hidden true was that inside the machine it was cleverly concealed a chess 
master. For a more detailed information see also: 
https://requester.mturk.com/help/faq#what_is_amazon_mechanical_turk. 
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otherwise workers in amazon, who are hired by the employers, 
called requesters, are supposed to execute one or some tasks, 
called HIT/s (an acronym that stands for Human Intelligence 
Task). In exchange, the workers, or better call them respondents, 
get a wage or reward.  
The anonymity is ensured for both respondents and 
requesters, even though there is the possibility for both to 
communicate through an ID provided by Amazon. HITs are 
posted by requesters and there is the possibility to show them 
only to specific respondents who accomplish predefined criteria 
such as country of residence, certain level of completion rate, 
number of hits already approved and many more. Even though, 
the first three criteria are considered System Qualifications and 
are freely offered by amazon while any other more specific one, 
such as marital status, car owner, US political affiliation, 
household income and so on and so forth, are called Premium 
Qualifications and are significantly more expensive. On the other 
side, respondents can freely decide what task to execute. They 
can sort them according to some criteria such as size of the 
reward and the maximum time allotted for the completion of the 
task. In addition, brief descriptions of the task and relative 
previews are allowed for the respondents before accepting it.  
In general, tasks are quite simple and takes few minutes to 
complete them, even though usually requesters allocate even up 
to one or two hours so that respondents can do it partially and 
complete it later without feeling pressured by the time 
constraint. At the completion of the task, the requester can pay 
the respondent. There are many ways that amazon adopt to 
protect both sides of the labour market. In fact, if a respondent 
executes a good task then the requester can give him a bonus or, 
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differently, if the respondent executes the HIT with poor quality 
then the requester can refuse the payment or even block the 
respondent from completing future tasks. On the other side, if a 
requester does not give sufficient explanation regarding the 
rejection of a respondent, then the former can be filtered out by 
the respondent in order to avoid future exploitation. As far as 
the speed of recruiting is concerned, generally it does not take 
long, even though it also depends on the main characteristics of 
the HIT such as the payment (see Burhmester et al., 2011), the 
time constraint and so on and so forth. In our case, it took us less 
than three days, by recruiting only few hours each day during 
daylight, to collect slightly less than 400 respondents. Thanks to 
this, MTurk offers the possibility of running experiments that 
require interactions between respondents, such as the case of a 
game theory experimental designs or group decision-making. 
Mechanical Turk presents a set of advantages and 
disadvantages as well (see Mason and Suri, 2012). First of all, 
online experiments per se include a series of benefits which are 
widely explained in former work (see Reips, 2000, 2002).  Apart 
from those, MTurk seems to include also a series of unique 
advantages: (i) subject pool access, (ii) subject pool diversity and 
(iii) low cost. This means that, thanks to MTurk, there exist a 
significant amount of people that remains relatively stable over 
time (see Ipeirotis, 2010). This characteristic allow also the 
possibility of doing longitudinal studies by preserving people’s 
identity and anonymity simply through their amazon ID. 
Summing up, the main characteristic of MTurk is the availability 
of having access to a large, stable pool of people, coming from a 
very diverse background (see Eriksson & Simpson, 2010) and 
willing to participate in experiments for relatively low pay, in 
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comparison to other online recruitment methods (see Paolacci et 
al. 2010) or paid laboratory subjects.  
On the other side, MTurk presents some drawbacks as well, 
and one of them is the fact that the population of respondents is 
not representative, for the moment, of any one country or region. 
This is also due to the fact that Internet users differ 
systematically from non-Internet users. In fact, respondents seem 
to be younger, overeducated, underemployed, less religious and 
more liberal in comparison to the general population (see 
Berinsky, Huber, & Lenz, 2012; Paolacci et al., 2010; Shapiro, 
Chandler, & Mueller, 2013). Even though, in 2014 was reported 
that MTurk workforce is composed of more than 500,000 
individuals from approximately 190 countries. Besides, there are 
consistent demographic surveys that confirm the presence of 
mainly respondents with residence in the United States and 
India while less than a quarter of them reside in other countries 
(see Paolacci et al., 2010; Ross et al., 2010). Another aspect is the 
average payment to the repondents which is actually below the 
minimum federal hourly wage. This leads to questions about the 
reasons that drive people to accept and complete task. 
Surprisingly, respondents list both extrinsic and intrinsic reasons 
such as “to make basic ends meet” and “because tasks are fun”. 
Therefore, monetary award is not the only motivation (see 
Paolacci, Chandler, & Ipeirotis, 2010; Ross, Irani, Silberman, 
Zaldivar, & Tomlinson, 2010). 
Some doubts may arise when it comes to assure that the HITs 
are completed by different respondents. Likely, each respondent, 
as I already mentioned, has his or her own WorkerID and 
amazon prevent respondents by completing the same task twice 
by default. Even though, there is actually the possibility for a 
 191 
 
respondent to have double current MTurk account, therefore two 
different WorkerIDs. To protect requesters from this event, 
Amazon continuously works to identify and successively 
eliminate double accounts. The requesters can protect 
themselves from these respondents by restricting well paid HITs 
only to those who already have a high-quality ranking regarding 
the past completed tasks because it is supposed to be less likely 
for those respondents to take the risk of creating a second profile. 
Moreover, according to a study (see Berinsky et al., 2012), it was 
revealed that, by analysing IP addresses, only a very small 
fraction of respondents, approximately 2.5%, submit HITs from 
the same IP address. Even though, double IP addresses often 
means that respondents are separate members of the same 
household. In fact, another study (see Shapiro et al., 2013) did a 
specific research on this issue by tracking demographic 
responses and IP addresses across time points and found out 
that 2.8% of respondents used to share the same IP address with 
at least one other respondent. The positive side is that most of 
these individuals reported consistent demographic 
characteristics supporting the idea of distinct individuals inside 
the same household. This suggests that the number of 
respondents with double amazon accounts is lower than simply 
analysing the IP address51. 
After using MTurk, I can easily confirm the fact that this 
service is extremely efficient when it comes to link a new 
                                                          
51 In my sample of randomized online experiment, I have seven couples with 
the same IP account. I checked the answers and it is very likely that it is the 
case of respondents living in the same household. Most of the time it seems that 
they are couples living together and using the same computer to answer the 
survey.  
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hypothesis with testing it, analyse the results and update the 
theory. In fact, in the past, the recruiting process has always been 
very long in terms of timing and expensive too. Thanks to 
amazon and to its large pool of subjects online, I could overcome 
these two problems in less than three days with a very limited 
cost. Of course, I cannot claim that MTurk is the best methods to 
conduct behavioural research comparing to all the others but, if I 
consider all its characteristics, I can surely affirm that taken as a 
whole, MTurk can be very useful and fairly correct as a tool for 
many researchers. 
There are different ways of creating a HIT. One possibility is 
using the rudimentary in-house survey platform offered by 
MTurk, even though this is not very recommended because of its 
several constraints and its poor user-friendly presentation. 
Another solution is providing a link to an external site for 
respondents interested in your hit. This is my case and I used 
Limesurvey as external link.  
Limesurvey is software that gives you the possibility to 
quickly create intuitive powerful online question-and-answer 
surveys. The main advantages are being self-guiding for the 
respondents participating to the survey and a relatively low 
monthly cost comparing to other services. Limesurvey offers 
different options to customize my survey. In fact, I asked the 
software to record the IP address as well. Other options that I 
adopted were: a question by question format, compulsory 
answer to continue in the next section, a short welcome screen, 
show progress bar, allow backward navigation, show the 
number of questions present in the survey, set cookie to prevent 
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repeated participation, use of CAPTCHA52, responses were date 
stamped, responses had their IP address and their referring URL 
logged, timing was saved, anonymized responses, use HTML 
format for token emails and send confirmation emails. At the 
end of the survey I gave a code as well that respondents were 
supposed to put in amazon so that they could be paid by 24 
hours53. 
 
 
A.2 Robustness Checks remaining Tables with 
the addition of the Interaction Terms 
  
Here there are all the remaining tables regarding the addition of 
the interaction terms for all the rest of the questions in the online 
survey. Those tables show no significance in the interaction 
terms. 
                                                          
52 Described in detail in the next section. 
53 When presenting the task in amazon I wrote that in order to get the payment, 
they would have to finish the survey to obtain the code for the payment. 
Actually, I paid them anyway because I was relying also to the fact that all the 
questions were compulsory to proceed and I was trusting the fact that the 
people selected had a completion rate of 95%. That was the case. The total 
number of drops was almost irrelevant, 7 respondents out of 416, less than 
1.7%. 
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Table 10e. Comparison between the benchmark and the results 
of the treated with interaction terms 
 
Drinking perceived healthy product 
 
Benchmark Male Unempl. Married Child College 
Treated 0.421*** 0.376*** 0.418*** 0.444*** 0.429*** 0.445*** 
 
-0.045 -0.072 -0.046 -0.054 -0.053 -0.059 
Male -0.111** -0.151** -0.11** -0.112** -0.11** -0.111** 
 
(0.05) (0.07) (0.05) (0.05) (0.05) (0.05) 
Unemploy. -0.047 -0.04 -0.088 -0.042 -0.045 -0.045 
 
(0.092) (0.092) (0.131) (0.093) (0.093) (0.092) 
Married -0.096* -0.092 -0.096* -0.059 -0.097* -0.098* 
 
(0.058) (0.058) (0.057) (0.073) (0.058) (0.058) 
Child -0.019 -0.02 -0.019 -0.02 -0.013 -0.018 
 
(0.024) (0.024) (0.024) (0.024) (0.031) (0.024) 
College 0.069 0.07 0.069 0.068 0.07 0.097 
 
(0.045) (0.045) (0.045) (0.046) (0.045) (0.065) 
Inter. Term 
(treated*1,2,
3,4,5) 
 
0.075 0.065 -0.073 -0.011 -0.054 
 
 
(0.092) (0.184) (0.098) (0.04) (0.091) 
Constant 0.22 0.241* 0.224 0.216 0.216 0.216 
 
-0.137 -0.14 -0.138 -0.136 -0.137 -0.136 
Interaction 
term  
No Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes 
N 409 409 409 409 409 409 
Standard errors in parentheses. 
The level of significance is the following: 
***Significant at the 1 percent level; 
**Significant at the 5 percent level;  
*Significant at the 10 percent level. 
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Table 10f. Comparison between the benchmark and the results of 
the treated with interaction terms 
 
Govn't should be strict on sugar as with alcohol 
 
Benchmark Male Unempl. Married Child College 
Treated 0.116** 0.105 0.111** 0.136** 0.113** 0.111* 
 
-0.048 -0.077 -0.049 -0.058 -0.056 -0.066 
Male 0.003 -0.006 0.006 0.002 0.003 0.003 
 
(0.056) (0.076) (0.056) (0.056) (0.056) (0.056) 
Unemploy. 0.08 0.081 0.004 0.083 0.079 0.079 
 
(0.113) (0.114) (0.184) (0.114) (0.114) (0.114) 
Married 0.059 0.06 0.059 0.09 0.06 0.06 
 
(0.061) (0.061) (0.061) (0.081) (0.061) (0.061) 
Child 0.013 0.013 0.013 0.013 0.01 0.013 
 
(0.024) (0.024) (0.024) (0.024) (0.032) (0.024) 
College -0.09* -0.089* -0.09* -0.09* -0.09* -0.095 
 
(0.048) (0.048) (0.049) (0.049) (0.048) (0.068) 
Inter. Term  
(treated*1,2,3,4,5)  
0.019 0.121 -0.061 0.005 0.011 
 
 
(0.098) (0.234) (0.105) (0.039) (0.097) 
Constant -0.043 -0.038 -0.036 -0.047 -0.041 -0.042 
 
-0.147 -0.15 -0.147 -0.147 -0.148 -0.147 
Interaction term  No Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes 
N 409 409 409 409 409 409 
Standard errors in parentheses. 
The level of significance is the following: 
***Significant at the 1 percent level; 
**Significant at the 5 percent level; 
*Significant at the 10 percent level. 
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Table 10g. Comparison between the benchmark and the results 
of the treated with interaction terms 
 
 
Said would petition for tax on profits 
 
Benchmark Male 
Unemp
l. 
Married Child College 
Treated 0.066 0.087 0.066 0.065 0.082 -0.003 
 
-0.048 -0.076 -0.049 -0.059 -0.056 -0.065 
Male -0.022 -0.004 -0.022 -0.022 -0.02 -0.022 
 
(0.055) (0.077) (0.055) (0.055) (0.055) (0.054) 
Unemploy. -0.119 -0.123 -0.122 -0.119 -0.115 -0.126 
 
(0.122) (0.123) (0.179) (0.123) (0.124) (0.126) 
Married 0.021 0.02 0.021 0.02 0.019 0.028 
 
(0.061) (0.061) (0.061) (0.082) (0.061) (0.061) 
Child 0.015 0.015 0.015 0.015 0.027 0.012 
 
(0.023) (0.023) (0.023) (0.024) (0.031) (0.023) 
College 0.008 0.007 0.008 0.008 0.01 -0.071 
 
(0.048) (0.049) (0.049) (0.049) (0.049) (0.07) 
Inter. Term  
(treated*1,2, 
3,4,5) 
 
-0.034 0.004 0.002 -0.022 0.156 
 
 
(0.098) (0.245) (0.103) (0.038) (0.097) 
Constant 0.007 -0.002 0.008 0.008 -0.002 0.019 
 
-0.14 -0.143 -0.142 -0.14 -0.141 -0.141 
Interaction term  No Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes 
N 409 409 409 409 409 409 
Standard errors in parentheses. 
The level of significance is the following: 
***Significant at the 1 percent level; 
**Significant at the 5 percent level; 
*Significant at the 10 percent level. 
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Table 10h. Comparison between the benchmark and the results 
of the treated with interaction terms 
 
Actually signed the petition 
 
Benchmark Male Unempl. Married Child College 
Treated 0.116*** 0.089 0.118*** 0.109** 0.13*** 0.068 
 
-0.042 -0.063 -0.043 -0.05 -0.048 -0.055 
Male 0.073 0.049 0.072 0.073 0.075 0.073 
 
(0.046) (0.059) (0.046) (0.046) (0.046) (0.046) 
Unemploy. -0.093 -0.088 -0.068 -0.094 -0.089 -0.098 
 
(0.102) (0.103) (0.154) (0.103) (0.103) (0.106) 
Married 0.046 0.049 0.047 0.036 0.044 0.051 
 
(0.055) (0.055) (0.055) (0.068) (0.055) (0.055) 
Child 0.043* 0.042* 0.043* 0.043* 0.053* 0.041* 
 
(0.023) (0.023) (0.023) (0.023) (0.029) (0.023) 
College -0.015 -0.015 -0.015 -0.015 -0.013 -0.071 
 
(0.043) (0.043) (0.043) (0.043) (0.043) (0.057) 
Inter. Term 
(treated*1,2
,3,4,5) 
 
0.046 -0.039 0.02 -0.018 0.11 
 
 
(0.084) (0.206) (0.091) (0.036) (0.085) 
Constant -0.246** -0.233* -0.248** -0.245** -0.254** -0.237* 
 
-0.123 -0.125 -0.124 -0.123 -0.124 -0.122 
Interaction 
term  
No Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes 
N 409 409 409 409 409 409 
Standard errors in parentheses. 
The level of significance is the following: 
***Significant at the 1 percent level; 
**Significant at the 5 percent level; 
*Significant at the 10 percent level. 
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A.3 Randomized Online Survey 
Below, I list the set of questions present in the omnibus 
randomized survey. The only difference between the treated and 
the control group is that in the first one I have the information 
written in italic style while in the control, there are only the 
questions. Another little difference is the statement of the 
petition which has to be slightly different so that I could build 
two petitions with the same content but with a different 
formulation in the same website.  
The survey URL for the treated group is the following: 
http://emisilvi.limequery.com/915996?lang=en; 
while the survey URL for the control group is:  
http://emisilvi.limequery.com/137827?lang=en. 
 
OMNIBUS RANDOMIZED SURVEY 
 
1) What is your gender? 
Male    Female    
2) What is your age? Numeric number only 
 
3) What is your marital status? 
Single   Married Divorced Widowed/Widow 
4) How many children do you have? 
Numeric number only 
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5) How would you describe your ethnicity/race? 
European American/White  African American/Black 
Hispanic/Latino  Asian/Asian American Other 
6) Do you have U.S. citizenship?       Yes  No 
7) Which category best describes your highest level of education? 
Eight grade or less  4-year College Degree 
Some high school  Master’s Degree 
High school degree/GED Doctoral Degree  
Some college  Professional Degree (JD, MD, MBA) 
2-year college degree 
8) What is your current employment status? 
Full-time employee Unemployed and looking for work 
Part-time employee Student 
Self-employed or small business owner   
Not in labor force (i.e. retired, full-time parent, not looking  
for job anymore) 
 
9) What was your TOTAL household income, before taxes, last 
year (2016)?      
$0 - $9,999    $50,000 - $74,999 
$10,000 - $14,999   $75,000 - $99,999 
$15,000 - $19,999   $100,000 - $124,999 
$20,000 - $29,999   $125,000 - $149,999 
$30,000 - $39,999   $150,000 - 199,999 
$40,000 - $49,999   $200,000+ 
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10) Who did you support in the presidential election 2012? If you 
were not able to vote, just choose the person you wanted to win 
the election at that time. 
Barack Obama   Mitt Romney 
11) On economic policy matters, where do you see yourself on 
the liberal/conservative spectrum? 
Very conservative Conservative Moderate Liberal    
Very liberal 
12) Which party did you support in the last election in 
November 2016? 
Democratic Republican Other  None 
13) How much of the time do you think you can trust 
government in Washington to do what is right? 
1. Just about always 2. Most of the time  
3. Only some of the time  4. Hardly ever  
14) Where would you rate yourself on a scale of 1 to 5, where 1 
means you think the government should do only those things 
necessary to provide the most basic government functions, and 5 
means you think the government should take active steps in 
every area it can try and improve the lives of its citizens? 
1 2 3 4  5 
15) Do you have a specific disease or allergy? If so, mention 
which ones in the comment below: …  
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16) How much do you weigh (in lbs)? Numeric answer only. 
 
17) Do you read food and drink labelling when you buy one? 
Never  Rarely  Sometimes  Always 
18) How many smoothies, on average, do you drink per week? 
Numeric answer only. 
Question 19 
One calorie of sugar is not the same as one calorie of proteins because 
the body uses different amount of energy to process them. 
Added sugars are sugars and syrups put in foods during preparation or 
processing, or added at the table. The American Heart Association 
recommends no more than 9 teaspoons (tsp) of added sugar a day for 
men and 6 for women.  
One typical can of Coca-Cola of 12 fl. oz. contains approximately 9 tsp 
of sugar. 
One small glass of Jamba juice strawberry smoothie (real whole fruit 
and 100% juice) contains 17 tsp of sugar. A medium one has 23.5 tsp 
of sugar while a large glass has 31 tsp. If 31 tsp of sugar were taken 
from the original fruit instead of drinking them, then you would have 
to eat approximately: 4 peaches, 9 limes, 30 lemons and 30 
strawberries.  
 
Yes, it is clear 
Partially clear 
No, it is not clear (explain why in the comment below) 
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How healthy do you think it is to drink one large glass of Jamba 
juice strawberry smoothie made with real whole fruit and 100% 
juice? 
very unhealthy unhealthy  healthy very healthy  
Question 20 
In the field of food products, the bliss point is the amount of an 
ingredient contained in a food or drink, such as salt, sugar or fat which 
is able to maximize the pleasure of eating that specific food. When a 
company gets the bliss point right, then the product typically takes off. 
For example, the bliss point for Mountain Dew seems to be 
approximately 37 tsp of sugar (without considering the amount of other 
sweeteners such as high fructose corn syrup) in a bottle of 1.25 litres.  
Some food perceived as healthy contains the following amount of sugar: 
one bar of Nutri Grain apple cinnamon cereal contains 3 tsp of sugar 
(both naturally and added sugars); in one small glass (240 ml) of 
Tropicana 100% pure orange juice there are slightly more than 5 tsp of 
sugar; one small container (170g or 6oz) of Dannon plain no-fat yogurt 
has 3 tsp of sugar. 
Do you think that multinational food industry such as Coca-
Cola, McDonald’s, Nestlé, Kraft, Nabisco, General Mills, Procter 
& Gamble, Mars, Dannon, Tropicana and Kellogg’s put profits 
ahead of people’s health? 
Strongly agree        Agree       Disagree       Strongly disagree 
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Question 21 
FDA (or Food and Drug Administration) is a federal agency in the 
Department of Health and Human Services responsible for monitoring 
trading and safety standards in the food and drug industries54. 
FDA regulates the content of labelling for food products, such as their 
sugar content. 
There are two types of sugars in American diets: naturally occurring 
sugars (sugars found naturally in fruits and milk) and added sugars. 
Generally, the nutrition facts panel of a food does not distinguish 
between the two types therefore the word “sugar” includes both. 
Added sugar can be easily present in our daily diet because there are 
more than 50 different names to describe forms of sugar. 
 
Products that are labelled as sugar free can still contain artificial 
sweeteners. Moreover, since food manufacturers are not required to 
notify you on the front of the package when a product contains an 
artificial sweetener, consumers may need to check the ingredient list 
carefully55. 
According to FDA, a food can be labelled with the term “sugar free” or 
“no sugar” if the food contains less than 0.5 g of sugars per labelled 
serving. Moreover, they still can contain sugar alcohols, one type of 
reduced-calorie sweetener. It is good to keep in mind that the problem is 
not one serving but the amount of total serving eaten per day. 
The term “lightly sweetened” is not defined by FDA, it is freely used by 
food industries, each applying their own definition. 
 
                                                          
54 According to Collins English Dictionary, 12th Edition 2014. 
55 Information found in “The Sugar Association”. 
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Food label are misleading because they try to attract potential 
consumers and hide unhealthy ingredients without breaking the 
rules settled by FDA (Food and Drug Administration is a federal 
agency in the Department of Health and Human Services 
responsible for monitoring trading and safety standards in the 
food and drug industries): 
 
Strongly agree        Agree       Disagree   Strongly disagree 
 
Question 22 
Over the past 50 years, sugar consumption has tripled worldwide. 
Some of the diseases induced by sugar consumption are associated with 
metabolic syndrome such as: hypertension, high triglycerides and 
insulin resistance through synthesis of fat in the liver, diabetes, ageing 
process. Sucrose, commonly known as table sugar, is composed by 
glucose and fructose. Fructose exerts toxic effects on the liver which are 
akin to those of alcohol; in fact, alcohol comes from the fermentation of 
sugar. Moreover, the effect of sugar on the brain is that of encouraging 
subsequent intake because it does not suppress the feeling of being 
hungry.  
For all the above reasons, some doctors claim that added sweeteners has 
a clear potential for abuse therefore they should be controlled, like FDA 
does with alcohol, because the way sugar is eaten today make it toxic 
and it should be regulated. 
According to FDA, fructose is in the list of Generally Regarded as Safe 
(GRAS), which means that food manufacturers can add unlimited 
amounts of it to any food. It can be argued that also iron and vitamins 
A and D are in the GRAS list can be toxic if over-consumed but, unlike 
sugar, they have no abuse potential. 
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The government should intervene and behave towards sugar as 
strict as with the alcohol. 
 
Strongly agree   Agree   Disagree   Strongly disagree 
23) Up to how much, in percentage would you pay more to have 
a healthier product in terms of added sugar (think about food 
that you regularly eat in a daily or at most weekly basis)?  
Up to….% (give a percentage amount you would pay more on 
average) 
 
24) Would you agree with an eventual policy that can be taken 
by the government in which profits of industries producing high 
sugar soft drinks and food should be taxed by 10% (where high 
is the level where one serving of a product overcome half of the 
daily consumption of added sugar suggested by FDA)?  
Strongly agree        Agree       Disagree      Strongly disagree 
25) If you either agree or strongly agree with the policy related to 
the previous question, then would you also agree in using the 
money collected by the tax to be invested in elementary schools 
for free healthy food education lessons for children?  
Strongly agree   Agree   Disagree   Strongly disagree 
26) Would you sign a petition where you ask for a 10% tax on 
profits of industries producing food and soft drinks with high 
sugar level (where high is the level where one serving of a 
product overcome half of the daily consumption of added sugar 
suggested by FDA)?        Yes  No 
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The claim of the petition is the following (for the treated): 
We ask to the Government of United States of America to apply 
an additional tax of 10% on profits of industries who produce 
food and soft drinks with high added sugar level. For high sugar 
level we consider any food or soft drink in which one serving 
overcome half of the daily consumption of added sugar 
suggested by the Food and Drug Administration (3 teaspoons of 
added sugar is half of the daily consumption). 
The claim of the petition for the control group is: 
This petition wants to ask for the application of an additional tax 
on profits of 10% on industries producing food and soft drinks 
with high level of added sugar. We consider high level of added 
sugar all those products which contain at least three teaspoons of 
added sugar per serving. 
27) If yes, then go to the following link to sign the existing 
petition (for the treated): 
https://petitions.whitehouse.gov/petition/we-ask-additional-tax-
10-profits-industries-producing-food-and-soft-drinks-high-
added-sugar-level 
The link for the control group is the following: 
https://petitions.whitehouse.gov/petition/apply-additional-tax-
profits-10-industries-producing-foodsoft-drinks-high-level-
added-sugar 
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28) Did you actually go to the website and signed the petition?  
Yes   No 
29) Do you feel that this survey was biased? 
Yes, left-wing biased 
Yes, right-wing biased 
No, it did not feel biased  
 
30) Please feel free to give us any feedback or impression 
regarding this survey. 
………………………………………. 
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Appendix B  
 
Appendix for Chapter 4 
B.1 Dataset Description  
Both dependent and covariates can be found in the WIOD 
dataset in two different sections: world input-output tables and 
socio-economic account section. All the variables taken in 
consideration are in log, with the exception of time trend56. 
WIOD dataset shows all the values in current prices and in 
millions of US dollars while the data taken from the 
socioeconomic section are at current basic prices in millions of 
national currencies. Some data are present in both section with 
the difference that in one section they are expressed in US dollars 
while, in the other one, the data are in national currency. 
Moreover, some data can be found in both sections but they have 
different currency. This is also the main reason why WIOD give 
data about the exchange rate as well. Besides, the data we are 
using are turned from current to constant value where 1995 is 
our base year. The price levels are again given by WIOD in the 
socio-economic section.  
Another important note is the fact that we multiply all the 
variables, with the exception of the one identifying time trend, 
                                                          
56 Further it will be clearer why the log of the time trend does not make any 
economic sense. 
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for one million before applying the logarithm. The reason that 
drives this decision is that of avoiding to get a value equal or 
smaller than 1, which is actually the case for many data. 
 
  = real value of gross output. Real value of gross output is 
calculated by multiplying gross output and exchange rate over 
price level of gross output57. The subscripts, c, k and t, identify 
respectively the country, the sector and the time. The dependent 
variable is calculated by taking the value from the socio-
economic section and after the multiplication and division, it 
coincides with the value of the WIOD input-output tables; 
 
  = factors of production; the superscripts, i and j, identifies 
respectively the different covariates. The covariates we are 
considering are: capital, labor and intermediate goods; 
 
Capital = capital is one of the independent variables which can be 
found in the socioeconomic section of WIOD and it is 
represented by the real fixed capital stock where the base year is 
again 1995. Since its value is in national currency, we had to 
multiply it by the exchange rate; 
 
Labor = labor covariate is represented by the total hours worked 
by three different skilled-workers: high, medium and low–
skilled workers. This means that we have three different 
variables that explain labor, or in other words, three different 
variables that analyze deeply the fragmentation of skilled 
workers in the labor market. In the socioeconomic section we 
                                                          
57 Recall that the base year is always 1995=100 
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have the share in total hours of the different skilled workers and 
the total hours worked by persons engaged for each of them in 
millions so by multiplying the two, we get three different 
covariates representing labor; 
 
Domestic Inputs= this is one of the intermediate goods. Those 
data correspond to all the area that matches all the industries of 
the same country of the WIOD dataset. More precisely, if you 
look at the intercountry input output table of each year, the 
values inside the dataset represents the inputs that a specific 
country and a specific industry produces for that precise year 
and whose inputs are used by the other home or foreign 
industries. This is actually the definition of intermediate good. In 
the case of domestic inputs, we have that the inputs of one 
industry of a country A are used by any other industry of the 
same country. In other words, domestic inputs are all the values 
regarding trade among industries inside their own country; 
 
Foreign inputs = this is the second covariate identifying foreign 
inputs. In this case, the inputs of one industry of a country A are 
used by any other industry of a foreign country. Therefore, 
foreign inputs are all the values regarding trade among 
industries in different countries.  
 
Domestic and foreign inputs are shown in millions of US 
dollars in nominal prices therefore we multiply them by one 
million and divide them by the price levels of intermediate 
goods, as given in the socio-economic section. 
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  = time trend adopted for the identification of technical 
change; 
 
  = error term;   
 
According to the equation describing the translog function, 
apart from the covariates we have a set of interaction terms 
among all the single independent variables and a set of square 
terms of each of the listed covariates. 
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